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### **A study of the influence of custom on the moral judgment**

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Chapter IV - Immediacy and authority among the students of agriculture

## CHAPTER IV

IMMEDIACY AND AUTHORITY AMONG THE STUDENTS  
OF AGRICULTURE

We now turn to an examination of the influence of authority upon a class of young men, who, however great their native endowment may be, have not enjoyed the privileges and gained the power that come from education, whose range of vision has not been broadened by training or variety of experience, whose ability to introspect and generalize has never been developed, whose power of expression is rudimentary and who, through these and other causes are less in touch than almost any other portion of the community with the movements of contemporary life.

The Short Course in Agriculture in the University of Wisconsin consists of two terms of fourteen weeks each, running from December into March. The time is devoted to the most concrete and immediately practical phases of farming that are capable of supplying material for instruction. The students are, for the most part, from Wisconsin farms. There are no entrance requirements of any kind, the fees, for residents of the state, are nominal. As a result poor and rich, stupid and clever, uneducated and educated are to be found among them, the uneducated greatly predominating.

The study of these students was begun early in January, 1907. In order to exclude as far as possible all influences that might be due to connection with the University, the inquiry was confined to the first year class. But the questions were not given them until they had been here long enough to wear off some of their first timidity and self-consciousness. The class numbered slightly more than two hundred. From this fifty were obtained for careful study by the following process of exclusion. In the first place, acting upon a suggestion of one of their teachers, I

divided the questions into two parts, giving out half of the ten that formed the total on a Monday, and the remainder three days later. Out of two hundred and eleven possible replies I received one hundred and nineteen, seventy-eight being full sets and forty-one half sets. This does not indicate that the forty-one who got but half way found the rest of the road impassable. These students are required to work very hard and their leisure accordingly is small; many undoubtedly were therefore unable to give me the time, others presumably thought they had done for me all I had a right to ask, still others, it may be assumed, had lost interest in the subject. The seventy-eight who answered the full quota of ten questions were reduced to fifty-five by omitting: (1) All those who had had anything more in the way of education than two years at a high school; (2) those from outside the state; (3) those from cities, towns, or even villages of any size. The remainder were to supply the subject matter of my study. My object was of course to confine my inquiry as far as possible to the lower levels of attainment and experience. The great majority had had no education beyond that provided by the country elementary school, many had not even completed the eighth grade. Almost all of them, I soon discovered, would have to be interviewed because of the extreme indefiniteness of their written answers, the frequency with which they misunderstood my questions, and the almost total absence from the paper of assigned reasons. Of those who were invited to meet me, five failed to appear. Their reasons, as far as I learned them, had nothing to do with their attitude towards the questions or their ability or inability to solve them or to find reasons. With these five out, the material for investigation numbered just fifty persons.

The ages of these students may be of some interest as throwing a little light upon their maturity and the amount of their experience. The admirable records kept at the office of the Agricultural College made it very easy to get this and similar information. Three of the young men who belonged to this group of fifty were sixteen years of age, three were thirty, thirty-two, and about forty respectively. None of these, I may say in parenthesis, exhibited anything out of the common in their answers. The remainder of the group ranged from eighteen to twenty-

seven years, the overwhelming majority being about evenly distributed through the four years beginning with the nineteenth.

The problems upon which the study of immediacy was based were in principle the same as those given to the members of the College of Letters and Science for the same purpose. It seemed wise, however, to modify somewhat the wording of the questions, for which reason they are here repeated. As will be observed, two of them are much simplified. The others are practically identical with their predecessors. Together with the material additions made in the interviews, they will be found just below.

It proved to be desirable and even necessary to make a regular practice of employing in the interviews questions supplementary to the basal ones that appeared in the printed paper. These questions are divisible into three groups. All had been used more or less among the "Hill" students and are accordingly already familiar to the reader. The first group consisted of additional casuistry questions, dealing with the same general problem as one of the fundamental ones, but involving in each case the interests of a different set of parties. The second, used where a considerable number of rigoristic answers appeared for which the student was unable to assign a reason, consisted simply in an inquiry as to whether one or another possible eudæmonistic reason for the observance of general rules had actually been in the mind when the judgment was formed and had determined the decision. The third, designed to elicit the exact nature of the attitude towards the precepts of the Bible, dealt with a problem similar to that suggested by the Prometheus myth, as described in Chapter II.<sup>1</sup>

The supplementary casuistry questions, as has just been said, were planned so as to discover whether and in what way the attitude of the student would change in response to variations in the nature and amount of the interests affected. The following formulae exhibit the various situations with which the questions deal. A stands for the agent; Y and Z stand for other parties whose interests are affected by the act. The symbol > is of course to be read "is greater than." Zero is here to be un-

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<sup>1</sup> See page 53 above.



derstood as representing not actual nothingness, but a quantity so small that it is treated by the respondent as negligible. The number of combinations represented in these questions is seven.

1. Z's good > Z's harm.
2. A's good > Z's harm.
3. A's good > Z's harm (=0).
4. Y's good > Z's harm.
5. Y's good > Z's harm (=0).
6.  $Y_1$ 's +  $Y_2$ 's + ... good > Z's harm.
7.  $Y_1$ 's +  $Y_2$ 's + ... good > Z's harm (=0).

The questions used in the investigation follow. The numbering of the basal questions is that of Chapter II, the number in brackets shows its place in the paper which was put into the hands of the Agricultural students.

I [I] In a Russian city last year a poor man who could get no work took from a baker's shop without the knowledge of the owner several loaves of bread in order to save from starvation the young children of a sick widow who was his neighbor. He was unable to get the food in any other way. Did he do wrong?

In the interview it was explained, wherever necessary, that a Russian workingman in 1905 might easily become absolutely penniless through inability to get work due to no fault of his own. It is assumed that the people are Jews and that this fact, if no other, makes it impossible for them to get help from either the city authorities or the citizens, including the baker himself. Their fellow Jews, if there were any in the city, are supposed to have scattered, so that no one is left to whom they might turn.

1. The Chinese government having announced that it would prohibit the general sale of opium after a certain date, a Chinese who had contracted the opium habit lays in a store of the drug sufficient to last for many years. It would still be possible for him to break off the habit by a mighty effort without endangering his life, so that he can not receive the benefit of that portion of the law which permits the sale to those who can not live without it. As soon as the law has gone into effect, friends who have been trying for some time to induce him to break off the habit secretly enter his house, seize his entire supply of the drug and destroy it. It is assumed that conditions are thereby created

which will actually lead to his reformation and that nothing else would. Did they do right?

2. The basal question modified so that the poor man steals to save himself from starvation and does it persistently so as to cause an appreciable though not necessarily great loss to the baker.

3a. The basal question modified so that the poor man steals for himself a single loaf of bread from a large store owned by a very well-to-do man.

3b. An unmarried Englishwoman who had lived in the family of Mr. X in New York for many years died, bequeathing all her property to a wealthy sister in England. Mr. X, as executor, attended, among other matters, to the sending of the personal effects of the deceased to the English sister. Six months later a half-worn pair of shoes which had belonged to her were discovered. Mrs. X wished to send them to the Salvation Army to be given to some poor person, but Mr. X objected that the shoes were not theirs to give away. He accordingly had them packed up for shipment to England. But now it appeared that the exact address of the sister (whom they had never known) was lost, and as she had in the meantime moved to another city, some time and trouble were expended before the shoes could be sent. This was the more serious because Mr. X was at the head of a very large business which left him little leisure. Was he morally bound to send the shoes?

3c. The same as 3b except that the scene is laid in a small but prosperous town. The shoes if not sent to England will be thrown away, as the town contains no poor to whom they could be given.

4a. The basal question; the baker, however, is here supposed to be rather poor, and the only one in town so that the bread must be taken from him or not at all.

4b. As 4a except that, work being absolutely unobtainable, the thefts continue through several months.

4c. A shop girl just able to support herself steals a necklace from a jewelry store in order that her mother who is stricken with consumption may save her life by going to Colorado as directed by the physician. The money can be obtained in no other way, and the life of the mother depends upon the possi-

bility of getting into another climate. Did the daughter do wrong?

5. The basal question with the additional statement that the baker is well-to-do and carries on a big business. [All reference to this point is omitted in the basal question itself.]

6. The physicians' code demands that they publish their medical discoveries freely to the world. This was done, among others, by the discoverer of the antitoxin for diphtheria. But suppose that he had determined to use it as a gold mine; obtain a patent, charge "all the traffic would bear" and let the profits pile up. Then suppose an assistant aware of these intentions and indignant at them, before the patent is applied for gets possession of the recipe and gives it out to the public. Would the assistant have done wrong?

