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ETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

NO. 236

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A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF CUSTOM ON THE  
MORAL JUDGMENT

BY

FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP, PH. D.

*Professor of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin*

*Published bi-monthly by authority of law with the approval of the Regents  
of the University and entered as second-class matter  
at the post office at Madison, Wisconsin*

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JUNE, 1908

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# A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF CUSTOM ON THE MORAL JUDGMENT

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## INTRODUCTION

IN presenting a study which makes use of the questionnaire, I am well aware that this method is at present viewed in some quarters with decided disfavor. That there is genuine warrant for such an attitude I do not hesitate to admit. But the criticisms urged affect at bottom not so much the method itself as its uncritical employment on the part of certain persons whose zeal outruns their discretion. That, in itself, it is sound and capable of bringing forth good fruit is demonstrated—if in no other way—by the results obtained by Sir Francis Galton in his studies of imagery and other allied phenomena. Its value in any particular case, therefore, is not to be hastily prejudged, but is rather to be determined by an examination of what it is set to do, the care with which returns are sifted, the precautions used against possible sources of error, and the relation established between data and conclusions. Nothing would be more fatal to the future of ethics than a general condemnation before a hearing of all studies of the moral life that employ the questionnaire. For, if we are to solve the problems of our science, we simply must begin in some way or other to study the moral life about us in its concreteness. Contemporary economics must point us our way. Economics began its career with the production of analytic treatises of which "The Wealth of Nations" is the typical example. Data were obtained partly from introspection, partly from observation, more or less careful, of that part of the industrial world with which circumstances had happened to make the author acquainted. About the middle

of the last century the Germans introduced the historical and comparative methods, greatly to the enrichment of the science. Within the last twenty years certain representatives of the present generation of economists have turned to an exhaustive investigation of some one field in order to determine by direct observation what the phenomena of the production and distribution of wealth in that particular area actually are. Ethics has reached the second stage in a similar course of development. It is now high time that it passed into the third. Such a statement represents no disparagement of the methods first applied. Can one not learn from both Boehm-Bawerk and Hadley? It goes without saying that you can not understand the present except in the light of the past, the here except in the light of the distant. It goes without saying that you can not get along without the help of introspective analysis at every turn. But in ethics, as in economics, it still remains true that the data supposed to be supplied by observation must be subjected to every test conceivable, that the accidental and purely individual elements must be carefully distinguished from the universal, and that in ethics the moralist must not expect to find any satisfactory solution for the majority of his problems solely by the examination of his own consciousness, debauched as he is by his study of theories and mad as he has been made by much learning.

It is a problem of the kind just referred to that is here proposed. The question whether moral judgments are the product of custom and kindred forces is at once one of fundamental importance for theory and practice, and one that can never be decided by an appeal to introspection. Our minds are now, as has just been said, too artificial, they have lost entirely their original *naïveté*. Memory can as little be depended upon because our recollections of our moral attitudes before we began philosophizing must necessarily be sketchy and inadequate, to say nothing of the possibilities in the way of distortion of the picture through prejudices which are the product of the intervening years. There is but one alternative. We must study those persons about us who are still in the naive stage as far as moral self-consciousness is concerned. The method employed in the following study may perhaps not be the best one possible. If so, another must be found. For the problem will either be

solved in some such way as is here indicated or it will remain unsolved.

The study which follows is an examination of the moral consciousness of a small group of young men and young women connected with the University of Wisconsin. Reasons are offered, however, for believing that the results obtained hold for a large section of the American and presumably, therefore, of European society. But no conclusions are drawn from our data as to the relation of custom and the moral code among semi-civilized or still more primitive peoples. I trust my readers will exhibit a similar conservatism with regard to inferences in the reverse direction. Some of them will doubtless approach this study with very definite views of the place of custom in primitive morality. I hope they will not allow such views to prevent them from making an impartial examination of the material here presented. Of course the unity of the race creates a certain presumption that the fundamental forces at work at one stage of development will be found at all the other stages also. But this general presumption can not be final in a matter like that which is before us. Let it be assumed for the sake of argument that moral judgments are entirely unreasoned at the lower end of the scale of human existence. It will be admitted by everybody, I suppose, that they are largely, if not entirely, reasoned among the most intelligent and thoughtful members of the most highly civilized communities, laymen as well as philosophers. This being granted, nothing but actual investigation can determine how far down the scale this insight extends. The evidence adduced concerning any particular social group must therefore be allowed to stand or fall on its own merits.

In the investigation reported in the following pages, I have received from friends in the University of Wisconsin assistance which it is a great pleasure to acknowledge. Mr. Maxwell Otto, the present fellow in philosophy, has made contributions upon two special phases of the problem which are credited to him in their place. He has also contributed much for which I am able to make only this general acknowledgment. My colleagues, Professors McGilvary and Bode, have helped me very materially with criticisms and suggestions during the progress of the work

and in the preparation of the manuscript. I wish also to thank Professors R. A. Moore and D. H. Otis of the College of Agriculture for the aid they have given in bringing me into personal contact with the students under their charge. Professor Moore in particular had special opportunities of enlisting the interest of these young men. He treated the work as if it had been his own, and it is due largely to his enthusiasm and activity that I am able to present the data obtained from this source.

## CHAPTER I

## THE PROBLEM

From the dawn of ethical speculation to the present time, it has been a favorite doctrine that custom is the mother of morality. This view has been held not merely by men of the world like Herodotus and Montaigne, but also by great numbers of special students of ethics, and is probably more widely accepted today than ever before. For all its popularity, however, it has never, I believe, been adequately tested. For the most part, in fact, its truth seems to have been virtually assumed as a matter of course. But the subject has too much importance for both theory and practice to justify us in resting in mere impressions. I have accordingly thought it worth while to undertake a detailed examination of the relation of custom to the moral judgment. The field selected for investigation is, of necessity, circumscribed in area, but it will, I believe, prove to be typical of a large section of contemporary civilized society. So that the present study, while not pretending to be exhaustive, may fairly claim to represent a serious beginning.

Custom is defined in the Dictionary of Philosophy as "a manner of acting somewhat widespread and habitual in a society, but not physiologically inherited." The theory under examination will hold, then, that the prevalence of a uniform mode of behavior in a given society, especially if none of its members can remember a divergent mode as existing within its borders, is capable of creating the judgment that the conduct in question is a duty. In connection with this there is usually held a second view, namely, that the moral judgments which thus arise are immediate, that is, formed without any consciousness of the relation of the conduct approved or disapproved to happiness, beauty, or whatever other values may give their actual validity to such judgments in the eyes of the philosopher. "Moral laws,"

writes Professor Paulsen,<sup>1</sup> "arise in consciousness as categorical imperatives. They do not counsel us to promote individual or universal happiness, but appear as absolute commands and prohibitions." Again:<sup>2</sup> "In obeying customs the individual is not conscious of their purposiveness, but only of their existence and obligation. He insists upon their observance by others as well as self, formulating them into those universal rules which begin: Thou shalt, and Thou shalt not."

If we attempt to picture with some degree of definiteness the *modus operandi* of the processes to be investigated, there are open to us, as far as I can see, three and only three possibilities. (1) The mere fact that a certain mode of conduct is observed to be general, generates in the mind of the individual the notion that it is obligatory. (2) The fact that a mode of conduct is general is taken by the individual as evidence that the majority (or all) wish it to be universal. This felt pressure of the wills of the many upon his will generates in him the conviction that the action is obligatory. (3) In this the individual is supposed to start with at least some moral conceptions of his own resulting from the native structure of the mind, but to be, at the same time, more or less distrustful of his own powers. From the fact that certain forms of conduct are general in his community, and, of course, from other data, he infers that those who practice them believe them to be right. In so far as he looks upon the conscience of the majority as a safer guide than his own, he casts his own judgments aside in cases of conflict, and fills in gaps according to the pattern supplied him from without. Obviously this third view is radically different from the first two. They assert that custom creates the code; the last claims only that custom modifies it after it has come into existence.

The first of these views I can hardly believe to have ever been accepted by any serious student of the subject, at least for modern civilized society, with which, in this study, we are alone concerned. Illustrations of the differences everywhere recognized to exist between mere custom and morality are so numerous that it is embarrassing to have to make a selection. In a certain American city one balmy June morning five or six years ago a

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<sup>1</sup> *System of Ethics*, Eng. tr., 356.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 343.

business man went down town without a hat. Before he had reached his office he was seized by the police and carried off to the insane asylum in the suburbs from which they supposed he had escaped. If the theory under discussion were true, he would, of course, have been taken to the police-station from which he would have been sent to the penitentiary. According to an article in the *American Journal of Psychology* for January, 1907, certain arithmetical prodigies when multiplying begin at the left instead of at the right as in the ordinary written method. According to our theory, this would be an "unheard of" crime, more terrible, because more infrequent, than anything in the long catalogue of human iniquity. It is, of course, true that universal or nearly universal modes of conduct may exert a pressure upon us by their mere existence, but in such cases they appeal to something very different from the moral consciousness, namely, the dislike of being conspicuous. Furthermore, whereas wrong-doing in others always tends to awaken blame and indignation, it is only under certain circumstances that a mere breach of custom does so. If a woman (in the United States) stands on the platform of a street-car when there is plenty of room inside, or a university student known to have ample means for the supply of every need wears a straw hat all through a New England winter, people will assume that they are trying to make themselves conspicuous, and some will think less of them for that reason. When an Englishman who had travelled in the United States introduced into his house in a provincial English city an American furnace and the appointments of an American bathroom, the disapprobation with which certain of his neighbors met these breaches of custom was due to their supposition that he was setting himself up before them as knowing more than they. When a family in a New England town began to adopt some of the formalities of entertainment customary in the large cities, the censure that followed was due, among other things, to the fear that this would lead to the breaking up of a certain routine which was dear if for no other reason than that it was habitual. But anyone can distinguish these three considerations from moral disapprobation. And, furthermore, where they do not hold, a mere breach of custom on the part of others is regarded with indifference. When an acquaintance on

meeting us lifts his hat instead of bowing, or when the lightning calculator begins his multiplication with the left hand figure instead of the right, these facts, as the Germans phrase it, leave us quite cold.

If, then, custom be admitted to have any influence upon the moral code—and no one can deny that it has some influence—the choice lies—at any rate as far as modern society is concerned—between the second and the third formulations of the doctrine. Either the fact that my parents, my teachers, the community about me, or God above me, desire me to perform a certain action can create in me the conviction that it is my duty, or the human mind has standards of its own which can indeed be influenced by other persons, but which at the same time have a very definite power of resistance. In order that we may decide between the claims of these rivals, it will be necessary to understand precisely what each involves.

The characteristic features of (2) have already been stated. They are immediacy in the judgment, and the practically unlimited power of authority. (3) however, can not be so easily dismissed.

Among contemporary moralists the adherents of this third view, which I shall call the theory of autonomy, may include three different classes: the Intuitionists, including the Kantians; the Herbartians; and those schools which agree in placing the ultimate source of the moral judgment in the feelings of approbation and disapprobation, or—what I believe to be the same thing—in desire. I shall leave the representatives of the first two schools, now relatively few in number, to state their attitude towards the facts of custom as best they can, and shall confine myself to a statement of the position of the third, as I conceive it. In so doing I may, after all, be speaking for the others also, as I do not believe Intuitionists and Herbartians will find a great deal to criticize in my presentation. I shall take up first the question of the extent to which the school under consideration can admit the influence of another's personality in the formation of the moral judgment.

