The so-called Euro crisis has revealed that the asymmetric structure of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is flawed with respect to the ability to absorb macroeconomic shocks. Taking a holistic approach, this thesis first assesses the European Central Banks asset purchase programme launched in 2015 (known as quantitative easing), which, according to some voices in literature, has been employed to counteract symmetric shocks affecting Member States equally. However, from a legal point of view no such intention (hence economic policy objective) and no alleged incompatibility with the Treaties can be identified. Considering this, also the recent preliminary reference by the German Constitutional Court has to be rejected. Next, this thesis turns to the new framework for private and public risk sharing, mitigating the impact of (asymmetric) shocks, as envisaged in the Five Presidents' Report on Completing the EMU. Private sector risk sharing comprises various initiatives towards a Banking and a Capital Markets Union. Public risk sharing revolves around the establishment of a Fiscal Union aimed at a macroeconomic stabilisation function. Starting with the Banking Union, substantive and institutional instruments, such as bail-in, the Single Resolution Mechanism and the planned European Deposit Insurance Scheme, are examined. One point of criticism is the institutional setting in light of the Meroni doctrine. Subsequently, the substance and the difficulties of the first measures for the Capital Markets Union the (proposed) legislative acts for securitisation, prospectus as well as venture capital and social entrepreneurship funds are highlighted. The new regime indicates deeper integrated capital markets (and presumably stronger risk sharing), but could also bring up new risks, eg linked to supervision/supervisory convergence. The focus then shifts to the analysis of the stabilisation function in the Fiscal Union. Three key legal issues arise in the context of its potential design. Firstly, only Art 175(3) and Art 352(1) TFEU could be considered as possible legal bases. Secondly, as regards Art 352 TFEU, Art 125(1) TFEU would entail conditions to prompt Member States to maintain sound fiscal policies. Thirdly, subject to certain requirements, the financing of the function could be designed within and/or outside of the EU budget. The thesis concludes that any further development of the EMU should go hand in hand with strengthening democratic legitimacy and accountability.