7. As 6, with the additional statement that the discoverer is already very rich and is simply preparing to pile one fortune upon another.

II [VII] A man who had devoted his life to building up a very successful grain elevator business had an only son whom he wished to continue the business after his death. The young man himself was very anxious to go into stock raising, but at the earnest request of his father he promised to give up his life to the business. Soon afterwards the father died. The young man stuck to his promise at first, but although successful in the business, he hated it more and more. So after about two years he sold out and went into stock raising. Was this right? He had no reason to suppose that his father would have released him from his promise, if living.

1. Some sixty or seventy years ago in Wisconsin, in a part of the state where there were no telegraphs, railroads, or regular mails, a man, living in a small town was very sick. His son, ten miles away on a farm and separated from his father by almost impassable roads, is also very sick. On the daughter-in-law being compelled to come into town one day the father said: You need not attempt to let me know every day or even regularly about the condition of my son if you will only promise to inform me in case he grows decidedly worse. The promise is made. The son grows very much worse indeed (or he may be at the point of death). But it is practically certain that the

news will (a) cause the death of the father, or (b) cause a very serious and dangerous relapse. What is it the duty of the daughter-in-law to do?

2. The basal question with the omission of the statement that the father died. The son begs for a release from his promise, but is refused.

3. A man who has just returned from a residence of many years in India promises his nephews—he has no children of his own—to leave them his fine collection of Indian curios. On making a visit to these nephews, however, he discovers that they care nothing for the curios he has already given them. The young men are already grown so he does not expect any change in their taste to occur. So on his return home he changes his will and leaves the curios to his town library. Was this right?

4. A is the one man in a New England village who is at once wealthy and generous with his money. Y is a man in the same village who though industrious and honest has, through lack of business ability, never succeeded in anything he has undertaken. As a result he and his large family are in want of the necessities a good deal of the time. Y has borrowed money from A several times to help him in his attempts to start a business, but never having been successful, he has not been able to repay it. After one of these failures A's wife, whom we shall call Z, a lady who is as "close" as her husband is generous, extracts from the latter a promise never to loan Y any money again. Some time after this Y comes to A once more to borrow from him. This time by providing a little capital he has an opportunity to go into partnership with a man who will supplement his defects and the two together may be expected to succeed finely. This, accordingly, seems a really good opening. Y moreover can borrow from no other source. May A break his promise? His doing so, it should be said, is not likely to endanger the peace of the family for his wife is too much accustomed to bow to the will of her husband to make trouble.

5. A farmer promises to take his wife to town, a dozen miles distant, on a certain day. She is at the head of a large household and has inefficient help so that she has to plan a week in advance in order to be able to get away and at the same time have things run smoothly at home during her absence. Just as

they are about to start, a call for help comes from the adjoining farm, where the barn is on fire. Our farmer is the only near neighbor and is needed to help save the movables, and if possible the barn itself. His wife, however, objects to his going, reminding him of his promise to her and how she always has to plan to get a free day and insisting that under the circumstances their neighbors be allowed to look out for themselves. What ought the farmer to do?

III [II] Is it right to tell children that there is a Santa Claus?

1. A sick man demands information about the condition of his son who is also very sick, in another part of the town. The truth is likely (a) to kill him or (b) to produce a painful and dangerous relapse. Would it be right for them to give an answer which is not true?

3. A is engaged to the daughter of a wealthy man who objects to the match solely because A is poor. The daughter believes she can win her father's consent in a few months if only the affair can be kept secret in the meantime. Otherwise there will be trouble, as the father is hot-headed and "pig-headed," too. Z is an acquaintance of A who, without being in the least ill-intentioned, is one of those incessant talkers who can no more keep a secret, even if bound by the most solemn of promises, than a sieve can hold water. One day by mere accident Z asks A a question of no importance to himself but one which, if answered truthfully, or if an answer is refused, will reveal the engagement. A knows Z's reputation. What ought he to do?

5. [From an old work on casuistry.] "A malicious Saracen had secretly defiled one of the mosques which the Turks have in Jerusalem. The fact was imputed to the Christians (as the Saracen wished it should be), who, denying it, but having no credit with their enemies, were all presently dragged to the place of execution. Thereupon one of their number, a young man, declared he did it, in order to save the others. He was put to death by the Turks with exquisite torture." Was he justified in telling the falsehood?

IV [V] A University student hired a room, agreeing to keep it for a year. After four weeks, when there was no longer any chance of renting it to anyone else, he left and went to another house because he there got a room rent free for taking care of

the furnace. The student was working his way through the University and needed to save every dollar he could. The house he left belonged to a poor widow with a young child whose principal means of support was renting rooms. Was it right for him to leave? Suppose the owner of the house he left, instead of being poor, had been comfortably situated so that the room rent would not have been greatly missed, would it have been right for him to leave? Oral additions: No one would rent a room to any student in September who would not agree to stay the entire year. The financial situation was as follows. The student's room rent at the first house was \$40 for the school year and this [under certain conditions that were specified] represented a net loss to the landlady of practically the entire amount. The student could probably raise this extra money by doing odd jobs at 20 cents an hour; but he must spend time looking for them (in the absence of the now-existing employment bureau), and in going and coming, which in Madison may be a serious factor, whereas the care of the furnace will require almost no expenditure of time. He has to earn a good deal of money in doing odd jobs, anyway, for he has little to spend that he does not himself earn.

V [VIII] Is it right for a physician, by giving an overdose of morphine, or otherwise, to hasten by several weeks the death of a patient hopelessly sick with cancer and suffering terrible torture all the time, when he knows that the patient is in every respect prepared to die and will be glad to die?

The eudaemonistic reasons for the observance of general rules were as follows:<sup>3</sup>

1. The effects of one's example upon others, the reasons for which the agent permits himself to break the rule being either not known or not understood by others.
2. The danger of starting a habit of breaking the rule. The infraction might be innocent in itself, but, as a result, a reason not quite so good is liable to serve as an excuse for breaking the rule a second time, and so on.
3. The agent will lose the confidence of others. They will believe they can not depend upon him.

<sup>3</sup> See above, page 64.

4. The act will tend to cause others to lose their confidence in their fellow-men as such.

5. If everybody acted in that way, property, confidence in the word of others, *et cetera*, would be undermined; the life of society would thus become impossible.

6. If you once admit a single exception to a general rule, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to determine where to draw the line.

The question designed to determine the exact nature of the attitude towards the commands of God was based upon the story of the sacrifice of Isaac. After relating the story, as told in Genesis xxii: 1-13, the following explanation was added. We must remember that Abraham, when this command came to him, and indeed to the very end of his life, had no such knowledge of God as we have been given through the Christian revelation. He left his home in the Chaldean city to worship our God knowing only that Jehovah was the true God, but knowing at first little else about Him. And it was only gradually that he could become at all acquainted with His character. Now the gods of his own country whom he had been trained to believe in all through his childhood and youth were supposed to delight in human suffering and to demand the sacrifice of human beings. It would not be strange, then, if, when he heard the command to sacrifice Isaac upon the altar he had believed that God was demanding this simply for the pleasure of seeing him (Abraham) suffer. If Abraham had looked at the matter in that way, would it have been his duty to obey the command?

The students whose moral judgments we are now about to examine may be divided into three groups according to the nature of their answers.

GROUP I. As among the "Hill" students Group I consists of those who give three or more demonstrably eudaemonistic answers to the basal questions. The criteria used for determining what is "demonstrably eudaemonistic" are those employed in Chapter II and described above, page 27. The only exception to the rule that answers counted for admission into this group must be answers to a basal question is in I. This is always

counted as eudaemonistic whether the reference to welfare as a standard appears in the answer to the basal question itself or in the answer to some one of the supplementary questions dealing with the theft of bread in the Russian city.

Of the papers received in reply to the printed questions only four contained a sufficient number of eudaemonistic answers to entitle them to a place in this group. As might be expected, reasons were assigned in the written replies far less frequently by the members of this Course than by the "Hill" students. The great majority of Group I owe their place in it, accordingly, to the use of the interview. The total number of students belonging to it is thirty-one, or nearly two-thirds of all those examined.