In the first place, then, the theory that treats approbation as the fundamental fact of the moral life is bound to admit that common sense means by the word "right" something more than

one's accidental likes and dislikes. It means at the lowest this much: that which will be approved by me when all the relevant facts of the case, all the phases of the situation under criticism have been considered, and when the resultant verdict has been brought into consistency with the entire system of my moral judgments. So much objectivity every moral judgment claims, and this claim obviously may be well- or ill-founded. Thus it comes about that we may distrust our own conclusions in matters of right and wrong as well as anywhere else, and may accordingly take the word of our parents, of society about us, or of the Bible or the Church, concerning the content of duty, just as we may with regard to the truth of any historical event. Secondly, in the case of God, we may believe that He not merely knows what is best, but also that He is guiding events for the best interests of His children and therefore, for their sakes and our own, we must not interfere with His plans as far as we can discover what they are. Thirdly, emotions, including the emotions at the foundation of the moral judgment, are contagious, and we are particularly susceptible to such influences when they form, as it were, a complete net-work about us, or when they proceed from those whom we admire or love.

These indubitable facts are obviously something very different from the claim that the mere pressure of one will upon another, the supposition that society wants me to perform a certain action, or—to return for an instant to (1)—that the mere knowledge that everyone is performing it, is capable of glueing together any conceivable mode of conduct and the feeling of obligation. All of them might be, and indeed would be, admitted by a moralist who held that every moral judgment was determined by the perceived conduciveness of the action to the welfare of those directly and indirectly affected by it. Such a formula I myself should consider far too narrow. In particular I am convinced that common sense, in forming its moral judgments, makes use not of a single standard but of a number of standards. But, however the representatives of this school might disagree on such points, all would be equally justified in admitting or rather insisting upon the facts described in the preceding paragraph.

Where they would part company with the adherents of what,

from now on, I shall call the foreign pressure theory would be in their account of the process by which the influence of one personality makes itself felt in the moral judgments of another, and secondly, in the extent of this influence. The former lies beyond the range of the present study; the latter, however, provides us with just the means we need for testing the truth of the rival theories. According to the foreign pressure theory, where it is held in its purity, the pressure of the social will, as has already been pointed out, is omnipotent. The mind of man is mere putty, as far, at least, as his moral nature is concerned. The only limit to the effects of pressure from one direction is a greater pressure from some other. According to that form of the autonomic theory which is being here presented, on the other hand, man is born with certain desires or approbations, just as he is born with certain other emotions, as fear or curiosity. Precisely how far these desires will develop, precisely what forms of conduct they will demand, will depend to a considerable extent upon the character of the human environment in which they are rooted. But in the nature of the case there is a limit to this power of the environment. If, then, an examination of the moral judgments of common sense should reveal the existence of such limits, and particularly if the limits turned out to be decidedly narrow ones, the foreign pressure theory of the origin of the moral judgment would have to be ruled out of court.

We turn now to the relation of the two theories to immediacy. The foreign pressure theory usually asserts immediacy to be a characteristic of the moral judgments of common sense. The reasons for this are patent. All that is supposed to be necessary to create a moral judgment is a vigorous and perhaps persistent demand on the part of society or God. A perception of the *rationale* of that demand is not a factor. The third form of the autonomic theory,<sup>3</sup> on the other hand, would seem compelled to hold that every such judgment involves an awareness of the values to be gained and lost by the action. This, however, is not necessarily the case. The idea of value must indeed always be the moving force but it need not be always explicitly in con-

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<sup>3</sup> See above, page 12.

sciousness. The possibility, in other words, of "unconscious cerebration" cannot be denied or ignored.

If, then, the moral judgments investigated exhibit a large amount of immediacy, we shall be unable to decide between the foreign pressure theory and the theory of autonomy, as far as this phase of the subject is concerned. However, any approach to complete immediacy would be a point in favor of the former. For if "unconscious cerebration" is to be used as a means of explanation, not as a means of throwing dust into your opponents' eyes, it must be conceived as a process working according to certain ascertainable laws. And the study of its exhibitions in the fields of social tact and business judgment seems to show that it ordinarily appears in complex cases rather than in simple ones, and that in the average man it is decidedly the exception rather than the rule. While, then, no dogmatic statement is permissible in advance of a careful examination of the situation as a whole, we may assert, as above, that the existence of wide-spread immediacy would create a strong presumption in favor of the foreign pressure theory. While *per contra* its complete or almost complete absence would supply a strong argument in favor of the theory of autonomy.

Besides "unconscious cerebration" there is another form of immediacy that is entirely compatible with the autonomic theory. Let us suppose that in deciding a certain set of cases, for example, matters of veracity, a man habitually uses a certain principle or set of principles of whose value he is in general fully aware. To such a one it may often happen that when the question of the permissibility of lying arises he recognizes it as belonging to a class with regard to which he has already made up his mind. The answer accordingly emerges in an instant without any explicit awareness of its grounds. If this phenomenon is to be called immediacy, it is an immediacy that is found equally in the "prudential" judgment. The chief executive of any large business establishment, for instance, may make a score of decisions an hour without having before his mind the reasons that justify them. He merely recognizes each problem as belonging to a class upon which he has already passed and recalls to mind his former conclusion. The considerations which then guided him he may not even be able to remember, and yet he

may feel great confidence in the validity of his present decision. The ultimate source of this will, of course, be, in the absence of "unconscious cerebration," open-eyed scrutiny of the relevant data. Such immediacy, then, is entirely compatible with autonomism. If the amount of it is great we shall once more find it difficult to decide between the claims of autonomism and its rival. However, we may use the same principle here that we used in discussing "unconscious cerebration." If autonomism is true, immediacy of the kind under discussion should be a somewhat sporadic phenomenon. For it has its source in mediated judgments that have been so frequently repeated that, in accordance with the law of habit, the greater part of their bulk (*i. e.*, the considerations which have led up to the conclusion) has dropped out of focal and perhaps even marginal consciousness. It can therefore be found only in judgments upon frequently recurring situations. Moreover a retentive memory ought to be able to resuscitate most of the considerations whenever there is any motive for attempting to do so. Summarizing our discussion of immediacy, therefore, we may assert that in the abstract almost any amount of it is compatible with autonomism. Actually, however, the discovery of any very large amount of it in any given society might properly be treated as affording strong evidence for the foreign pressure theory, while its merely sporadic appearance would create a strong presumption in favor of autonomism.

In the preceding account I have been describing the foreign pressure theory in its most thorough-going form. I am, of course, aware that it may be held with certain modifications. To these I shall attempt to do justice as the study proceeds. I am also well aware that it is possible to hold that while the pressure we have been describing is an important factor in determining the content of the moral code, it is not the only factor. Such a view is, of course, more difficult to test than the more radical one. The data to be presented, however, seem to me to afford help in determining the attitude to be taken towards this position also.

The words immediacy and mediacy have appeared again and again in the preceding description. A brief statement with regard to the use of these terms is therefore necessary before we

take up the investigation before us. The denial of immediacy at any particular point is not intended to carry with it any implication as to the presence of reasoning processes in the formation of the judgment in question. In fact I am prepared to insist that the majority of our moral judgments do not contain even the suggestion of an inference. Thus when we see a son neglecting his parents or allowing them to suffer for the want of what he could provide, our condemnation is not usually, I believe, the result of the subsumption of his conduct under some major premise. We condemn him directly. However, the judgment is mediated, in the sense in which I shall use the term, because the condemnation is based upon a perception of the relation of the man's conduct to the welfare of those affected. Still more obviously are judgments arising from a perception of moral beauty independent of any syllogistic process. They again, however, are in the nomenclature here adopted mediated because they have their source in a sense of value. When, therefore, in what follows, the persons examined speak of seeing the reasons for a judgment, this may merely mean that they have perceived the relation of the conduct under criticism to the welfare of some or all of the parties concerned, or have seen its beauty, or any other value it may have, and approve or disapprove as the result of such perception. Of course judgments of welfare may be actually reasoned, as where the conclusion is based upon an estimate of the indirect effects of the action. The point is, however, that they need not be. If the use of the term immediacy here adopted is somewhat unusual it can be justified by the maxim: "Necessity knows no law."

The method adopted for testing the truth of the foreign pressure theory consisted in the examination of a large number of actual moral judgments. The great majority of these were passed upon certain modes of conduct which most students of ethics would agree belong, objectively considered, under the jurisdiction of what I shall call the eudaemonistic standard. It is demonstrable that common sense makes use of several different standards in the work of moral approbation and condemnation. The eudaemonistic standard is, of course, that which is based upon the claims of welfare. So that the eudaemonistic judgment is one in which conduct is approved or disapproved

according as it aims or fails to aim at the welfare of some individual or individuals or social group that will be affected directly or indirectly by the action. "Welfare" is here, of course, not necessarily pleasure. We are, it must be remembered, engaged in investigating the moral consciousness of common sense, so that in this study "welfare" stands for whatever common sense includes under the term.

In examining these judgments the attempt was made to determine, first, whether the eudaemonistic judgment would anywhere appear; and—since the first casual reading of the returns showed that it did—more definitely, to how great an extent; secondly, whether any light would be thrown upon the claims of authority to possess sufficient power to mould the utterances of conscience to its own will.

The method employed throughout is the use of casuistry questions. Two groups of students in the University of Wisconsin supplied the material, one consisting of about one hundred members of the College of Letters and Science, whom, following local nomenclature, I shall call "Hill" students; the other, half as large, recruited from the first year class in the Short Course in Agriculture. To the members of each group papers containing the problems were presented in printed form, with the request to hand in answers in writing. They were directed not to consult with each other before replying, and were requested to give their reasons for their answers wherever possible. In order to insure perfect frankness on their part they were assured that their names would not be made public in connection with their answers. None of the men or women whose answers I used—it seems hardly necessary to say—had ever been a student in any department of ethics in this or any other institution, or had heard from other students anything about the topics discussed in my ethics classes, or had any acquaintance with the literature of the subject.

The study of the written returns thus obtained was supplemented, wherever necessary, by personal interviews. In these, ambiguities in the written answers were cleared up, reasons were asked for where omitted in the paper, and, in some cases, additional problems were presented. Leading questions were, however, scrupulously avoided throughout except in certain in-

stances which are explicitly mentioned in their proper place. They had always to do with reasons for judgments expressed in the paper. No intimation was ever given by me (consciously at least) in any of these interviews as to my position upon any problem.<sup>4</sup> Every student was requested to say nothing to any one else about the interview, and with the Agricultural students I invariably took the precaution, with each new comer, of satisfying myself that this request had been complied with in his case. Of the students from the College of Letters and Science over half were interviewed; of the Agricultural group, all the members but four, the written answers in their case supplying (with the exception named) little more than a vague outline of their thought. The reports of these interviews were written up ordinarily immediately after the interview itself. Particular care was taken in this respect with the Agricultural students, who supplied me, in my opinion, with my most valuable material. Using, as I do, a combination of longhand and shorthand I was able in many cases to record the interview practically *verbatim*, and in every instance, I believe, its substance was reproduced in my notes with entire accuracy.

It may be advantageous to summarize, at the very outset, the results of the investigation. Of the more than five hundred answers obtained from the "Hill" students only eleven can urge even a *prima facie* claim to immediacy. Of these at least two seem to be of the type described above, page 15. The remainder are more or less obscure. They may be regarded as cases of genuine immediacy, but on the other hand they are capable of being interpreted with varying degrees of plausibility as applications of the eudaemonistic standard. These answers supply no unequivocal example of "unconscious cerebration," though there are apparently two or three cases of it among other answers obtained at the same time but not made use of in this study. The examination of the members of the Short Course in Agriculture yielded precisely the same results. These students were asked so many questions in the interviews that the total number of answers to their credit exceeds considerably those supplied by the College of Letters and Science. Of these about fifteen may

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<sup>4</sup> For further material on this subject, see below, page 104 ff.

possibly be immediate, though again all or almost all leave the door open to classification as eudaemonistic.

The direct examination of the power of volitional pressure to produce moral judgments was carried on in the following way. The representatives of the foreign pressure theory recognize, as of course they must do, that the pressure of God's will, if actually felt as a living reality by the individual, is capable of bringing about the same effects as the pressure exercised by society. If, then, the theory is valid, this pressure should exhibit evidences of its efficacy in the judgments of those persons who believe that in the Bible we have an authentic record of His will. Those students were accordingly noted who held this view, and their answers to questions about the justifiability of breaking the Sixth or the Eighth Commandment and the law requiring forgiveness in the place of revenge were analyzed and classified with reference to their relation to the divine authority. These answers, it was found, were divisible into three classes: (1) Those which decided against obedience, but tried to conceal this fact from themselves by various forms of sophistry; (2) those that deliberately repudiated the authority of the commandment and offered no excuse for it; and (3) those whose decisions were in line with the commandment, but which held obedience to be justified solely by the fact that God knows what is best for His children, so that, to obtain this best, we must follow His guidance. The outcome was essentially the same in both colleges. Sporadic cases of leaning upon authority were indeed found in each, but they were too insignificant in number and character to supply the foundations required by the foreign pressure theory, and they were easily explainable by the principles of autonomism.

The only conclusion I am able to draw from these data is the absence of any evidence for the existence in these two groups of persons of moral judgments created by the mere pressure of a foreign will. And the influence of the autonomic factors is demonstrably so overwhelming that it seems to me to exclude even those various modifications of the theory we are testing which regard pressure as merely one factor acting in cooperation with native standards to produce the moral world. To the far more moderate claims of these views, also, our results seem to me to justify us in saying: No evidence!

## CHAPTER II

## IMMEDIACY

The present chapter, as well as that which directly follows it, deals with the material supplied by the students of the College of Letters and Science. The methods employed with the members of the Short Course in Agriculture were in certain respects so different that that portion of the work must be reserved for separate treatment. We shall take up first the subject of immediacy, leaving for Chapter III the problem of the influence of authority.

The material now to be passed in review was obtained from members of the Sophomore, Junior, and Senior classes (the Juniors being greatly in the majority) who were at the time students in courses in elementary psychology and logic. The total membership in these courses was a little over two hundred. Of these ninety-three,—forty-five women and forty-eight men,—handed in written replies. To this number must be added ten more from the same courses, from whom I obtained replies under circumstances that will be described in the proper place. In February, 1906, two months later, a second set of questions was sent to these ninety-three students. Seventy-eight responded—thirty-five men and forty-three women. Altogether twenty-one questions were asked, of which only five directly concern us in this chapter.<sup>1</sup> All of these belonged to the first series. They dealt with respect for property, promises, truth, contracts, and life, and read as follows:

I. May a poor man without money, out of work, and unable at the time to find employment, take, without the knowledge of the owner, a loaf of bread from a baker's shop in order to save from starvation the young children of a neighbor? Their mother,

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<sup>1</sup> The two sets of questions, in their entirety, will be found in the Appendix.

a widow, is sick in bed and unable for the time to earn money for their support, and the man himself is unable to get the bread in any other way.

II. A young man just graduated from college was hesitating between law and business. His tastes inclined him very strongly to the former; indeed the very idea of the latter alternative filled him with antipathy. But the young man's father had built up a large manufacturing business by his own unaided efforts and wished this, his only son, to carry it on after he himself should be compelled to give it up. Before the matter was decided the father fell sick. On his death-bed he obtained from his son a promise to abandon all thought of the law and devote his life to carrying on the business. The young man did as he promised, but although successful in the work, the longer he continued in it the more distasteful it grew, until he began to feel it positively unendurable. Under these circumstances would he be justified, after giving it a fair trial, say for a year or two, to abandon the business career and turn to the law?

III. Is it right to tell children that there is a Santa Claus?

IV. A university student hires a room for a year. After four weeks, when there is no longer any probability of its being taken by any one else, he leaves and goes to another room. Is this right under any of the following conditions? (1) He is lonely and wishes to go to a house several blocks away where some friends are lodging. (2) He is working his way through the university and an opportunity offers itself to get room-rent in return for an exceptionally small amount of service. He could earn enough to put himself through in other ways, but the change will save him two hours a day, which will enable him to do very much better university work. Does the answer to (1) or (2) differ if we suppose that: (a) his present room belongs to a man sufficiently well situated so that he and his family will not actually suffer at the loss of the rent; or (b) that it belongs to a widow with a young child and that she has no other means of support than the income from her rooms, representing let us say a net income of \$400 a year, which in case (1) will be reduced by \$60.00 and in (2) by \$30.00 if the lodger leaves.

V. Is it right for a physician, by administering an overdose of morphine or otherwise, to hasten by several weeks the death

of a patient hopelessly sick with cancer and suffering terrible torture all the time? Three cases may be distinguished: (1) It is done without the knowledge of the patient and his family; (2) it is done with the knowledge and consent of the family, but without the knowledge of the patient; (3) it is done at the request of the patient and with the consent of the family. Does the answer differ for the different cases?

Wherever they made any difference in the answer the following additions to I and II were made orally in the interviews. They are assumed in every answer that is counted.

I. The possibility of a later repayment whether by money or service may be ignored. The man who took the bread and the widow are Jews living in a Russian city in the latter part of 1905. They are preparing to flee from the country provided they can obtain help from relatives in America. In the midst of the anarchy then prevailing they can not look forward with any confidence to getting track of the baker again.

II. The son is well aware that the father blinded by his desire to have the business remain in the family, would not, if alive, release him from his promise.

The answers received fall into two classes which I shall call the latitudinarian and the rigoristic, respectively. These terms are not intended to be dyslogistic or eulogistic but to indicate certain facts. The latitudinarian answers are those which in the case under consideration permit or demand an exception to the general rule of respect for property, truth, *et cetera*. The rigoristic answers are those which stand for obedience to the rule. In IV and V where several different conditions are enumerated I shall call an answer latitudinarian when it permits a breach of the rule under any of the circumstances described. A presentation of typical answers follows.

#### LATITUDINARIAN ANSWERS

I. a. He is perfectly justified to take the bread without the baker's knowledge. Because he would be injuring no one, not even himself, if he took the bread to prevent starvation which could not be prevented in any other way.

b. I think that the poor man was justified in taking the bread under these circumstances. He would be doing an infinitely large amount of good compared to the trivial harm done, and he would be doing the good by the only possible method open to him.

c. If stealing was his only means of warding off starvation, I would consider his action justifiable. The unselfish motive of the man justifies him morally.

II. a. This young man is justified in returning to law, because the promise exacted on the death-bed was not fair. It is not right that the life of the young man should be made miserable because of the hobby of the father. The young man has the right to enjoy life as well as his father has.

b. I think the young man would be justified to abandon the business career because he would spoil the happiness of the best part of his life if he should continue the business; whereas if he should give it up he would not mar his father's life, since the latter is dead.

c. He would be justified in leaving the business. As long as he found the work distasteful to him he would never accomplish much. A person can only do the best things for himself and society when he is engaged in work that he can put his heart and soul into.

III. a. It is right to tell children that there is a Santa Claus, because they obtain enjoyment that they otherwise would not. In fact I think it wrong to deprive them of all of this enjoyment. [A statement like that of the second sentence appears altogether no less than four times.]

b. I think perhaps children get a little more enjoyment out of Christmas because of their belief in regard to Santa Claus, and I don't believe that the deceit practiced has any influence in forming habits of deceit in the child. There seem to be cases here and there where the child has lost some confidence in the parents' truthfulness through the deception, but I think they are exceptional cases.

c. Yes. The telling of such a myth does not injure the moral sensibility of either parent or child, and stimulates the imagination of the child, if nothing more.

IV. a. Under condition (1) he would not have been justified,

because he ought to have foreseen what the results would be, and then the results are of no great importance. Under condition (2a) he might leave the place because the benefit to the student would be greater than the loss to the landlord. Case (2b) is different. There the widow is actually depending upon room rent for support, while the change of rooms will only make things more convenient for the student. Therefore it would be wrong for the student to leave the widow in the lurch.

b. If it is just to keep himself from being lonely, the student is not justified in leaving the room, whether the landlord or landlady be comfortably situated financially or not. It is selfishness on his part to make others suffer just to make himself more comfortable. It takes just a little exertion on his part to drive away this loneliness without making the owner of the house suffer for it. Under second conditions mentioned, where he works his way through college, he is justified in leaving his room, irrespective of the financial circumstances of the owner. He would never get ahead if he were to look out for the good of everyone else.

V. a. The physician *has* a right to hasten the death of the patient as he would thereby benefit both the patient and his family, relieving him and his family of unnecessary pain and suffering, and not harming anyone thereby. This holds especially in cases (2) and (3).

#### RIGORISTIC ANSWERS

I. d. No. A person has no right to steal anything, no matter what the value of the article is and no matter what excuse he has. If we say that it was right in this case, where is the line to be drawn? The next person might steal a coat to keep his wife from freezing, *et cetera*, until he stole money. If he is not to consider that wrong he will go on and on without limit.

II. d. No. The son should have stuck to his promise for the sake of the father he loved.

e. No, the young man would not be justifiable in going back on his promise. A promise is a promise, and he should not have made a promise so intimately concerning his entire life until he had carefully and exhaustively considered the subject, and had

made up his mind to keep his promise for better or worse. A promise would soon cease to be of any value, if anyone could break it under even very good reasons.

III. d. Experience leads me to say no. The pleasure in believing there is a Santa Claus does not offset the disappointment of being disillusioned. Christmas can be made pleasurable and significant by other means, without misrepresentation.

e. I do not think that children ought to be made to believe in a Santa Claus. I believed in the story myself until I was about thirteen years old. When I found out it was not true I was very greatly disappointed. I remember distinctly that it was the first time I had any reason to doubt the truth of what my parents said. For some time afterward I would not trust them at all, and it was only after my grief in finding there was no Santa Claus had worn away that I again placed my confidence in them. I take great pleasure in all fairy tales and fables without believing in them and I think a child could have just as much pleasure without the pain.

f. No. It is not right, because it raises false hopes in the child, and when he discovers that there is no such person he awakes to the realization that his parents have been lying to him, and he begins to feel that it will be all right for him to tell falsehoods too because his parents have told him falsehoods, and thus we have him going astray, and it may be the first beginning of a life of deceit and crime.

IV. c. Under none of the conditions described has the student a right to give up his room. The bottom would drop out of everything if you commenced to permit any contracts to be broken.

d. If the student has agreed to occupy the room for a certain specified time it is his duty to live up to his bargain provided that by not doing so he will injure the other party.

V. b. In no case should the physician administer an overdose of morphine. It would be minimizing the sacredness of human life, which it has taken centuries of Christianity to enlarge and establish, and would open the way for, would be a precedent for evils untold, for the future.

c. I do not think it would be right under any circumstances to take a person's life before the appointed time. If a Supreme

Power exists, and it places those sufferings on a person, it must be for the best, and therefore the person is not justified in taking his life away. If he does not believe in a future life he would be perfectly in the right in ending his sufferings as soon as possible.

d. I do not think that it is right under any conditions to hasten death, because any sickness that we may have is the result of our own wrongs, and we are destined to a certain amount of punishment for it by divine plan. Therefore it is not right to interrupt this plan.

As the most cursory examination of these answers will show, all, with the possible exception of the last one, are indubitable examples of the use of the eudaemonistic standard. The last is also, if the purpose of God in punishing is regarded as educative. As a matter of fact this purpose is probably conceived as retributive, and thus the standard is what may be called dysdaemonistic, *i. e.*, the action is judged right because it aims to harm the person affected. For purposes of convenience in presentation, however, since it will make no difference in our conclusions, I shall assume that the first mentioned hypothesis is the true one, thus reducing all the answers to a single class. That such answers can be found among a hundred university students, should occasion no surprise. The real problem of the chapter is, how many of them conform to these types?