The eudaemonistic answers are quite similar to those which we have made the acquaintance of in Chapter II. The answers to the supplementary questions conform to the same types. It might therefore seem possible to pass to other groups without farther description. I shall, however, deal with these responses in detail, and that for several reasons. In the first place, while the presence of demonstrably eudaemonistic judgments in at least three out of five possible cases may well create a presumption that the remainder belong in the same category, where after careful scrutiny no positive evidence to the contrary can be discovered, the evidence for the use of the eudaemonistic standard is far more complete than that. In the great majority of this group such evidence appears, in one form or another, in every one of the five classes of problems with which they had to deal. To show this it will be necessary to present certain sets of replies in their completeness. In the second place, this mode of procedure will enable us to test the validity of some objections that may be urged against the methods employed with the "Hill" students, in particular the objection that the homage shown by them to the eudaemonistic standard was a matter of mere lip service, the real springs of their decisions lying deeper. For these reasons I have selected for complete presentation ten sets of replies from Group I, chosen at random. That is to say, I have taken the first ten members of this group in alphabetical order, omitting two who on account of the presence of three and four eudaemonistic written answers respectively were not interviewed. The responses of these young men are typical for the en-



tire group in matters of principle, and not even a great deal in the way of significant details would have been added if the remaining twenty-one had been placed before the reader with equal completeness.

A few words of explanation will be needed in order to understand the following presentation. Written and oral answers to the basal questions are distinguished thus: WRITTEN; ORAL. Where the written answer does not appear that does not mean that none was attempted. It means merely that the corresponding question was misunderstood. The exact statements of the students, written or oral, are in quotation marks. My formulation of their statements is given in ordinary Roman print. This will sometimes be found among the written questions as well as the oral, as a device for saving space. For some of the men persist in incorporating the question into the answer, or performing some other equally unnecessary evolution before coming to the point. Statements made or questions asked by me during the interviews are in italics. My own comments, explanations, etc., are in square brackets. All answers were given without suggestion from me (unless it be a "suggestion" to inquire Why?) except as it appears from this record that the contrary was the case. With a few insignificant exceptions the discussion of the five basal questions, with that of the supplementary questions belonging to them, is given in its entirety. So that where reasons do not appear they were not demanded. Where the answer itself was not worth the space required to quote it, the nature of the decision is indicated by the letter L, where it was latitudinarian, and R, where rigoristic. In reporting the written returns I have changed only spelling, punctuation, and capitalization, and also, in two or three places, the grammar. The order of presentation is that of the order of discussion in the interview. At the close of each report will be found a list of the answers that are counted as eudaemonistic.

201. I. WRITTEN: "I should say this was wrong from the man. In the first place he stole the bread. And second, if God intended to save the widow and her children, it would be done without a man stealing food for them."

III. WRITTEN: "I should think this is right because the Santa Claus may be compared with Christ. If the story of Christ be

told them, and the good He brings them, they would not understand it, and would not feel so happy during Christmas time as they do this way."

IV. WRITTEN: "A person must not break his promise. He left this widow in great fear of starvation, which he could never pay with all the dollars he saved during the year. Had the owner of the house been better situated it would be wrong too."

II. WRITTEN: "I think it was all right that the young man left the business. Because doing work in which a person is not interested is a pretty hard thing and it doesn't make life a pleasure."

I retold the story modifying it so as to lay much stress upon the fact that the father had always done a great deal for the happiness of the boy. He said the boy should have kept his promise. *Why have you changed your answer from that of the paper?* "I did not understand it as you told it that his father was so good to him." *But I think his father was selfish to get him to make such a promise.* He agreed and the answer was thereupon changed to, The boy did right. "His father is dead, and it will do him [the father] no good, and would not do any one else any good if he stayed. So he may go." *What is the difference between IV and II?* In the first the people might hear of it and would not trust him and he might lose a great deal. In the second they might not hear of it, or if they did they might say he did right.

V. WRITTEN: Wrong. ORAL: "God has sent this suffering upon him and we ought not to stop it." I told the story of the sacrifice of Isaac, as above p 71. Abraham need not have obeyed. *Suppose God is merely delighting Himself with the sight of this man's suffering?* Then the doctor might have stopped it with the poison. *Why did God send this suffering?* We must believe because the man deserved it.

[III, IV, and II are here classified as (demonstrably) "eudaemonistic;" IV, partly because of the written answer, and partly because of the ground adduced for the difference between the answers to IV and II. A number of instances from other papers show that what are given out as two reasons for I may be different formulations of exactly the same idea.]

202. I. WRITTEN: "Stealing is wrong. But in that case the baker could stand the loss. For the bread was taken in a good cause, for it was taken to save a poor woman from starvation. I do not like stealing. But to save people from starvation, it is a different thing." 4 a and 5: It would not make any difference whether the baker was rich or poor, seeing it was saving them from starvation.

III. WRITTEN: "Yes, I think it is right to give the young children something to think about. But when they are older I think they should be told the truth." ORAL: *Why is this right?* "It gives them pleasure to expect Santa Claus and to think their presents come from him." *What do you suppose those members of your class who take the other side have to say against it?* He could think of nothing they could say except that it was not the truth.

IV. WRITTEN: "If a man has made an honest agreement he should stick to it through thick and thin. Even [if] he made a losing agreement he ought to have stayed until his time was [out]. In the second I think it was all right." ORAL: The reason assigned for the answer to the second part was that of II 5 below [By exception the discussion of II preceded that of IV in this interview]. "To be sure," he added, "if I was keeping a boarding-house I would not want people to leave like that. But I guess it would be all right this time."

II. WRITTEN: "I think the young man ought to stick to his promise, especially as it was a death-bed promise. Of course it would be hard to stick to a business you did not like but a death-bed promise is sacred." He had partially misunderstood the question given him, so I asked: *If the father had not been on his death-bed, but had fallen sick and died some little time after obtaining the promise, would the son have done wrong in breaking it?* "Not quite so wrong; still it would have been wrong." 2: "In that case he may break his promise. The sacredness of the promise is due to the fact that the father is dead." 1 a and b: L. 3: L. He should put the curios into such hands that they would do some good, not into the hands of those who cared nothing for them. 4 he found difficult till I eliminated the factor of family discord [which I never did except as I suspected it was causing perplexity]. Then L, if it was to do the

poor man so great a service. *What is to be said on the other side?* "A man ought to keep his promises, and he ought to respect his wife's feelings." 5: L. *How would you defend your answer against some of the boys who have taken the other side?* "It was a great deal more to the neighbor to have the man's help in saving his cattle and other things than it was to the wife to go to town just that day."

V. WRITTEN: "Yes, since the patient is willing and when his life is doomed anyway and he suffers torture every day he lives." Reasons for loyalty to general rules: 1, 2, and 6 he had not thought of in preparing his paper. 3 was familiar. He had thought of it in answering I, but in spite of that believed that the theft was justified under the conditions. As to the authority of the Bible, he believes it to be the word of God and "mostly infallible." But he has recently been learning some heresies in a Bible class, which, however, seem to refer to the historical and scientific statements. *How do you reconcile your answer to I with the Eighth Commandment?* "It would only be right under such circumstances as this. Perhaps there are no other exceptions." *How about V and the Sixth Commandment?* "It would only be right if the man was willing to die. Even if it shortened his life by only a day, if the sick man was not willing, it would not be right."

[I, III, and V are classified as "eudaemonistic." IV is not here counted as "eudaemonistic" because the reason is assigned, not indeed in response to a leading question, but as an application of a previous answer to a supplementary question. The answer in I "Stealing is wrong" constantly appears where the writer means "Stealing is usually wrong." This is clearly its meaning here.]

203. I. WRITTEN: "No, not if the baker was a man who could have given something to help the poor and was too stingy to do so." 2, 3a, 4a, 4b, 5: L. if it can be done without too serious a loss to the baker. It would make a great deal of difference whether he was under obligation to the woman [he continued without suggestion from me], as because of some favor she might have done him. Then he might go to almost any length to get the bread. *How far may he go otherwise?* If the baker is

wealthy he may go ahead as far as necessary for "he could do it without affecting the baker's surplus," for "the richer baker could afford the loss better, and besides might be [*i. e.*, apparently would be likely to be] mean spirited." But if the baker does a very small business he must not take the bread [except under the conditions mentioned above] from the same shop more than two or three times, even to save his own life; but he might go from one baker to another and thus keep himself alive for some time. 1: L. Because the opium was doing him an injury. 3b: L. "The sister would have thrown the shoes into a trunk and they would never have done any one any good." 3c: R. He was supposed to have sent to England the things that belonged to the dead woman, and he should have done so. 6: [The story revised as it was for a few students to bring out the fact that even if the assistant gave the recipe to the world the reputation which the discovery would bring the doctor would bring in a cash return in the form of a larger practice so as to recompense him handsomely for the labor of the discovery.] L. If the assistant knew he was planning to ask a price that would give more than a fair return on the cost of the article, *i. e.*, more than 10-20 per cent. in the way of profits, he was really stealing, "just as the telephone companies are stealing from the farmers who need the money more than they do."