In presenting the data collected on this subject, I must premise that in the following no answer is counted as eudaemonistic unless it rises to the standards of clearness and distinctness exhibited in the preceding illustrations. In other words, in the eudaemonistic answers, as the term will be used in this study, the relation of the conduct to welfare is explicitly stated, in one way or another, to be the basis of the judgment; "eudaemonistic" is here *demonstrably eudaemonistic*. "Non-eudaemonistic" (or more broadly "non-mediated") simply means that the reply does not rise to this standard of definiteness; it leaves the question of the actual use of the eudaemonistic standard an open one. "Immediate," finally, applied to a judgment, means that it was really formed without conscious reference to the relation of the action to welfare.

The answers that supply the subject matter of our study were found for the most part, in the written papers, but a small proportion, about fifteen per cent., were obtained through interviews. No answer classified as eudaemonistic, however, was gained in response to leading questions of any kind on my part. I must add that in all enumerations of eudaemonistic answers (as in the paragraph just below), only answers to the five printed questions are counted; so that the answers to various supplementary questions employed, at times, in the interviews, are not used to swell totals.

The total number of students who handed in written replies was ninety-three. They may be divided for our present purpose into two groups. Group I consists of those who supplied three or more eudaemonistic answers, written or oral, in the sense of the term just explained. Group II, naturally, contains the remainder.

The total number of persons in Group I is seventy-five,—thirty-nine women and thirty-six men—or eighty per cent. of the whole. The total number of eudaemonistic answers received from them is two hundred and eighty-four. The accompanying table gives the details.

	Women	Men	Total
Three eudaemonistic answers .....	18	15	33
Four eudaemonistic answers .....	15	10	25
Five eudaemonistic answers .....	6	11	17

There remain eighty-four answers unaccounted for.<sup>2</sup> Of these eight, written by six persons, were studied with some care and will be taken up *seriatim* later. The others, seventy-six in number, were not followed up, and their character, in so far forth might be said to be unknown. For the answer that merely neglects to state the relation to welfare and that which takes its character from a failure to see it, look outwardly alike. However, a certain general consideration may help us to form a pretty definite opinion as to the probability of immediate answers being concealed in this unexplored territory.

This consideration is the principle that immediacy is to be

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<sup>2</sup> In seven instances either the answer was omitted or the question misunderstood.

looked for rather in the rigoristic than in the latitudinarian answers. The grounds for this assertion are obvious. According to the theory under examination, common sense morality has its source in an unthinking adherence to general rules. It would follow, therefore, that where the breach of a rule is approved, the person is standing upon his own feet, thinking for himself, except where public opinion notoriously sanctions the breach. This, for our questions, is true only of the third. *A priori*, therefore, we should not expect to find any examples of immediacy in the latitudinarian answers to questions I, II, IV, and V. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that in the course of our examination of several hundred latitudinarian answers among the "Hill" and the Agricultural students, not a single one was discovered that could urge even a *prima facie* claim to immediacy.

If immediacy is to be a property only of our rigoristic answers, the problem of the unexamined remainder becomes a simple one. For of the seventy-six answers in Group I which were not subjected to an investigation, only sixteen are rigoristic. But even this is not the last word. The probability against concealed immediacy even in this small group is reduced to a minimum by the distribution of these answers. Eleven of them are the sole non-mediated rigoristic answers in their respective papers. This state of things, of course, did not come about by chance. It was due to the employment of the interview as a supplement to the written returns. The interview, I may say in parenthesis, was used, in this department of the investigation, primarily for two purposes, one of which partially included the other. One was the examination of those persons whose paper contained less than three eudaemonistic answers, whether rigoristic or latitudinarian. The second was the examination of the rigoristic non-eudaemonistic answers. At the outset I had planned to thus examine every answer of the second kind. In the end, however, this appeared unnecessary, and I decided to content myself with an examination of those papers in which two or more of them appeared. This program was carried so far towards completion that in Group I but three papers remain which contain more than one rigoristic non-mediated answer.

Consider what this statement means. Here we have in the

first place seventeen persons (see page 28) who, without hint or other suggestion from the investigator, have five times explicitly based their approbation or condemnation upon the value of the action in terms of the welfare of those affected. Here, furthermore, are fifty-eight who have done the same thing for at least three times, and in the fourth have given either a eudaemonistic answer again, or a latitudinarian answer which, as we have seen, is practically its equivalent. If, then, the fifth answer be an unexamined rigoristic one, what is the probability that it is immediate? There might, of course, be a stray case or two, but anything beyond that is almost inconceivable.

Even in the three papers that contain two unexamined rigoristic answers the chances of immediacy are very remote. In one case the second rigoristic answer belongs to the group of eight which have been set aside for later examination (see below, page 37). I think we shall conclude that it is at bottom eudaemonistic. In the other two papers, one of the two rigoristic answers was in each case at first classified as eudaemonistic. They lost their position in this class as a result of my screwing up a peg higher the standards of admission, but that they are really immediate is extremely improbable. I may add that in the case of several of the non-mediated rigoristic answers referred to in the preceding paragraph, indications afforded by the answer itself point almost unmistakably to the use of the eudaemonistic standard.

In view of all these facts I conclude that while it is possible that a very few answers with a *prima facie* claim to immediacy may be concealed in the unexplored territory of Group I, their number must be, at most, insignificant.

Group II consists of those who gave less than three (demonstrably) eudaemonistic answers, written or oral. Its members fall into two sub-groups. The larger, fourteen in number, consists of those with whom no attempt was made to go beyond the returns contained in the papers. No one of these papers contained more than one non-mediated rigoristic answer, five of them contained none at all. In view of this fact and in view of the results obtained from Group I, farther examination seemed unnecessary.

The remaining four demand individual attention. I shall

refer to each by the number of his paper as it appears in my list.<sup>3</sup>

43. Two eudaemonistic answers: III, latitudinarian; V, rigoristic of the type illustrated under V c. I, II, and IV, are rigoristic. In the interview I asked her a number of supplementary questions, about half of those which will be found in Chapter IV, page 65 ff. In almost every case the answer was rigoristic. I then inquired for the reasons for her attitude. In answering I:5 (see page 67) she had said in explanation of her rigorism: "If you once permit stealing it is impossible to draw the line." Following up this clue I inquired whether it was the difficulty of drawing the line that had determined her attitude. She replied that it was, both in the oral questions I had just put before her, and in the written answers to I, II, and IV. She insisted with great positiveness that this consideration had been clearly in her mind and had been the determining factor in her judgment when writing out the answers. In order to see whether she was merely following my lead I placed the question about drawing the line in the midst of a series of leading questions as to the reasons for assuming the rigoristic attitude.<sup>4</sup> She asserted that the others had not occurred to her. 43, then, supplies no immediate answers. I, II, and IV are indeed not "eudaemonistic" in the narrow sense in which I am using the term in this study, because the ground on which they are based was discovered in the process of asking supplementary casuistry problems (see page 28) and then, more comprehensively, as the result of a leading question on my part. But they are none the less based upon the eudaemonistic standard.

140. My report on this student is unsatisfactory, because the investigation itself was incomplete. This in turn was due partly to lack of time, partly, it would seem, to a failure of my mental machinery to work. Answers to III and V are mediated latitudinarian. The answer to I will be considered later in connection with the eight answers left over from Group I. IV was non-mediated and rigoristic. There was no time to take it up

<sup>3</sup>In this chapter and the chapters following numbers 1-52 are women, and 101-151 are men in the College of Letters and Science; 201-250 are students in the Agricultural College.

<sup>4</sup>These reasons are enumerated in chapter IV, p. 70. For convenience of reference, they have also been placed in the Appendix, page 144.

in the interview; the reader may therefore classify it to suit himself. II. The written answer read: "A promise should be kept by all means. If the young man knew that he did not like the business as well as law and would not perhaps stick to the business if he did try it, he should not have made the promise. He knew that he would not get the most out of life nor would it be pleasant for him if he followed work which he despised." I tried to get his point of view by asking questions II 1a and b and II 4 (see pages 67 and 68). In each instance he replied: **Break the promise.** Then I inquired what the difference was between these cases and the promise made to the dying father. He tried to find a difference but could not. Thereupon he at first said he felt differently about them anyway, appearing inclined to stick to each decision; then without warning he went definitely over to the other side and declared he would change his answer to the written question. I suggested there was one real difference between the two sets of cases; in the questions of the interview the promise was broken in order to help another person, while in the printed question it was broken for the promiser's own advantage. However, he said this made no difference in his opinion. The original answer to this question, I am inclined to believe, is based upon the same grounds as that of d quoted above, (page 25) reinforced, perhaps, by the feeling, frequently expressed, that a promise to the dead is more binding than one to the living. The answers to the two oral questions are doubtless eudaemonistic in source, and the final answer to the printed question is undoubtedly derived from these by analogy. But this hypothesis, unfortunately, was not verified.

136. His answer to V will be found above, page 27, as V. d. The other four were rigoristic also, no grounds being assigned. The method of investigation pursued was the same as with 43, and the results were precisely the same.

137. All answers are non-eudaemonistic and rigoristic. We had one interview in which I assured myself by means of the supplementary questions already referred to and in other ways that he was thoroughly rigoristic—the most uncompromisingly so of anyone in the entire number. I also determined that he was not guided by any of the considerations listed in the Appendix, which have been already referred to. Only one of those I

mentioned had appealed to him—admiration for the man who takes a position and sticks to it without compromise. He is, he told me, a great admirer of John Quincy Adams, whose life he is well acquainted with, and the doughty old warrior's stand for principle has had much influence upon him. Beyond this point we were unable to go that day for lack of time. It was my desire to have a second interview, but that proved impossible. As he did not answer the questions of February, 1906, I was left without farther light on the problem. While then it seems probable that he is, in part at least, a representative of the aesthetic type; and while any possible remainder can be explained in several different ways in the light of the results obtained from certain of the Agricultural students, I should prefer to reserve a decision in his case and mark the answer "Incomplete."

For Group II, then, we have the following results. Nowhere does positive evidence of immediacy appear, unless it be in 140, I, which is reserved for later examination. All the positive evidence there is, is decidedly against the existence of immediacy. 140, II and IV and 137 are interesting cases unfortunately left incomplete. Combining our findings with those for Group I we can summarize in the statement that in ninety-three papers the only chances for immediacy are narrowed down to a few sporadic answers.

It may be urged, however, that any attempt to draw broad conclusions from these data would be unjustifiable. For it may be that they do not represent the average student faithfully. These young women and men were requested to give reasons for their answers wherever possible. No special emphasis was placed upon this request. Nevertheless it may be objected that the hundred and ten or more members of these classes who handed in no replies consisted largely or entirely of those who found themselves unable to assign reasons for their decisions; and that it was precisely this fact that deterred them from writing the desired paper.

In order to decide this matter, I appeared before the classes a second time and told them that the main purpose of my investigation was to discover how far people are aware of the reasons for their judgments of right and wrong; and that in order to solve this problem it was necessary now to know how many had

failed to hand in written replies because of inability to assign grounds for them. Those of whom this was true were accordingly requested to make a written statement to that effect. In response to this request eleven statements were received. One was unsigned; the writers of the others, seven women and three men, I proceeded to interview. Here, if anywhere, should be our blind worshipers of the powers that be. As a matter of fact they differed in no respect from the students already examined. Indeed there were only two persons who even claimed inability to assign reasons for any of the answers. One of these wrote: "I could answer most of the questions, but could not give reasons. I just felt that they were right or wrong." The other eight said either that there were certain questions for which they could find no reasons (one in number), or no reasons that satisfied them (three), or else that they had failed to hand in a paper because of certain questions which they could not decide (four). The inability of this last group to come to a decision turned out, upon investigation, to be due in every case not to paucity but to multiplicity of reasons, between the conflicting claims of which they had been unable to find a resting-place. The three who were not satisfied with their reasons seem merely to have been afraid that *I* would not find the reasons satisfactory; the "certain questions" for which one person could find no reasons were questions outside of the set that we have been studying, and of an entirely different nature.