III. WRITTEN: "Yes. If it is going to make the child any better a man without his losing his confidence in you when he grows up."

IV. WRITTEN: "I think it was right to leave as he needed every dollar he could save" [last eight words in italics]. ORAL: He might also leave in each case if he was lonely [see the question as given to the "Hill" students]. He says frankly that he himself would leave in each of the four cases.

II. WRITTEN: "I think that as long as he was successful in grain business remain." *Why this difference between IV and II?* In II the promise is made to a member of his family; also his father is dead. If living, the son would be at liberty to break it.

V. ORAL: "Yes, if they asked the patient and he wished it."  
[I, III and V are classified as eudaemonistic.]

205. I. WRITTEN: L. 3a, 4a, 5: L and eudaemonistic. 1: L. If he did not know enough to stop the habit himself his friends had the right to do it for him. *Because it was for his interest?* "Yes." 3b: L and eudaemonistic. 6: If the doctor was going to put up the price to the point where many could not obtain it, the assistant did right. Otherwise it would be treachery to the interests of his employer.

III. WRITTEN: Wrong "because it is lying to them and may cause them to lie when they get older." ORAL: *Many of your classmates think it does not teach children to lie; if so, would it be right?* "Yes." *Why?* He could not assign a reason. *Your father and mother thought it innocent* [he had just told me his parents taught him to believe in the myth]; *why did they think so?* "Because it would make us enjoy Christmas more." *Was this a good reason?* "Yes." Further conversation made it perfectly clear, if that was necessary after the preceding, that he believed if the bad effect mentioned could be eliminated the lie would be entirely innocent.

IV. WRITTEN: "If he took the room for the year I think it would be his duty to stay providing the lady was very poor; but if comfortably situated I think it would be all right for him to leave." ORAL: *Why must he stay in the first case but not in the second?* Because the money was very much needed by the landlady in the first and was not in the other. *Where would you draw the line?* Where the rent would go for necessities he must stay, for luxuries, he may go.

II. WRITTEN: R. 1a: If the son died they must tell the father because if they did not he would be very angry. If the son merely grew worse, they need not tell the father, because afterwards when he discovered that the promise had not been kept he would not care. 3: R. 4: L. The difference between this and II is that in this he benefits some one other than himself.

V. ORAL: L. *Why?* "He has got to die anyway, and it saves him all that suffering."

[III, IV, V classified as eudaemonistic. Note that in III he declared himself unable to assign a reason, and in the next moment gave a very good one.]

211. [An unambiguous case of rigoristic eudaemonism. He answered my written questions immediately upon reading them because he could see only one side to them, and he did not entirely conceal—it seemed to me—a slight contempt for me because I wasted my own and others' time over such obvious matters. His parents had been rigoristic by example and training, but had never, as far as he could remember, assigned reasons for the observance of general rules. These he thinks he learned from his reading of books and newspapers and from the sermons of the clergyman of a village in which his sister lives. About this last statement I feel somewhat doubtful, for he mentioned the clergyman only in response to an inquiry to that effect and I could get no definite information as to the nature of this influence. Moreover it is not the habit—as far as I know—for rural clergymen, or most others for that matter, to assign in their sermons the sort of reason which follows. His standpoint appears—**apart from what is said in answer to specific casuistry questions—in his answer to my request for the reasons for his "strictness."** It was given instantly: "Why, society would go to pieces if every one was all the time trying to get out of doing things."]

I. WRITTEN: "I think he would be considered a thief, even in a case of starvation." 4a and 5: It makes no difference whether the baker is rich or poor. 1: At first he thought this might be right, then decided it was wrong. 3b: L. I tried to discover why he answered this differently from I but could get no definite result. [The reason seems to be that in 3b nothing is actually taken out of the possession of some one else.]

III. WRITTEN: "No. It causes children to be distrustful." 1a: L. 3: R. 5: R.

IV. WRITTEN: R.

II. WRITTEN: R.

V. WRITTEN: "No, if this were the case there would be many such cases where wealth was involved."

[All answers classified as eudaemonistic because of statement, quoted above, made at conclusion of interview.]

217. I. WRITTEN: "If the baker was a man of some means I would not say that the man did anything wrong." 4a

and 5: If the only shop in town was owned by a poor man it would not be right, because it might reduce him to poverty and starvation so that he would be as badly off as the poor family. The answer of the paper holds only for a baker of some means.

III. WRITTEN: "No. Children should never be told anything that was not the truth." ORAL: *What is your reason for your answer?* "The children will find it out in the end and it will make them suspicious of their parents and teach them to lie." *Is there anything to be said on the other side?* "Sometimes it makes them behave better." However he did not think this very important and apparently he attached still less importance to my suggestion that it would make them enjoy Christmas better.

IV. WRITTEN: R. ORAL: He should remain in both cases in order that people may have confidence in his word at the time and later on in his life.

II. WRITTEN: R. ORAL: The principle stated under IV gives the reason for his answer. 2: It would make no difference whether the father was living or dead except that the shock of disappointment would be very great if the father was alive, so that breaking the promise would be worse if he was living. 4: L. Because he could do so much good by breaking the promise. 5: L. Because it was far more important that he should help save his neighbor's property than that his wife should go to town on any particular day.

V. WRITTEN: "No, because the life he has is not his own but God's, and for such a reason no man has a right to help to end a person's life, because God rules over the life of men and knows what is best to do." ORAL: I asked for the meaning of the written statement. "God has made us and owns us and rules the world." *Of course He can do what He wants to with us, but does that make it right?* "It is not right unless it is done for our best" was the instantaneous reply. We passed to the reasons for obedience to general rules. He declared himself familiar with all that I inquired for, viz., 1, 2, 3 and 6. Then I asked if the commandments of the Bible appealed to him as a reason for obedience also. "Yes." *How can you make your answer to I agree with the commandment Thou shalt not steal?* "When it does so much good as that, I do not believe it can be



wrong." *Then Thou shalt not steal applies only where it will do harm?* "Yes."

[All answers classified as eudaemonistic.]

218. I. WRITTEN: "He did not do wrong because he saved the lives of the children who could not help themselves, and it was not loss enough to the baker to cause any hurt." 2: This would not be right. For if he started doing that, no one could tell where he would stop. *Is this the reason it would be right for him to do it for others?* Yes. He would not be likely to keep it up. 4a, 4b and 5: In answering the printed question he thought of the baker as carrying on a big business. If the business was on a small scale, he was doubtful how to answer. There must have been others besides these people who were "fixed that way," and if all had turned in they would have put the baker in the same position with themselves [Note that the baker here occupies the focus of consciousness]. "I believe in helping another, but not so that you are on a lower level than he is." 3b: R. At first his answer was latitudinarian, but then it occurred to him that the shoes not being sent to England in the first place was the fault of the executor or his wife. This consideration caused him to change his answer. I did not pursue the subject farther. 6: R., then L, because it would do good to so many.

III. WRITTEN: "It is all right for they get lots of fun, and I don't think it does them any harm." ORAL: *Are there arguments for the other side?* "You might say it would teach them to lie." But it was evident he did not think the danger sufficient to be worth considering.

IV. ORAL: He might leave in both cases. The "Short Course student" should not, for he could soon go out and earn money, so he would be able to borrow at the time and thus get through. I asked him by what arguments he could defend himself against one who took the other side. He could not answer beyond saying: "The widow might have luck and find some one to take her room." Then I asked if he decided the question by the principle of I 5. He replied: "That would be a good principle."

II. WRITTEN: "A promise is a promise, but he should not have made the promise if he did not intend to keep it."

V:L. *Why?* "Because he would be better off out of his misery." *Can you see any reason against it?* None except that the doctor would be punished. *There is the danger of abuse* [described in some detail]. He had not thought of it and it did not seem to impress him very strongly.

[I, III, and V, classified as eudaemonistic.]

221. I. WRITTEN: "No. The lives of the children were worth more than the bread and the offense of stealing it." 2 and 3a: He may not steal the bread for himself. 3b: L. Because the shoes were worth nothing to the sister. 1: L. 4c: at first L, then R. Thereupon he reversed his answer to I and 1. At the close of the interview I took up the reasons for this change of attitude. After attempting in vain to discover its grounds without asking leading questions I finally inquired whether it was due to the discovery that the latitudinarian answers were leading to a point where the distinction between stealing and not stealing threatened to disappear. I have not given the exact words of my question, but the exact words, or rather word of his reply was "Sure," enunciated with great fervor.

III. WRITTEN: "No. You should not lie to your or any other children, as it will learn them to lie. If the parents lie to their children as jokes, you will find that the children are also liars."

IV. WRITTEN: "No. A man is a word. No word, no man."

II. WRITTEN: "Yes, he had a right to quit the elevator. A person should follow his own instinct." ORAL: I read the preceding statement and said: *That may be a good reason as far as it goes, but it is not quite complete enough. The mere fact that it is disagreeable for the young man can not make it wrong. It is disagreeable for a man who has failed in business to set to work and pay his debts.* He replied: "It won't do the father any good, he is dead." I then asked 2. He said that was a very different thing. After some consideration he found he could not decide it. As he had had no trouble with IV, [which, according to my habit, I had gone over with him orally to assure myself that he understood the question] I inquired what was the difference between the two. He replied: In IV it is only for a year; in this it is for a life time.

V. WRITTEN: "Yes. A person suffering terrible pain is better off dead than alive."

[III, II, V, classified as eudaemonistic.]

224. I. WRITTEN: L. 4a: L. 3b: at first R, then without warning: "For a little thing like these shoes it was not worth while to go through all that trouble. If they had been of some value it would have been different." 7: L. Easier than I because it saved the lives of more people.

III. WRITTEN: "I think not, because sooner or later they find out the truth and it tends to lessen their faith in humanity." ORAL: *Many of your classmates answer this differently from you. What would you say to them?* "It is true it gives them pleasure, but they can get the pleasure by being told about Santa Claus and at the same time being told it is not true."

IV. ORAL: In the first case he ought certainly to stay, "the widow being dependent on it, perhaps not able to get any other roomers." In the second [after some consideration] he may leave: "It would do him more harm to stay than it would do good to the well-to-do people."

II. WRITTEN: L. 2: He saw no particular difference between the two cases. In 2 it would not do any one any harm if he gave up the business except the hurt to his father's feelings. In II his father would not even know of it.

V. ORAL: "If I had seen such a case I might feel differently about it, but as it is I must say they must not kill him." He had not thought of the danger of abuse. His reason was that such matters must be left in the hands of God. *Because the Bible says Thou shalt not kill?* Yes. *How about your answer to I and Thou shalt not steal?* He could not answer, but affirmed expressly in reply to my question that he did not wish to change his position on that subject. *Then there is something else besides the command?* "Yes," but he could not tell what it was. *Suppose we believed—what is impossible—that God was torturing this fine and noble man merely for the pleasure of torturing him, as children may torture a cat. Would the doctor be justified in giving the overdose in that case?* At first he said No, then without any hint or suggestion from me that I am aware of, Yes. *What then are we taking for granted about*

*God's purposes, if we believe it wrong to kill the sick man?* He could not tell, but assented to my assertion that we must suppose the suffering sent for the man's real good.

[III, IV, and II, classified as eudaemonistic.]

226. I. WRITTEN: "He did wrong to steal in any case. But owing to the fact that he could get no work himself and had nothing to give her (the widow) and the baker had something which it was possible to spare, the poor man ought to be justified in doing what he did. And I believe I could do the same with a clear conscience for some of the rich ought to share with the poor, in some cases, anyway."

III. WRITTEN AND ORAL: R and eudaemonistic.

IV. WRITTEN: Since he "had agreed to keep the room he should have done it regardless of the situation of the owner. . . . Further it was as necessary for the poor widow and child to live as for the two-faced thing to attend the University. But do unto others as you would have them do unto you."

II. WRITTEN: R.

V. WRITTEN AND ORAL: L (provided the doctor will not get into trouble). Eudaemonistic.

[I, III, and V are classified as eudaemonistic.]

A study of these returns will show that in the great majority of instances the respondent does not look to any general rule as such for guidance. On the contrary, the mind turns spontaneously to a consideration of the interests of the parties affected. Thus in I he asks himself in effect: Ought the baker to be compelled (for that is what the theft amounts to) to give of his possessions in order to save the family. In II the question is whether the son is bound by his promise to sacrifice his happiness to the desires of his father. Here the cravings of filial affection or sympathy for the dead will sometimes be the deciding consideration, at other times the insignificance of the stake of the parent compared with that of the son, or the fact that the dead can not be affected by what we do. Even where obedience to general rules is demanded it is usually because of the indirect effects of obedience upon welfare. Sometimes, no doubt, the exact nature and extent of the obligation created by

a promise or contract may be obscure (see above ch. II pages 42 and 43); but even of this the records offer no unequivocal evidence. Thus the references everywhere found to eudaemonistic considerations are not epiphenomena; they are the forces that determine the result.

An examination of the preceding pages will also show, I believe, that although but two of these ten sets of responses are credited with more than three eudaemonistic answers to the basal questions, as a matter of fact they are in reality eudaemonistic from beginning to end. An answer is not classified as eudaemonistic except as it meets certain conditions, this in order to reduce to a minimum the possibilities of error (see ch. II, page 27). But good evidence for the eudaemonistic attitude is found far beyond these somewhat artificial limits; it extends in fact to the very boundaries of our inquiry. Rigoristic answers there are, to be sure, in these reports that are not demonstrably motivated by eudaemonistic considerations but they are answers that were not investigated either for lack of time or because there appeared to be no genuine necessity. Under the circumstances they can hardly be used for purposes of refutation by a hostile critic.

An equally detailed examination of the remaining twenty-one sets of returns that belong to this group would yield essentially the same result. There are but two in which there seem to be any rational grounds for asserting even a *prima facie* claim to immediacy. These are III in 238 and I 1 and 3 and IV in 241. Each answer occurs in a thorough-going eudaemonistic setting, latitudinarian, in part all too latitudinarian, in character, and represents an unaccounted-for lapse into rigorism. But in each case I was prevented by lack of time from asking whether the rigorism was due to the eudaemonistic reasons for loyalty to general rules, so that there is nothing in the way of the supposition that some one or more of these suddenly, as they not infrequently do, put in a claim that succeeded in making itself heard.

GROUP II. Its members supply two eudaemonistic answers to the printed questions and one or more such answers to the supplementary questions. It numbers eleven.

It will perhaps be supposed that the failure to obtain a larger

number of eudaemonistic answers points to the presence of a considerable amount of immediacy. An analysis of the reasons for the fact will show, however, that such an inference is not justified. In the first place five of the eleven presented rigoristic answers the reasons for which could be obtained only by means of leading questions. As has already been pointed out and as will be shown at greater length below, the inability to volunteer reasons is not incompatible with their actual presence in forming the judgment. In five more cases there were either lapses on my part during the interview so that I supposed I had eudaemonistic answers where later and more critical reflection showed me I had not, or else I was unable to complete the interview for lack of time. The eleventh case is somewhat peculiar and will be examined later.

After this explanation it will not seem presumptuous to contend that in reality this group stands practically on the same basis as Group I. We must remember that there are always at least three eudaemonistic answers, only that one or more of those above two are answers to the supplementary questions. Usually there is a considerable number of such answers. Furthermore in every one of these eleven records except one,<sup>4</sup> the non-eudaemonistic answers, with a total of two exceptions for the basal questions and three for the supplementary, are either latitudinarian or else were declared by the respondent—in answer, as already said, to leading questions from me—to be motivated by some one of the considerations that appear in the list of reasons for rigorism. And in the one exception, the interview was left incomplete for lack of time. The reader will remember the grounds upon which the improbability of immediacy in latitudinarian answers was asserted (see ch. II, pages 28 and 29.).

The only problem that can arise with regard to this group, then, is the validity of any inference from reasons for rigorism obtained through leading questions. This problem we must now consider. The attempt to discover in this manner the reasons for rigoristic answers was made altogether with eighteen persons. It was usually conducted in connection with some one of the printed casuistry questions. For instance: "Is the reason you think he ought not to take the bread that

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<sup>4</sup> The eleventh is number 213, which is presented at length below.

if he does," *et cetera*? The grounds for placing confidence in the replies of the students are as follows. No one of the eighteen claimed to be familiar with and to have used all of them; they picked and chose. Some claimed to be familiar with a good many, but declared with positiveness they used none in answering my questions (as 204). Others recognized a less number but had used them. 207 recognized reason 5 but said it was not *his* reason: "I first thought it wrong, and besides thought of this as a good reason." A typical illustration of the results obtained is the following (239). 1 and 3 he had never thought of. 2 and 6 were perfectly familiar. 2 he had thought of and used in answering I 3 b: "I thought if he got started doing that he might not know where to stop." Such a statement as this seems to me to bear the stamp of veracity upon its face.