This is a rather discouraging showing for the searcher after immediacy. But there is worse to come. Even the two young women upon whom he has been feeling he could depend are to prove faithless or partly faithless. The evidence is clear. 51, who "just felt that they were right or wrong" has two plainly eudaemonistic answers, and three that are open to discussion. The former are III and V. III she declared herself in the interview unable to decide: "On the one hand there is the pleasure of the children; on the other the loss of faith in the parents." She distinctly remembered that these were her reasons when the printed questions were before her and she offered circumstantial evidence to verify her assertion. In V (1) and (2) she thinks it would be wrong to give the morphine; but in (3) it would be right because it would be merciful to relieve him of

his sufferings. The answer to I must be left for the next chapter. II and IV go to join the little group that has been awaiting our attention for some time. 51 has really done very little to help the cause, but the contributions of 46 are zero. She made indeed a promising start, answering all the five questions, in the interview, in thorough-going rigoristic fashion. When, however, I asked her if she could tell me her reason for being so strict she had no difficulty in doing so whatever. "If you allow yourself one exception, why not others? till you could in the end allow yourself anything." "But why not allow yourself anything?" I inquired. "Because then society would go to pieces," was the reply. She affirmed in the most positive manner that both these ideas were before her mind clearly when the questions were given her in December, and that she had applied them in deciding upon the answers. She had failed to hand in her paper because she did not understand what I meant by asking for reasons. A reason to her mind evidently meant something very profound and remote.

It appears then that our ninety-three students were thoroughly representative after all. The only problem that remains is whether there is any immediacy discoverable at all. To solve this we take up the answers, whose number has now grown to eleven, which from time to time we have been setting aside for detailed examination.

Before entering upon this, however, it will be necessary for us to become acquainted with a form of the eudaemonistic judgment which we have not as yet met in the course of this investigation. It is due to the demand which common sense makes that its moral judgments be consistent. This demand is involved in the very meaning of the word "right." It does not come primarily from the philosopher as such, it will be equally insisted upon by the veriest Philistine, innocent of all reflection upon the deeper problems of conduct. Where two moral judgments appear to contradict each other he recognizes, in the abstract at least, that one or both must be modified. For the same reason, in deciding complicated questions, as that of "tainted money," he usually starts from some maxim regarded as beyond the reach of criticism, and argues from what is logically involved therein to the mode of conduct that shall prove to be worthy of

approbation. This method of procedure will normally lead to satisfactory results if the starting-point is proof against criticism. But a single flaw in the reasoning, more particularly the acceptance as a premise of a universal proposition which is valid only under certain conditions will yield results which are not only erroneous but are in some cases apparently impossible to trace to the standard from which the judgment actually started.

Just what is meant by this last statement will appear from an illustration taken from the sphere of what is commonly ranked as prudence rather than morality. In his *Psychology of the Religious Experience*, page 68, Professor Coe reproduces the confession of a farmer boy who once heard and took to heart that excellent maxim: "Whatever is worth doing is worth doing well." Using this as a principle of universal application, when he was running the reaping machine he would stop his team and go carefully back upon his course to pull up every wisp of grain that the machine missed. Before he discovered the error of his way he had rendered his life almost unendurable. Obviously he looked at the situation in the light of a general principle which, because of circumstances that escaped his attention, did not apply in this case; and he reacted with emotions appropriate to the abstract principle.

The following is an example of the same thing from the field of the moral judgment. Among the questions given to the "Hill" students was the following: A century or more ago a shipload of people were wrecked upon a desert island in the Pacific far from all trade routes. There they and their descendants lived for many years, unvisited by other men, until finally a ship appeared and carried them away to Europe. At that time there was in their prison a man who had just been sentenced to be hung for murder. Is the community, before breaking up, its members to scatter to different parts of the world, bound to hang this murderer or are they at liberty to set him free? It being assumed that while the murder was in every respect unjustifiable, it was committed under circumstances which give no grounds for the fear that the murderer, if freed, would ever commit another similar crime.

To this there was received, among others, the following written answer: "The breaking up of the community does not

change the status of the murderer, and the people are just as much bound as ever to hang him." In order to determine the exact source of this judgment I followed up the reply by means of an interview the substance of which follows. I must, however, premise before quoting that while his statements were in the form of answers to my questions, none of these was in any possible sense of the term a leading question. The young man said: "I recognize two reasons for punishing a murderer: as a warning to others, and to keep that same man from doing it again. I was perfectly willing to believe that a man might commit a deliberate and unjustifiable murder, for which he would be hung, under such circumstances that there was no probability that he would do it again. The reason why I answered as I did in my paper was that I thought the first reason still held: he did something for which he ought to be hung and the fact that the community was going to scatter did not seem to me to have anything to do with the question of his punishment." Thereupon I inquired whether if the community broke up and its government ceased to exist, its members scattering to become the subjects of new governments, the first reason for punishment still held. To this he replied: "Now that you ask me I see that it does not and I should reverse my written answer." This was by no means an isolated instance. Out of eighty-seven unequivocal replies sixteen exhibited this fallacy. It was possible to show some of the students that their conclusion did not follow from the premises; but others could not be made to see it, even after the expenditure on my part of considerable effort. A judgment of this kind I shall call pseudo-eudaemonistic.

After this excursus we are now prepared to take up the cases that have been reserved for special examination. The first shall be number V of paper 120. The answers to I and II in this paper are mediated latitudinarian, and of III, mediated rigoristic. IV I am unable to pass upon. I made an attempt to get at its foundation in the interview, got off on a wrong track, and in the end discovered nothing. The written answer to V reads: "Wrong in every instance. 'Tis not right to destroy life except to save it." His oral explanation in the interview, elicited by questions, but not leading questions, and given (of course with necessary compression) mainly in his own words,

was as follows: "Life is sacred because its beginning and end are shrouded in mystery. Therefore it is something that we ought not to tamper with." The answer to c and d on pages 26 and 27 do not represent what he means. He found the question very difficult to answer for he knew of a case which though not exactly the same, was somewhat like this, and he had more than once asked himself: "What purpose is served by letting this person live?" However, he always came back to the conclusion stated above. This view "is the outgrowth of my religious life. God has many attributes of which we know nothing. Of others we only know that they exist, not their nature. Life is one of these latter. Therefore we must not decide when it shall end." The binding force of the preceding "therefores" is a little hard to see. But answers to other questions may perhaps throw some light upon it. In the first place I think we may feel certain that his answer is not immediate. It is difficult to conceive of immediacy in dealing with a problem like this on the part of a man who sums up his conclusion with regard to I in the following (written) words: "Within custom and law the welfare of men may be expected to be secured; when it is not, then it may be sought without the bounds of convention." Immediacy becomes still more difficult to suppose when we remember that, brought face to face with a problem of this kind in actual life he had repeatedly asked himself, what purpose is served by letting this person live? In the second place we get some positive help from his answer to XI of Series II, (see Appendix) written before this interview: "Life is sacred and not ours except to live for men. Clerk or clergyman, we live not for ourselves or our own—but for character, our own character and our neighbor's character both of physical and moral life." This answer and the answer to I supply the keynote (more than once repeated) of all his written and oral answers in both the first and second series. With this clue his general position with regard to V seems not hard to understand. In a universe of mystery, man has no right to take it upon himself to determine when the possibilities of character development that are placed in his hands, are exhausted. What is this but thoroughly self-conscious eudaemonism of the perfectionistic type? Some phases of his thinking may not be entirely

cleared up by this explanation, but any perfectly clean-cut formula would undoubtedly misrepresent his thought.

V of 44. I, III, and IV are mediated, the first rigoristic, the ground being that it is dangerous to start stealing, though she admits that she was at first carried away by her sympathies to the opposite conclusion. II is latitudinarian and essentially eudaemonistic though not rising quite to the standard here set for admission to that class. Supplementary oral questions on I show a thorough-going and on the whole discriminating use of the eudaemonistic standard. V was a very real question to her for she knew intimately of a pitiful case of cancer like that here described. The patient was abandoned by his family before the last stages of the disease had been reached, and he was thrown upon charity. He was sent first to a private, then to a public hospital, where after much suffering he died. Her written answer is: "It is wrong in every case. No physician has the right to cut off a human life." She was not able to formulate, in the interview, her reasons with perfect definiteness, but they are religious in character. The point of view is not that of c or d of pages 26 and 27; neither is it that of 120, just studied. It is rather that life is a gift which God has given us, for which reason we ought not to destroy it. Anything more definite than this was not elicited, as I did not ask leading questions. But apparently the half-formulated thought in her mind is: To destroy a life is to say that it is valueless. But it can't be that, because it is the gift of God. Mingled with this may well be the belief that to declare a life valueless is to insult God by supposing that He does not know when to give and when to take away.

I of 39. II, III, and IV are latitudinarian and mediated; V is rigoristic and mediated, of the type of c, page 26. The written answer to I is: "The act would be stealing, and that, whether it be a little matter of a loaf of bread, or a big matter of an individual or corporation stealing from the public, is wrong morally." In the interview she gave the same answer to the question I 6 (see below, page 67); but in I 3b (page 66) she thought it unnecessary to return the shoes at so much labor because the sister probably would not use them. The reasons for her answer were not any of the reasons for the observance of general rules enumerated in the Appendix. She was unable to assign the rea-

son but declared she felt that everyone has a standard in his own mind and that if he drops below this he injures the purity of his character. Why the standard forbade stealing to save a life she was unable to say. This may perhaps be a real case of immediacy. On the other hand Series II contains two such flagrant examples (as it seems to me) of the pseudo-eudaemonistic judgment that I find it hard to believe that this may not be another case of the same thing. The questions are I and II of Series II.<sup>5</sup> Her answer in each case was, Enforce the law. In the interview she said in explanation that the two problems seemed to her identical. In II she would not think less of the Chinese merchant for trying to get through, but the *officials* in each case had a duty to perform. The difficulty of drawing the line did not occur to her, she declared in answer to my question, though the danger of setting a bad example did, but it was not the determining factor. Laws are not binding except as they are for the good of those who live under them, but these were good laws and the officials were set there to enforce them. Therefore they ought to enforce them. A similar use of the principle, Private property is necessary for the existence of society and therefore all should unite in its protection, would, taken abstractly, yield the result that we find here. The difficulty, why this fallacy appears in I and not in the following answers, is one that any explanation would have to face. It might easily have been some observation or experience, which in its concreteness had disappeared from memory; it might have been a multiplicity of observations. This, of course, is pure speculation. But in the end the fact remains, whatever its significance, that a too abstract use of the eudaemonistic standard will explain this judgment and that the young woman has apparently been guilty of just this abstract thinking in dealing with two other questions.

IV in paper 135. I, II, and V are latitudinarian and mediated, III is rigoristic and mediated. The written answer to IV is: "In case one he does commit a wrong. No reasons. In case two he also commits a wrong. Doubtful. The suppositions (a) and (b) do not make any difference, he does a moral wrong in both cases. That is, I do not believe that the moral wrong is any different in either case. It seems self-evident that he does a moral wrong."

<sup>5</sup> See Appendix, page 139.

In the interview he declared that the statements accompanying his decisions in this answer described with exactness his state of mind at the time of writing. No reason came to his mind in answering this question. The minute he read it, it seemed to him self-evident that the student was bound to remain. Other problems concerning contracts were then given him, distinctly more puzzling than this. All were answered in the same way. Thereupon I inquired as to the reason for his position, enumerating those stated in the Appendix. Only one of these had he ever used (as far as he could remember) in deciding moral questions, and that was, the difficulty of drawing the line. This he had often thought of and often used. However, it was not in his mind in answering IV. That simply came to him at once as the right answer. However, as he went down the list of printed questions it did occur to him (though it was never a deciding factor). This case seems to differ from 43 and 136 (see above, pages 31 and 32) in one respect only; the principle habitually used in deciding this class of problems was in this particular instance not present in the mind of the person answering. This is, indeed, immediacy. But taking all the facts into consideration it does not look like the kind of immediacy demanded by the custom theory. "I answered these questions instantly," he declared at the close of the interview, referring of course to the printed questions, "as soon as I had read them over carefully enough to understand them. It took no longer to answer them than to get the answer down upon the paper. I always take sides at once [*i. e.*, in all practical affairs] and always know at once what I consider right or wrong." A person whose mind works as rapidly as this can not and need not have his reasons all spread out before him whenever he is called upon to deal with matters of conduct whether moral or prudential. He recognizes that this is one of a set of cases which he always decides in a certain way, and then he dismisses the subject from his mind. But if we can trust his statements in the interview, we shall not suppose that these decisions are without a foundation in his own thinking. From time to time he has seen the danger of breaking general rules and has adopted the maxims appropriate to this perception.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Cf. above, page 15.