Their failure to volunteer their reasons is, as has already been said, in no wise suspicious. It may be explained as due to their failure to understand what I meant by a "reason," or their inability to formulate a universal statement, though the material for it was right in their hands. Thus 223 could think of no reason for sticking to general rules. Yet his written answer to III read: "It is not right to tell children there is a Santa Claus for that is lying to them and they may, as they do after a time, find out that there is no such thing. Therefore they may start lying and telling things that are not true and get into trouble through the cause of that Santa Claus which there is none." When I stated the principle embodied in this answer he recognized it at once and remembered that he had used it in dealing with this question. This is but one of a considerable number of instances, among which 46 (page 35) and 205 (page 78) have already been quoted, in which convincing evidence has been afforded that the reasons which they could not formulate for themselves were really the forces at work in the determination of their moral judgments. As a result of all these considerations, I believe we are justified in concluding that the method now under examination supplies trustworthy information about the working of these minds.

There is one member of this group whose answers have been reserved for special examination, namely 213. His replies to I

and V were eudaemonistic, to II, III, and IV rigoristic and non-mediated. The (written) answer to I, which must be used in a minute, reads as follows: "He did not do wrong. Because if they would not have got this bread they would have starved, while the baker's loss was not near so bad as the loss of her children would have been to the sick widow." The answers to the supplementary questions to II and III, and also to IV, which last, as given to only two or three persons, I have not placed on the list in the early part of this chapter,—these answers are uniformly latitudinarian except III 3 which he was unable to decide. And wherever I demanded reasons he balanced gain against loss. Thus, for example in II 3 he assigned as his reason for a latitudinarian answer the fact that the curios would do the city a great deal more good than they would the nephews. Again he hesitated long before answering III 1, but answered 5 at once. I asked him why the latter was the easier and he replied because it saved more lives. In general where the losses involved in loyalty to the rule were very great he decided it was not obligatory. This point of view appears clearly in the answers to one of the questions on contracts just referred to. It was: "In 1859 Mr. S., an immensely wealthy New Yorker made a contract with a certain contractor for the erection of a magnificent palace on Fifth Avenue. Before the work was begun or the sub-contracts let, the war broke out, resulting in a great rise in the prices of materials and labor. Mr. S. nevertheless refused to modify the contract. The contractor faced ruin. If it had been possible legally to get out of the contract, would he have been justified morally in breaking it?" To this the answer was given that the contract need not be kept because it would have ruined the contractor, while Mr. S. could well afford to lose the money. "What is the difference," I asked, "between this and IV?" He repeated that the contractor was face to face with ruin while this was not the case with the student. The only place where he came out squarely for rigorism where it involved the very greatest sacrifices was in II, where, however, the promise is binding because made to the *father*. (This is not classified as eudaemonistic because elicited by a leading question.)

So far there is nothing to differentiate this paper from any



of the preceding. The anomalies arose when the reasons were sought for the rigoristic answers to III and IV. He was entirely unable to state them. After several futile direct attacks I read him his answer to I and asked him if he had applied, and then if he could apply it to IV. He could only reply that he thought when the boy had made an agreement he ought to stick it out. "It is easy enough," I said, "to see why he ought to stay where there is a poor widow dependent upon him, but why in the second case? Why should he keep a contract when it is so hard to do so? The whole object of my inquiry is to discover what reasons we give ourselves for doing things that are hard to do." Again he replied he could only answer: He ought to stay in the second case because he has agreed to.

We then turned to the reasons for rigorism. He declared none of them had been in his mind while writing out his paper, or during the discussion with me. In reply to a question he said that his mode of answering III and IV (and he included II in this list) was more "instinctive" than like deciding to buy a certain farm, the reasons for which one could assign at the time of forming the decision. On the other hand the following reasons had occurred to him at various times, 1, 2, 3, and 6; also 4 and 5 rather vaguely. Two or three rather recondite ones, which I threw out as a decoy, he declared he had never thought of. The others, however, were familiar, having occurred to him many times when he was deciding moral questions. The authority of the Bible was not a factor.

This case appears to me identical in principle with those of 135 and 22 in the College of Letters and Science (see above, page 40 ff). The main difference is that here I have definite statements which go to confirm that which at least in 135 was hypothesis. At the close of our second interview, I showed him again his answer to I, pointed out the fact that he had used it in many judgments, and that in IV on the other hand he had refused to use it and had not assigned any other reason in its place. He replied that as far as the answer to I was concerned he had never thought much about problems of property so that the reasons for being strict in that field would not naturally occur to him. "Then you have thought of these reasons in settling problems of veracity and faithfulness to promises?"

I inquired. Yes, he had thought a great deal about them, a variety of such problems having been brought before him in various ways. Thereupon I suggested the following hypothesis which he said he believed represented the facts accurately. In writing out the answers to III and IV, which was done very rapidly, he had no particular reasons in mind because he wrote out the answers to conform to previous solutions. They were therefore put down at once without any particular thought. Question I, on the other hand, as something new, he was compelled to solve for the first time. He answered it therefore in accordance with the principle which spontaneously occurred to him, without regarding more remote considerations. The appearance and manner of the boy, that of an exceptionally intelligent and thoughtful fellow, at once confirmed the truth of his own statements and created confidence in his ability to verify them. The immediacy here brought to light, then, is of a sort which, as has been shown above,<sup>5</sup> is entirely compatible with autonomism.

The preceding explanation leaves one difficulty behind it, why, namely, he was not able to assign a reason for his rigoristic answer of IV when it was demanded of him. After all, however, this is not very different from the problem why some students recognize reasons as their own when they can not volunteer them. On certain points, we must suppose, this young man had reached definitive conclusions. For the moment the mind was not able to retrace the path by which the goal had been reached.

GROUP III. The common characteristic of the eight sets of replies that form this group is the fact that the great, and sometimes the overwhelming majority of the answers are rigoristic, and that (generally) the reasons for such decisions are not volunteered, so that they must be discovered, if present, either by leading questions or by some other indirect method.

Three members of this group, 250, 216, 242, may be taken up together. Almost all answers are rigoristic but in every case there are latitudinarian answers with an indubitable eudaimonistic basis. Thus 250 answered II, and the supplementary questions, 2 and 3 rigoristically. But 1 a and b, and 5 were

<sup>5</sup> See page 15.

latitudinarian, while 4 he could not answer. 5 was answered in an instant. The difference between 4 and 5 is that the farmer in 5 is in "a worse fix" than the poor man in 4, for the latter *could* get along without the help. I protested against this view somewhat feebly, but to no avail. Apparently the imagination had been affected by 5 as it had not been by 4.

Having obtained little light from the casuistry questions I took up the reasons for rigorism. 250 volunteered number 3 (in connection with II), the other two students volunteered none. In reply to leading questions each, however, claimed to recognize, and to have used in judging, several of the reasons. One's conclusion with regard to these men accordingly must turn upon the credence he accords to this claim. The considerations that can be urged in its favor were presented during the examination of Group II.

All these men mentioned as one reason for their answers the "commands of God." This phrase, as I have attempted to show in Chapter I, is ambiguous. If it stands for the results of the mere pressure of another will upon our own, then deference to such a command supplies evidence for the custom theory. On the other hand, if the "command of God" means a revelation of God as to what is right independently of any command, then such deference means simply a resort to an infallible source of knowledge. In order to determine which of these two attitudes was the attitude of our three students, I asked two of them (in the interview with the third this was impossible for lack of time) the question based upon the story of Abraham and Isaac as narrated above, page 71. Both declared that under the hypothetical conditions described Abraham was not bound to sacrifice his son; whereupon the application to V was made by them at once and without help from me: If God could be supposed to be sending this horrible suffering simply in order to delight himself with the sight of it, the physician would be perfectly justified in administering the poison.

The fourth member of this group is 204. In a general way his responses were like the preceding except there was a little more latitudinarianism. His discussion of the difference between II 4 and 5, the former of which he answered in rigoristic fashion, the latter in latitudinarian is the exact counterpart of that quoted

just above. In reply to my leading question he declared he recognized but had not used reasons 1, 2, 3, and 6 in his rigoristic answers. His real ground throughout was the command of God. This, indeed, was sufficiently apparent from his paper. His written answer to I, for instance, read: "He did wrong. For God's commandment, Thou shalt not steal does not give anybody the right to steal under any conditions whatsoever. I also think that it was an act of God and the will of God that they were suffering, and if God wanted them saved from starvation he would have provided means in which it might have been done without doing wrong. For we find instances in the Bible where means have been supplied when people were starving." What conceptions was such an answer based on? The problem of the sacrifice of Isaac revealed them. Abraham, he declared as soon as he understood the question, was only bound to obey if he believed God intended the sacrifice for their good. How incompletely even this point of view was capable of determining his moral judgments was shown by the result of my inquiry why the answer to II 5 did not apply to I. He could not say; but, though given an opportunity, he did not offer to change either answer. The sources of each apparently lay beyond the commanded and the forbidden.