The possibility of having even an articulated system of rational principles in one's possession (something undoubtedly quite beyond what took place in 135), and yet letting them drop into temporary oblivescence in solving problems of conduct was expressly affirmed by 22. She had answered II in her paper thus: "One of our faculty says, 'The secret of happiness lies in liking what we have to do, not in doing what we like.' I think the young man could learn to like his business, especially if (as the problem states) he was successful. The conviction of its being unendurable likely grew out of pondering his sacrificial plans." In the interview she said she would have approved of his breaking his promise for some reasons but this one did not seem to her important enough. On my inquiring whether she had had before her mind the reasons that made the keeping of promises important she replied, "Not clearly, but they were there subconsciously." Asked for the grounds of this assertion she replied: "I had an ethical creed—a rather mixed one—worked out before I ever saw these questions. It shows itself clearly in I, and led me to balance gain and loss in all these questions." But in II, and, as it further appeared, also in IV, the exact nature of the gain involved in loyalty to promises and contracts was not clearly present in consciousness.

II and IV of 8. The answers to I, III, and V were latitudinarian and mediated. The answers not merely to II and IV but also (in the interview) to several supplementary questions on promises similar to and in part identical with those under II, on pages 67 and 68 were uncompromisingly rigoristic. In fact after II 5 she volunteered the sweeping statement that no promise, except one obtained by force, should be broken. My efforts in the interview were directed mainly to discovering the reasons for the difference in her attitude in these two sets of cases. In the first place her reason for rigorism was not any of those in the list of the Appendix. It was rather that in making a promise or contract a person takes, or may take, into consideration the various consequences and having accepted them voluntarily must stand by them. The æsthetic standard seems here to be speaking, demanding that a man shall be "man enough" to do what he has once resolved to do. Pseudo-eudaemonism

may well be present also, because, in the first place, as will appear immediately, she knows well enough that the claim of the promisee depends upon the existence of a desire which the promise will satisfy, and in the second place, she is guilty of a fallacy of the pseudo-eudaemonistic judgment in II of Series II, like 39.<sup>7</sup> But suppose the promisee is injured by faithfulness to the promise, as in II 1 a and b? He is getting what he wanted. *Injuria non fit volenti*, she would doubtless have said had she ever heard of the maxim. That these principles really coexisted in her mind with a clear-eyed eudaemonism seems to be shown from the following conversation with which (after having put the supplementary questions on promises referred to above) the interview practically opened. "Why," I inquired, "are you so severe in II with the young man, while in I you allow the man to steal?" The question in this form she waived aside, and answered: "I do not see that it is right for a person to let anyone die for want of food, when it can be obtained. I have read at different times in the newspapers of persons helping themselves under conditions like these and have always thought it right. Of course I should not think it right for him to take it from others, if they would suffer by it, but only from those who have abundance." "How does this differ from killing a man, or risking killing him, for the sake of keeping a promise?" This gave her a moment's pause. Then she said: "I suppose he wanted to know; so he ought to be told." "If then we must be so particular about our promises, why do you think it right to make children believe in Santa Claus?" "I can not see any harm in it; it gives children pleasure; it gave me pleasure, at least, in my childhood." Neither in II then, nor in IV, which for her was identical in principle with II, can I discover any of the immediacy which the custom theory demands.

The same is true of 51, II and IV. Her point of view is in essence identical with that just analyzed. The details indeed differ, but the differences are so superficial that it would be wearisome and useless to describe our interview. She is the young woman mentioned above, page 34. We can see how she could say of these two questions at any rate with a fair

<sup>7</sup> See above, page 40.

approximation to accuracy: "I could not give reasons [for my answers]. I just felt that they were right or wrong;" and yet how, none the less, immediacy might be absent.

I in 140 (see above, page 31). Supplementary questions I 3b and 6 (of pages 66 and 67) were asked in the interview. He answered both rigoristically, but the former only after considerable hesitation, and with the air of one who is doing something because he is forced to do it, and of which he ought to be ashamed. To get at the grounds of his opinion I ran through the list of possible reasons so often referred to in this part of our study, none of them had been in his mind in formulating either the written answer or the oral ones. He judged strictly in these matters, he said, because he felt the actions we were discussing injured character. The other questions, as II and V, he told me, had required a good deal of thought, but this had emerged at once of itself without any particular thought about reasons beyond the fact that it was wrong to steal anything small as well as big. This fact had been impressed upon him by seeing people ride on the street cars without paying the fare when the conductor overlooked them.

I shall not attempt to take any definite position with regard to this case because of absence of data. The hesitation and shamefacedness with which he answered question I 3b exhibit indeed that latent conception of the relation of morality to values, which this investigation has lead me to believe is never absent from the moral judgment. The reference to character may mean a still more definite conception of the relation of morality to values or it may not. Aesthetic factors, however, are almost certain to enter into such an estimate of character, and there is always the possibility also that, unknown to the man himself, the same may be true of the utilitarian values that depend upon the indirect effects of actions. No one can have failed to observe in specific cases the harm done by the departure from the general rules of conduct, and generalization of such observations may go on outside of the focus of consciousness. These generalizations may then, as we have seen, be applied far beyond their legitimate boundaries as the result of abstract thinking. These facts are perfectly capable of explaining the judgment under examination. But these are possibilities that are rather suggested by the results

obtained from this entire study than by anything contained in our immediate data.

I and IV of 129. II, III, and V are latitudinarian and mediated. The last is quoted as V. a on page 25 above. On my repeating question I in the interview he replied: "This can be looked at in two ways. If I say what I feel, he should not steal, but I can not give any reason for it. If I reason it out I should call it all right. For he saves his life and the lives of others and does no particular harm." He felt much perplexed, but in the end, though somewhat doubtfully, reaffirmed the rigoristic answer of his paper. I asked questions I 6 and I 3 b. The former he answered rigoristically; in the latter he thought it unnecessary to return the shoes because they were not worth the trouble it would cost. I pointed out to him that his answers to I and IV were more rigorous than those of most people would be and asked if he could assign any reasons for these answers. He was unable to do so. I then enumerated the various possible eudaemonistic reasons. He recognized none of them as his own. Of one he said it was a good reason but it had had nothing to do with determining his answer. The authority of the Bible was declared to play no rôle whatever. Here the interview closed.

As in the preceding case the data supplied by paper and interview are not sufficient to warrant us in asserting a positive conclusion. But again I can not refrain from pointing out that a very simple hypothesis is capable of explaining all the facts. I and IV are both, from one point of view, problems of property; and respect for property our student sees derives its obligatoriness from the fact that property has value (as is shown by the answer to I 3 b). Now suppose this young man (who is the son of wealthy parents) looks at these problems solely from the point of view of the property owner. Suppose also that, rating the demands of charity rather low, he conceives that the baker is under no obligation to supply the bread even if asked for it, or the landlord to release his tenant from the contract under any of the conditions mentioned. Then if he recognizes clearly or dimly that rights and duties are correlative, as many of our students implicitly do, especially in the answers to II,—if he recognizes, in other words, that A's rights against B are only B's duties towards A, he

could reach no other conclusion than the one he stated—and that without any mental process which he would be likely to call reasoning. Whether this represents the actual course of his thoughts I will not undertake to decide.

My conclusions with regard to these eight students may be summarized as follows: 120 and 44 seem almost certainly to be using in V the eudaemonistic standard. II and IV in 8 and 51 seem eudaemonistic with about equal certainty, the peculiarities of their reports being explained by the exceptional valuation placed upon the given word, a valuation of perhaps mixed aesthetic and eudaemonistic origin. I in 39 may be immediate, but, even if the student's record is considered as an isolated phenomenon, the chances are at least equal that it is pseudo-eudaemonistic. IV in 135 is an undoubted case of temporary immediacy but its foundations are apparently past observations of utility. I in 140 and I and IV in 129 may be immediate, but they may also be explained as due to the use of the eudaemonistic standard.

The view that all the members of this group are cases of the eudaemonistic standard rises, however, it seems to me, from a mere possibility to the status of an overwhelming probability when they are considered in relation to the whole of which they form a part. Data, written and oral, have been supplied by one hundred and two students (omitting number 137—see page 32 on the ground of the incompleteness of the examination). Of these, as we have seen, seventy-five supply at least three eudaemonistic answers. In twenty-five of these there are four eudaemonistic answers and in seventeen, five. Only three of these records contain more than one non-mediated rigoristic answer, and in each of these three one of the two, though not classed as eudaemonistic, is almost certainly so in fact. Of the remaining seventeen sets of replies fourteen contain two eudaemonistic answers and never more than one non-mediated rigoristic answer. They form a group not investigated by means of the interview, because it did not seem worth while. Two (43 and 136) are certainly using the eudaemonistic standard throughout, though in each it required more or less use of the leading question to bring this fact out. Finally, one (140) has two eudaemonistic answers, while the other

three answers had to be left in a more or less hazy condition. Of the total of five hundred answers, only eleven were discovered that had even a *prima facie* claim to immediacy, and the plausibility of even this modest claim is in many instances, as we have just seen, to say the least, doubtful. A record of this sort seems to me open to but one interpretation.

Two facts not as yet mentioned supply confirmatory evidence of the validity of the inferences which we have drawn from these data. In the latitudinarian answers to I only two persons attempt to justify their attitude by saying, "Not to take the bread would be murder." Yet on the theory under investigation, this is the only "reason" that could be assigned. It is true that a small number, but *only* a small number, put the matter thus: "It would be worse to let them starve than to steal." But whether this was intended as the equivalent of the preceding, I am unable to state.

In February, 1906, as has already been said, a second series of questions was given out to those who had answered the first set. Among them was the following, which was designed primarily to throw light upon the nature and distribution of the aesthetic standard: At the burning of Moscow in 1812, two guards at the royal palace were in the confusion forgotten and the order to relieve them was not given. They therefore remained at their post and were buried under the burning timbers. Was it their duty to remain when they knew there was nothing left to guard? If not strictly their duty would you think less of them for making their escape?

The great majority of those who answered this question took the opportunity to place themselves on record as explicitly denying the position which, according to the thorough-going adherents of the custom theory, common sense takes, by asserting that a sacrifice which does not result in compensating good is immoral. The following answer, though more comprehensive and more clearly formulated than most of the others, is nevertheless, in the spirit that it exhibits, thoroughly typical: "It was not their duty to remain and I should think no less of them for having left their posts. Indeed, it seems to me that they used no judgment at all. No matter what position a man may hold, circumstances alter his duty, and he must use his

judgment, not go blindly by some rule whatever the circumstances. It is never a man's duty to give his life or risk it, unless by doing so he does some good—helps a good cause, for example."

The study of the moral judgments of these students seems to me to point to the conclusion that the difference in kind which many philosophers imagine to exist between their own moral judgments and those of common sense is non-existent. Problems such as we have been discussing they would doubtless say belong, objectively considered, under the eudaemonistic standard. But that the "herd" are capable of seeing this, or at any rate that they do see it, is denied. Our data seem to show that, on the contrary, the "herd" use the same standards as the philosopher. The point of view may often be partial or one-sided, phases of the situation which are of the utmost importance may at times be overlooked. But *in essence* the process is the same for learned and unlearned, the wise man and the fool. Many objections can, of course, be urged against drawing such conclusions from the facts supplied in this chapter. These objections can, however, be best considered when we have the data before us in their totality. I will therefore ask the reader to suspend judgment till we reach the fifth chapter when they will be discussed at length.