Three more men may now be considered together, 207, 223, and 229. In these a vigorous and almost uninterrupted rigorism has its origin, mainly, in a single source, inability to see that a principle may hold in the great majority of cases, and yet because of the presence of exceptional conditions, not in all. Some of the eudaemonistic reasons for rigorism, enumerated in my list, were indeed recognized by all three men, one (223) declaring he used certain of them in preparing the paper and during the interview (see above, page 87), but in none was the central consideration of this nature. Two of them also made some concessions to latitudinarianism, while the third (207) showed at several points much reluctance in demanding a strict adherence to the rule. Furthermore they recognized that in all the more difficult cases, as I, II 4 and 5, III 1a and b, practically every one would break the rule, and they declared they would do so themselves. Furthermore, when I asked 207 whether he believed most people would consider such actions

wrong, he replied they probably would not unless they stopped to think about it. What thought then would be likely to give them pause? None other than this: "If you are not to keep your promise in this case [II 5] why in any case?" "Why not allow a promise to be broken any time?" I thereupon inquired. He was unable to reply.

In the other two men the same point of view appears, but it is expressed in terms of the agent's character as well as in terms of the action itself. 223, for example, could not see how you could call such actions as taking another man's property right in one case and wrong in another, and he feels that "if a man breaks the rule in one case, you never can have any confidence in him again, for he is just as likely to break it again in any other case." Similarly 229 in I: "If a man will steal one thing he will steal another;" and in V: "I can see no difference between the doctor's killing this man and anyone he might want to." Only here the answers came in reply to a question of mine to that effect; he being a young man from whom I could get nothing but Yes or No, except as I put a leading question.

The inferences we draw from these data will doubtless depend largely upon our confidence in the results already presented for acceptance. If we believe that forty-six out of the forty-nine thus far examined base their answers upon eudæmonistic considerations, we shall hardly see in the facts stated concerning these three young men anything to prevent us from placing them in the same category; especially as they are average representatives of their class, quite like the rest except for the taciturnity of 229, for which I found but one parallel. 223 expressly recognizes the value of confidence in others, and has made it the basis of a written answer (to III, see above page 87). His case, I think, is a clear one, especially as he recognized and used No. 6 as well as No. 3 of the reasons for rigorism. The other two are more obscure. And yet does not the foundation appear here also? In 207, the more communicative, we have the clean-cut assertion that the only reason for not breaking the rule in certain of the extreme cases is that then the rule disappears altogether. What objections are there to that? With his rudimentary powers of abstract thinking he is unable to formulate an answer. But can we believe that the experiences

of life, his observation and his reading (even if he reads nothing more than a country newspaper) have not forced upon his attention again and again the evils of theft, lying and murder? In reality, he knows the answer as well as anyone else. What he does not know is what I am driving at and what sort of an answer I expect. If we will go back in memory to our school days we shall recall exactly similar experiences of our own in the class room.

The remaining difficulty in these cases—the possibility of a recognition of the eudaemonistic basis of a moral judgment combined with the absence of a corresponding perception that a rule is not valid beyond the limits of its *raison d'être*—is removed by reminding ourselves that the same thing happens in the pseudo-eudaemonistic judgment described in Chapter II.<sup>6</sup> I tested 207 on this question, and although he stated clearly and on his own initiative the two eudaemonistic reasons for punishment and recognized that one, according to the terms of the question, no longer held, he thought the other still applied and necessitated the infliction of punishment.

The last member of Group III is 232. With him I had two interviews, aggregating four hours in length, making use of all the methods thus far described as well as others prepared for difficult cases which in mercy to the reader I will leave undescribed. In the end I was forced to give up without having obtained sufficient data upon which to base a conclusion. The trouble was that the best I could get out of him—with rare exceptions—was Yes or No, and often not even that. The simplest questions which the others, even the most dull, were able to answer, he could sometimes find no answer for. His answers to all the printed questions and to all the supplementary questions except two were rigoristic. The latitudinarian ones were II 5 and III 1a and b. He could not state the difference between the former and III 4 or explain his change of attitude. Of the grounds for rigorism, none had been in his mind in answering the questions either of the paper or the interview, but he declared himself perfectly familiar with 1, 2 (which we took up in connection with III), and 3 (in connection with III and IV). The others he had never thought of.

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<sup>6</sup> See above. page 35.

The commands of the Bible were a factor, but, as he seemed to think, if I understood him aright, not a very important one. "There is," he said, "something more than this, but I can not tell it." The teachings of his parents also he thought had a good deal to do with his opinions upon right and wrong. In answering these questions, he informed me in one of the rare lapses from his Yes-No procedure, he said to himself: "This is stealing, or lying, etc.; therefore it is wrong."

As far as I am concerned, anyone who cares to claim this young man, may have him. Readers who after the examination of the hundred and fifty cases that have been presented still believe in the social pressure theory should by all means exhibit student of agriculture number 232 as a demonstration of the truth of their theory. To be sure, in III he slaps in the face a custom in the midst of which, as he tells me, he grew up and decides against allowing children the joys of belief in Santa Claus on good eudaemonistic grounds. But then I am perfectly willing to admit that no view of this case is free from difficulty. Before celebrating the victory, however, it would be well to remember that several other explanations are equally at our disposal. In view of the results obtained from 17 and 49 (see Chapter III page 55) the possibility that the answers are due to the influence of parental or divine authority<sup>7</sup> can not be denied. It must be noted, however, that he himself believes "there is something more." Again, since he recognizes many of the reasons for rigorism, although he is not conscious of using them, he might be counted with 213 (page 87). In view of all the facts, however, I am inclined to classify him with 207, 223, and 229. It is true that in response to my inquiry he denied that he was moved by the consideration that appealed to them: If you are not to keep your promise, or to respect other people's property, in this instance, why in any? However, he missed the meaning of what I said so often that this denial is not decisive. On the whole I am willing to stand by my first offer: Anyone who thinks this young man will help his cause is welcome to him.

In order to determine whether the fifty students who have now been passed in review were fairly representative of the

<sup>7</sup> As explained above, pages 12 and 13.

entire first year class of which they were members, I came before them in their lecture room a second time, after all the papers had been handed in, and requested those who had failed to turn in answers solely because they could not give reasons for them, to inform me to that effect, in order that I might determine how many such persons there were. No one presented himself in response to this request. This result was about what I had expected. For in the first place, as may be remembered, over half of the entire number had turned in answers to the first set, which was no easier than the second. In the second place whatever had prevented the remainder from answering the questions, it was almost certainly not inability to assign reasons. For even those who in the interviews showed themselves to be most thoroughly eudaemonistic did not, in half the cases, feel bound to assign reasons in writing their papers.

The results of our study of immediacy among the members of the College of Agriculture may now be summarized. Between six hundred and fifty and seven hundred questions, basal and supplementary, were given to these fifty men. In Group I only two basal and two supplementary questions, belonging to two students, justify any suspicion whatever of their immediacy. Even these exhibit no positive evidence of its presence, the examination of them having been left incomplete for lack of time. In Group II there are two supplementary questions, belonging to one man, of which exactly the same may be said, and two basal questions and one supplementary question in the record of 213 that appear to owe their immediacy to a process of classification grown automatic through habit. In Group III the only evidence for immediacy is found in the returns from 232. As will be clear, it is a little difficult to make any statement as to the total number of these answers that have a *prima facie* claim to immediacy, but in any event it is not greater than in the returns from the "Hill" students, while the plausibility of the claim itself is in the case of every person save one (232) far less. This last fact has no more recondite explanation, I believe, than the greater thoroughness of the investigation.

What is true of our study of immediacy holds also for our examination of the influence of authority. There is no difference



of any importance between the students of the College of Letters and Science and the members of the Short Course in Agriculture. This is the more significant because the investigation made of this subject among the latter was, on the whole, distinctly more systematic and complete than that among the former. In twenty out of the twenty-four cases where the paper or the interview supplied the suggestion of a leaning upon the commands of the Bible, a careful inquiry was made to determine the nature of the facts themselves and the inferences which they require. If there were more than twenty-four such persons, then, with them, the belief in the Bible as a guide to conduct left not a single trace.