## CHAPTER III

## AUTHORITY

The preceding chapter has attempted to exhibit the morality of the forms of conduct there described as determined by their perceived relation to the welfare of some or all of the persons affected. Even if, however, the validity or the significance of this conclusion from our data be denied, positive evidence was collected during the investigation to show that the account of the sources of the moral judgment put forth by the foreign pressure theory is without adequate foundation. This material the present chapter will pass in review.

The theory in question, as has already been pointed out,<sup>1</sup> recognizes that the pressure of God's will is capable of bringing about the same effects as the pressure exercised by society. This is explicitly admitted by Professor Paulsen.<sup>2</sup> In any event, it is a necessary implication of the theory. For the former pressure does not differ from the latter in its nature as experienced by the individual who feels it, and where the presence of God is a living reality in the mind the one will be no less than the other in intensity. If then the theory is valid, judgments created by this pressure should appear in considerable numbers among those persons who believe that the Bible is an authoritative record of the divine will. To determine how far the facts would meet such a requirement an examination was made of the effects of the dicta of the Bible upon the judgments of those who professed to regard it as the ultimate guide in matters of faith and practice. The material was supplied by the answers to I and V of Series I, and X of Series II. The two former questions will be found above, pages 21 and 22, the last reads as follows:

A young man came to New York from the country without

<sup>1</sup> See above, page 20.

<sup>2</sup> *System of Ethics*, 345, 363, 364.

money and without friends. He was soon befriended by a prosperous business man who took him into his employment and into his home, and, in the end, made him his partner. The new partner took advantage of his position to cheat his benefactor out of all his money, deprived him of his share in the business, and turned him out of both shop and home, penniless. More than that, he openly boasted of it to certain persons, evidently considering it not merely a smart trick, but also a good joke. Suppose the benefactor, knowing not merely what had been done to him, but also the brazen effrontery of the man in boasting of his misdeeds, having no prospect before him of obtaining restitution from the courts, had found himself able to secure the aid of powerful influences that by diverting custom and withdrawing loans could have ruined the business of the younger man, would he have been morally justified in so doing? This story of ingratitude, I may add, is true in every detail.

The above questions are, of course, susceptible to either of two answers. Either, obey the rule, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not kill, Love your enemies, or break it. Among those who elect the second alternative we may distinguish four different attitudes towards the authority which they claim to accept.

(1) The statements or commands contained in the Bible are considered as valid in the abstract, but they are interpreted so as to conform to the individual's own standards. Thus 139 writes in answer to Question V: "It is wrong for a physician to give poison to a man suffering from cancer, because the Scriptures expressly forbid the taking of another person's life, and that is exactly what the physician would be doing." In I, he had said it was right for the man to steal. In reply to the inquiry whether the Scriptures do not expressly forbid the taking of another's property, he replied: "Yes, but I think it is right because the man did not do it for himself. If he had it would have been wrong." 51 supplies another slight variation upon the same theme. Her answers were all obtained in the interview.<sup>3</sup> Question I she could not decide. "On the one hand there is the lives of these people, on the other stealing is wrong."

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<sup>3</sup> See above, page 34.

The latter conviction was not due to any of the reasons enumerated in the Appendix. "Was it that the Bible forbids it?" "Yes, I remember distinctly that the minute I read this over the words came to my mind: 'Thou shalt not steal.'" Apparently this consideration did not entirely convince her, but when she answered V (3) in the affirmative "because it would be merciful to relieve him of his sufferings," I could not but inquire if she had forgotten the command "Thou shalt not kill." To this she at once replied: "If he consents it is not murder." In each of these cases, the principles of interpretation, including the principles by which definite commands were interpreted out of existence, were evidently obtained from the conscience of the person judging.

(2) is similar in principle to the first, differing in this, that certain commands are declared to be "counsels of perfection," valid enough for the angels, no doubt, but never intended for the guidance of ordinary human beings. Thus in answer to X of Series II, 37 writes: "If the man had followed strictly the law of Christ, he would not have taken advantage of an opportunity to retaliate. But if he was any less than divine, I don't see how he could keep from taking vengeance. No one would blame him for it, I think. Perhaps in the strictest sense he was not morally justified, yet I don't think he would really be doing wrong to take vengeance."

(3) The best example of this is the answer to IV of Series II, given by 10. The question was as follows: In the lives of the early Christian saints occurs the story of a certain monk who stole leather from the shop of a rich merchant in order to make shoes for poor children. Assuming that the leather could have been obtained in no other way, was this right?

The answer reads: "The monk did no wrong in taking the leather from the rich merchant. He was not disobeying God's commands in taking it but was obeying His commands to aid those who are distressed. The two commands are here seemingly in opposition, but the latter far outweighs the former." A similar reply was given to I and V of Series I. Let it not be said that the conviction that the latter command "far outweighs" the former is due to the paramount position accorded by the founder of Christianity to the precept: "Thou shalt

love thy neighbor as thyself." A mind that has no standards of its own can only accept what is given to it in the form in which it comes. It can only assume then that the definite commands "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not kill," are really in harmony with the love of our neighbor, whatever the appearances to the contrary, and are therefore to be unquestioningly obeyed.

(4) In the preceding types there is some pretence of guiding one's conscience by the express statement of the Bible. In the present one this pretence is thrown aside and the authority of God's commands is simply repudiated. The answer to V given by 19 appears on her paper as follows: "No in cases 1, 2, and 3. It would be murder, no matter how you look at it. It would be interfering with Divine Providence." Then below in another ink were written these words: "N. B.—Upon reconsideration I believe it would be an act of mercy, allowable under condition three." She informed me in the interview which naturally followed this declaration that the change in her opinion was due to hearing the description in vivid form of a peculiarly horrible case of death by cancer. I held the biblical prohibition squarely up in front of her face, but she showed no inclination to recant.

This student was able to assign a reason (or perhaps I should say, cause) for repudiating the commands of God, but where nothing of the kind can be formulated, that is not allowed to make any difference in the result. The following is a conversation which I held with a hard-working but very "slow" student who was soon afterwards dropped from the university for failure in three studies. He had answered in his paper the question on revenge as follows: "In one way I might say yes, but if we go according to teaching of the Scripture the answer should be *no*. Love thy enemies." This he informed me in the interview meant: "If a man believes in God and the Christian religion [as he did] it would be wrong. Otherwise it would be all right." For the sake of argument I assumed this statement to mean: Revenge is wrong because God has forbidden it, and asked him how he made his answer in I (which had been latitudinarian) agree with the VIII. commandment. "Well," he answered "what are you going to do about it? Are

you going to let those children starve?" "But," I urged, "the *commandment* says: Thou shalt not steal." "Every commandment," he replied, "has exceptions. For instance there is the command, Thou shalt not bear false witness. But we do not think it wrong for a doctor to lie to his patients." "If there can be an exception to that rule, why not to the rule: Do not revenge yourself?" "This is quite different. If a man ruined the man who had ruined him, others must suffer, his family, his creditors, *et cetera*." "That may be a very good reason for not seeking revenge, but it does not touch the main difficulty. The VIII commandment simply says: Thou shalt not steal. Now how can there be any exceptions to that?" "That question is too deep for me." "But you nevertheless believe there are exceptions?" "Yes, I do." After that he admitted that the reasons for not revenging oneself would hold whether a man believed in the Christian religion or not.

We now turn to the other class of answers, those in harmony with the commands of the Scriptures. Here the respondents showed in one way or another that they approved of obedience to the command because it was in harmony with their own standards, rather than because it was commanded. This appears in the answers c and d to V on pages 26 and 27, where the eudaemonistic and (probably) the dysdaemonistic standards are respectively employed. It appears equally from a declaration made by a young woman in one of the interviews that it was the duty of Abraham to obey the command of God to kill his son Isaac "because we must believe that God meant it in the end for his good." Six students who based a rigoristic answer to V upon the authority of the Bible without making any farther explanation of their position, were asked whether Prometheus was justified in disobeying the gods by bringing fire to man. Without exception they replied in the affirmative on the ground that the gods in forbidding him to do it were unjust or cruel.

All of these persons would probably have asserted, if asked in general terms, that their conceptions of right and wrong were determined by the teachings of the Bible. An interesting illustration of how far a person may be deceived in this matter is offered by the following statement of 104 made to me in an interview. "I started out to answer these questions" said the

student "with the principle that there are certain laws, laws of the state and laws of God—particularly the latter—which are absolutely binding. My first impulse would have been to say, the law must be obeyed in each case regardless of circumstances. But the more I thought about them, the more necessary I found it to admit certain exceptions. I made the first admission with a kind of surprise. Finally I awoke to the fact that I held the laws, Thou shalt not steal, and so forth, binding only in so far as they appealed to my own conscience." So great may be the gap between what we believe and what we believe we believe!

The significant fact about these five types is not so much that they exist as that among the hundred persons who answered the questions not one was found whose answer did not fall into some one of these categories. No systematic attempt was made to determine the number of those who believe the Bible to be the infallible revelation of the will of God. But there are at least thirty-six persons who appeal in their answer to the will of God or the commands of the Bible or in some way offer unmistakable evidence of believing that we may know the mind of God in matters of right and wrong. Everyone of these was carefully questioned in an interview, where necessary. The outcome was that no one was found who did not belong in one of the groups described.

It will be objected to the foregoing that our results prove too much. The statements of the Bible have been accepted by countless millions of human beings in matters of science and history. Autonomism itself admits the possibility of the same thing in morals also.<sup>4</sup> Why then is it not found here? The explanation will throw much light upon the true significance of our results. Men do believe the creation myths of Genesis, to be sure, but only until they, or others whom for one reason or another they trust, collect a mass of data incompatible with such stories. Then they either reinterpret the statements of their authority, converting, for instance, a day into an epoch, or they reject the accounts entirely, adjusting their theories of inspiration to the results, each in his own way. So in morals. In points where they have no serious convictions of their own,

<sup>4</sup> See Chapter I, above, page 13.

where they do not see clearly just what their ideals demand, as perhaps in the matter of divorce, or again, where they are wavering in their allegiance between two ideals, as often in the matter of revenge, there they may accept the statements of the Bible. But where their own ideas are clear and firmly rooted they either explain away the plain significance of the text, where a discrepancy arises, or repudiate it entirely.

Such a view enables us to find a place for the few traces of deference to authority that are actually discoverable. They are confined to two persons and for each the authority is not God but man. The importance of this subject for a theory of moral education will perhaps justify an account of each case. In both we are concerned with answers to X of Series II. 17 wrote: "He would not be justified in taking revenge. I have been taught that revenge is wrong and take for granted it must be." I inquired whether the principle of retaliation appealed to her. She said it did and she indulged in it herself. But she admired more a person who refrained and she thought it right to refrain. She used to believe that retaliation was right, but about four years ago the question came up with her father and he said very positively it was wrong. Since that time she has believed it to be wrong. Her father gave no reasons for his statement, but she now believes that his influence was in part at least due to the fact that it revived memories of her past self. For several years before this incident she had "thrown everything over." She had among other things indulged her desires for revenge, especially when aroused by jealousy. Previous to that, while she had not indeed said to herself, Revenge is wrong, she had had no revengeful desires. She believes, then, that her father's words called up her past self. "And you felt that to be a better person?" "Yes." Her father, she added, had a great influence over her although she did not accept everything he said.