As with the "Hill" students, these young men were examined as to the relation of their answers to I, V and the problem of revenge (see page 143, Question IX) to the VIII and VI commandments and the prohibition in the Gospels of revenge. As has been said, the results were the same in principle as those obtained on the "Hill." Class 1 is pretty well represented; an example is 217, quoted above (page 80). Classes 2 and 3 do not appear, but unequivocal examples of the attitude of 4 are very frequent. As an example take 224, already quoted (page 83). Class 5 has the largest number of representatives. In some cases their point of view appears spontaneously, as in the following written answer to V: "A man has no right to take another's life, which we would be doing in this case. All suffering is made for a purpose." More often it is discovered through the answers to the problem of the sacrifice of Isaac, as in 201 (above, page 73). Instead of eudaemonism, the dysdaemonistic judgment seems to show itself once or twice. At least the doctor is forbidden to put an end to the sufferings of the dying man because God is punishing him for his past sins. The suffering of infants, in the theodicy of one of these young men, I may say in passing, was accounted for by the fact that "the parents suffer about as much as the child." I may add that the attempts to discover, both here and on the "Hill," why this point of view permitted the taking of anaesthetics to relieve pain, but not to put an end to pain, brought to light nothing but futilities.

Of the twenty students examined sixteen fall readily into

some one of the classes 1, 4, and 5. The remaining four call for special treatment. Two of them, 223 and 232, have been in part presented above (pages 92 and 94). They were, as may be remembered, almost without exception, rigoristic. I asked them about the sacrifice of Isaac, and also the disobedience of Prometheus. Both floundered terribly and in the end gave them up, unable to decide them. Their difficulty was not due to a failure to understand the question. Nor, in the light of all the facts, can I believe that their hesitation was the result of a tendency to bow blindly in the presence of power. Only those will declare that, under the conditions of my question, Abraham ought not to have obeyed, who have imagination enough to deal with the results of an incredible supposition. If the fact that God can not be believed to torture men for the mere pleasure of torturing them obscures all the rest of the problem, the opposite answer is to be expected. The truth of this statement is well shown by the answers to V given by two brothers who are both Christian Scientists. The older of the two wrote: "It is not right. The case would not be hopeless if he resorted to Christian Science." But the minute I asked what might be done if the man was not a Christian Scientist, he replied: "It would then be all right for him to take the morphine." The younger brother, on the other hand, was incapable of getting back of the fact that there is no such thing as cancer, and could not put himself sufficiently in the place of an unbeliever in his faith, even of the days before the revelations of Mrs. Mary Baker Glover Eddy, to tell what he ought to do. For no other reason than that there is no such thing as cancer (and that there is a very deadly thing called morphine) he stuck to his position, despite all my arguments, that it was wrong to administer the poison. This principle I believe explains the hesitation of 223 and 232 to justify the disobedience of our hypothetical Abraham. And the explanation is rendered plausible by the fact that these two young men stood at about the bottom of the list in the matter of mental flexibility.

This conclusion, however, is not based upon mere presumptions. 232, as will be remembered, when asked whether the commands of the Bible determined his answers, replied "Mostly."

And when I inquired what that meant, said he felt there was something more but he could not put it into words. 223 answered I on his paper by an appeal to the VIII commandment and in the interview asserted that the commands of God were one of the reasons for his rigoristic answers in general. But in V he wrote: "This is too much of a question for me;" nor was he enabled to come to a decision by a reference on my part to the VI commandment. The fact of the matter is that if it had not been for his inability to see that a law may remain a law and yet under certain conditions suffer exceptions, his sympathies would have led him to approve of the administration of poison, despite all the commandments in the Decalogue.

A problem of a different sort is presented by 235. His written answer to I was: "No. He was helping poor and sick and to save these people he was willing to take the blame of stealing and [be] dealt with accordingly." The answer to V, I may add, was latitudinarian also. In the discussion of I he still affirmed that the man did right, nevertheless declared that his act was a sin. God would not like it, because it was contrary to the VIII commandment; but God would forgive him for stealing under the circumstances. The explanation of this doctrine of the two-fold right is very simple. To displease God is, on any view, in so far forth wrong, just as it is to displease one's father. On the other hand it is right to help the poor. Most of us would say, God would desire us in this case to make an exception to the general rule which he has laid down. Our student fails to see this but is sure that God will nevertheless forgive the offender "under the circumstances."

The last on our list is 215. Most of his answers are latitudinarian and of these the majority are demonstrably eudaemonistic. At the conclusion of the interview I inquired how he reconciled his latitudinarianism in I and V with the commands of the Bible. Thereupon, declaring he had not thought of that, he instantly changed his answers. There was no time to carry the subject farther on that day, and I did not seek another interview. I am therefore unable to tell what would have been his attitude toward the story of the sacrifice of Isaac; but in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is fair to assume that

he would have conformed to the rule that seems to have held for all the others.

Our review of the data furnished by the students in the Short Course in Agriculture is now completed. We find here, as among the members of the College of Letters and Science, that the authority of the Scriptures, even when regarded as the God-given guide to conduct, has again failed to demonstrate its ability to determine, in any appreciable degree, the content of the moral judgment. If this be true, what shall we say of the other forms of authority?

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The results of our examination of a hundred and fifty members of the student body of the University of Wisconsin have now been presented. If the conclusions reached are valid for them, for what classes in the larger community, from which those young people come, will they hold?

The members of the College of Letters and Science who submitted to the dissector's knife were unquestionably representative of the three upper classes from which they were drawn. The brilliant and studious, the future leaders, are here; so are the easy-going, so are the mediocre in talent, so are the stupid. There is no correlation between the character of the answers and either ability or industry. One of the students quoted at length was then taking the psychology course as an "encore." Four others among those who are here quoted were later conditioned in the course in psychology or logic which they were then taking, three of these certainly and the fourth probably not because of idleness but from genuine inability to "get the stuff."

Time was when college students were, on the whole, a picked class. But with the democratization of education and the frank appeal made by the modern university to the instincts of acquisitiveness, this is no longer true. Ability we have in plenty, as much, no doubt, as there ever was. Industry still characterizes the great majority, at least in our institutions in the West. But thoughtfulness upon the broader problems of life, interest in things intellectual, the cast of mind resulting from the read-

ing of the masters, all these things are absent. In this respect Wisconsin is probably neither better nor worse off than its neighbors. It must be remembered also that the same results were obtained from the lower as from the higher levels of the class. The fact that youth is less prone to raise the question *cui bono* than middle life must not be left out of the count. Taking all these things into consideration, I believe we are justified in affirming that the description of the moral judgment here given holds at the very least for the so-called upper and middle classes in the population of our towns and cities.

The returns from the members of the Short Course in Agriculture are almost equally representative of the body of students from which they came. The higher levels of attainment, in so far as these are the product of education or environment, were, as may be remembered (see above, page 63) excluded. The very lowest stratum, as far as that can be determined from class standings, excluded itself. I have the marks for the first hundred members of the class in alphabetical order. This number contains twenty-six of my respondents. The standings of the latter average 1.47 per cent. higher than those of the entire hundred, the passing mark being 60 per cent. But the lowest mark found in our group is 75 per cent., whereas there are twelve out of the remaining seventy-four whose marks are below this. Omitting these twelve, the average of our respondents is practically that of the rest of the class. I give these figures for what they are worth. I am not sure that they have any great significance. Certainly within the group examined no correlation could be discovered between standings. And 207, 223, 229, and 232, my most difficult cases, obtained marks above the average. The following statement is in any event, as I believe, justified: Our examination brought us at least very close to the lowest levels of the class.

How far, then, are these students representative of the farming communities of the state? According to Professor Moore who was in charge of this course from 1895 to 1905 inclusive, and who, moreover, is acquainted with the farmers of Wisconsin as are few other men, the average is slightly above that of this population in ability and culture. They come largely, though by no means entirely, from the more well-to-do families.

It must not be forgotten, however, that here, as in the College of Letters and Science, the minority yield the same results as the majority, and without going into details the general intellectual level of at least a portion of this minority, judged by any standard you may wish to apply, is very low. In view of all the facts, I think it not wide of the mark to assert that these returns are representative for at least the upper nine-tenths of the farming population of this state. And since a large proportion of the boys studied are the sons of European peasants (chiefly from Germany and Norway) and some of them live in essentially foreign communities, our results may fairly claim to have something more than a local significance.