49 wrote: "The benefactor would not be morally justified in taking revenge. Perhaps I have been influenced by what Mr. ——— said in Sunday-school, on revenge." Before having heard Mr. ———, (which was but a Sunday or two before writing the answer), she informed me orally, she would have said he ought to revenge himself. "What did he say? Did he

give any reasons?" "No, he gave no reason. He just quoted the words: 'Whosoever will smite thee on the one cheek, turn to him the other also.' " "Did you believe this because it came from the Bible?" "No" [the young woman is not a church member]. "Why then?" "Because I thought he would probably know." I regret to say that I did not carry the investigation farther and am therefore unable to make any report upon the totality of conditions which motived this sudden *volte face*. In attempting to explain this and the preceding case the reader must not forget that they form an insignificant fraction of the field which we have been exploring.

If the foreign pressure theory were true, it is impossible to see how the results presented in this chapter could have been obtained. According to it, authority may demand what it will. For the mind has no basis of its own for criticism, for selection and rejection. The nearest semblance to such a basis would be when one authority contradicted another. That, however, will not help us to explain the instances we have been studying where what generally passes as public opinion and the laws laid down in the Bible are quite in harmony. And if the pretensions of authority be reduced to the claim that it is merely one standard among others, we shall find it difficult to understand why in almost forty cases that which was regarded as the highest authority was not powerful enough to demonstrably determine the outcome in a single instance.

Perhaps it may be thought that the case for the foreign pressure theory is improved if the dogma of immediacy is surrendered and its claims are reduced to the assertion that the acceptance of conduciveness to welfare as the standard is due to authority. This modification of the theory will demand a few moments of our attention.

The authority in question may be the teachings of the Bible for those persons who regard them as representing the will of God, or it may be public opinion. We begin with the former alternative. We must note in the first place that even if it can explain the adoption of the eudaemonistic standard, it certainly can not explain an equally striking fact, the adoption and use of the dysdaemonistic standard, the principle that evil must be requited with evil. The words of Jesus himself with regard to

the forgiveness of enemies are too explicit for evasion by any other means than sophistry and too well known to make it possible to ignore them otherwise than deliberately. Yet such evasion and ignoring are indubitable facts.

But direct evidence is available to show the inadequacy of this view. It would rest its claim, I suppose, upon the fact that the Golden Rule has always been regarded as an epitome of the Christian code and that Jesus himself set forth the commandments, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, as covering the entire content of the moral law. From these, common sense might infer that what God demands throughout is action conformable to the requirements of welfare. In this way it would be easy to explain the eudaemonistic answers of I and V.

To this hypothesis it is possible to urge a number of objections. In the first place if the source of these judgments is the precepts of the Gospel we can not but wonder why these precepts themselves appear so infrequently in papers and interviews. As the alleged starting point of the respondent's thinking, they ought to spring to his mind spontaneously, yet this almost never happens. Again, if the average attendant upon the services of the church has interpreted the Golden Rule and the commandment: Love thy neighbor, as resolving morality into the promotion of welfare he has done so in practical defiance of, or, in any event, not as a result of the exegesis of his spiritual adviser, and that whether the latter is a Protestant or a Catholic. If the one he is almost certain (in the United States) to know and believe enough of Intuitionism, if the other, of Thomism, to look with hatred and scorn on such rank Utilitarianism as "a manifest and blatant error."

Neither of the above objections is capable of doing more than creating a presumption of rather indefinite force in the mind of the reader, but the following ones, it seems to me, go to the root of the matter. In the third place, then, the hypothesis under criticism does not meet the actual situation revealed in our study. Many, probably a majority of the respondents of classes (1), (2), and even (3), had supposed they regarded the Sixth and Eighth Commandments as ultimate, and discovered that they held them subject to eudaemonistic qualifications only when

they were placed face to face with a situation where conscience refused to sanction their application. This is shown either by the actual acceptance of one commandment as ultimate at the very same moment that the other is being interpreted out of existence, as in 139 and 51 above, page 50, or by the respondent's own statements, as that of 104, page 53. The fact is, if, at least, I can trust the impressions gathered during the course of the investigation, this view swings as much too far from the centre in one direction as the doctrine of immediacy does in the other. It replaces the unrelated injunctions, Thou shalt not steal, and the like, of the latter theory with some such maxim as, Right conduct consists in doing good and refraining from doing harm. But I feel quite certain as a result of my investigation that this does not accurately represent the situation. With only a few exceptions in the College of Letters and Science, these students do not seem to be aware, either vaguely or clearly, that they are using the welfare principle as a standard at every turn. When given a concrete problem they ask, What good or harm will be done? but for the most part they do not ask this because they have in mind any such general principle as, That is right which makes for the greatest good of the greatest number. There exists here, to modify slightly what was said of 104, a great gap between what they believe and what they are aware of believing.

Another objection remains to be urged. If the moral code of common sense has its source in authority, it must exhibit a gap where authority is silent. Now if the reader will look over the list of questions contained in the Appendix, he will find a considerable number that can be answered by an application of the injunction, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, only if "as" be interpreted in a very special sense, namely to mean "as much as." And the Scriptures will be searched in vain for any other principle by which to decide them. Nevertheless, of one hundred and forty-five persons who answered IX of Series I in an inquiry made in 1896 and 1897, only six declared themselves unable to decide it, while thirty more, by asserting that the child should be saved, showed they were using some other principle than the one here under consideration. The returns of 1905 were practically identical. Why not say, then, it may be in-

quired, that the majority were actually guided by the principle that we ought to love our neighbor as much as ourselves? I reply, because most of them showed by their answers to a parallel question that this was not what was guiding them. I have no data on this point from the investigation of 1905, but the students of 1895 and 1896 were asked their opinion concerning the following problem: The following might have happened at the Johnstown (Penn.) flood. A man found he had just time to warn either his wife or two other women who were not relatives. All these women have family ties, etc., so that looked upon purely from an objective standpoint the death of any one of them will involve as great a loss to all concerned as the death of any other. What is it his duty to do?

If the principle of equal love of neighbor and self were here being used, the returns would be identical with those from the preceding question. As a matter of fact they are directly reversed. One hundred and nine reply, Save the wife; thirty-one are for saving the two women; six are unable to decide.<sup>5</sup> An investigation just completed among the students in this year's Short Course in Agriculture by the fellow in philosophy in this university, Mr. Otto, shows directly what is inferable from the above data, that those who decide in favor of the larger good in the first question and the nearer good in the second have not in mind any general principle whatever upon which their decisions are based. Their alleged authority, then, has left them in the lurch, yet they answer these and several other questions where the same thing is true with as little hesitation as they do any of the rest.

The case against the authority of society as the source of the acceptance of the principle of welfare is even stronger. For it is open to the more serious objections that have been urged against attributing this function to the Bible and involves difficulties of its own besides. In the first place I must point out, though it does not bear directly upon the precise topic under discussion, that wherever opportunity is presented for a test, there the influence of public opinion, or what ordinarily passes as such,

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<sup>5</sup> For details see *The American Journal of Psychology*, 9: 203 ff.

turns out to be far too small for the rôle which the foreign pressure theory attributes to it. Thus of the Agricultural students who thought it wrong to make children believe in Santa Claus twenty were carefully questioned to discover what had been the attitude of their parents in this matter. In seventeen cases they themselves as well as their brothers and sisters and—where I inquired—their boyhood companions also had been led to believe in the reality of the children's saint. Only one of these had ever heard either of his parents condemn the practice. Of the three students who had not been taught to believe in Santa Claus only one, again, had ever heard any expression of disapproval on the subject from his parents. Again in V public opinion, I should suppose, would be considered as siding with those who would prolong the life regardless of circumstances. Yet among the Agricultural students 56 per cent., and among the "Hill" students 60 per cent. were in favor of administering the poison. This certainly looks as if they were doing their own thinking. And the impression which such facts make will be strengthened greatly by a careful reading of the reports of the ten interviews that will be found in Chapter IV.

In reply it will, of course, be urged that this is not the point at issue. When applying the principle of welfare, it will be admitted, common sense may show any amount of spontaneity, but the matter under discussion now is whether the adoption of the principle itself is not due to the authority of public opinion. To this contention I can only reply as before: This principle appears not to exist in the consciousness of the average man in the way which the hypothesis requires; and where public opinion has taken no position (as is true of those of our problems which involve the comparative imperativeness of different and conflicting claims to welfare) the individual finds his way with the same sense of security as anywhere else. Here, however, one more consideration can be added. Whereas it can be argued with some plausibility that the Gospels reduce all genuine morality to the attempt to increase welfare, I, at least, am acquainted with no organ of society, either the parents or teachers whom I personally know, the newspapers I read, or any other representative of public opinion, that is placing

today or was placing in my youth this position before the rising generation. Common sense does not know how eudaemonistic it is, and for this reason if no other is neither with nor without intention forcing this point of view upon the wills of those who come within the range of its influence.

## CHAPTER IV

IMMEDIACY AND AUTHORITY AMONG THE STUDENTS  
OF AGRICULTURE

We now turn to an examination of the influence of authority upon a class of young men, who, however great their native endowment may be, have not enjoyed the privileges and gained the power that come from education, whose range of vision has not been broadened by training or variety of experience, whose ability to introspect and generalize has never been developed, whose power of expression is rudimentary and who, through these and other causes are less in touch than almost any other portion of the community with the movements of contemporary life.

The Short Course in Agriculture in the University of Wisconsin consists of two terms of fourteen weeks each, running from December into March. The time is devoted to the most concrete and immediately practical phases of farming that are capable of supplying material for instruction. The students are, for the most part, from Wisconsin farms. There are no entrance requirements of any kind, the fees, for residents of the state, are nominal. As a result poor and rich, stupid and clever, uneducated and educated are to be found among them, the uneducated greatly predominating.

The study of these students was begun early in January, 1907. In order to exclude as far as possible all influences that might be due to connection with the University, the inquiry was confined to the first year class. But the questions were not given them until they had been here long enough to wear off some of their first timidity and self-consciousness. The class numbered slightly more than two hundred. From this fifty were obtained for careful study by the following process of exclusion. In the first place, acting upon a suggestion of one of their teachers, I

divided the questions into two parts, giving out half of the ten that formed the total on a Monday, and the remainder three days later. Out of two hundred and eleven possible replies I received one hundred and nineteen, seventy-eight being full sets and forty-one half sets. This does not indicate that the forty-one who got but half way found the rest of the road impassable. These students are required to work very hard and their leisure accordingly is small; many undoubtedly were therefore unable to give me the time, others presumably thought they had done for me all I had a right to ask, still others, it may be assumed, had lost interest in the subject. The seventy-eight who answered the full quota of ten questions were reduced to fifty-five by omitting: (1) All those who had had anything more in the way of education than two years at a high school; (2) those from outside the state; (3) those from cities, towns, or even villages of any size. The remainder were to supply the subject matter of my study. My object was of course to confine my inquiry as far as possible to the lower levels of attainment and experience. The great majority had had no education beyond that provided by the country elementary school, many had not even completed the eighth grade. Almost all of them, I soon discovered, would have to be interviewed because of the extreme indefiniteness of their written answers, the frequency with which they misunderstood my questions, and the almost total absence from the paper of assigned reasons. Of those who were invited to meet me, five failed to appear. Their reasons, as far as I learned them, had nothing to do with their attitude towards the questions or their ability or inability to solve them or to find reasons. With these five out, the material for investigation numbered just fifty persons.

The ages of these students may be of some interest as throwing a little light upon their maturity and the amount of their experience. The admirable records kept at the office of the Agricultural College made it very easy to get this and similar information. Three of the young men who belonged to this group of fifty were sixteen years of age, three were thirty, thirty-two, and about forty respectively. None of these, I may say in parenthesis, exhibited anything out of the common in their answers. The remainder of the group ranged from eighteen to twenty-

seven years, the overwhelming majority being about evenly distributed through the four years beginning with the nineteenth.

The problems upon which the study of immediacy was based were in principle the same as those given to the members of the College of Letters and Science for the same purpose. It seemed wise, however, to modify somewhat the wording of the questions, for which reason they are here repeated. As will be observed, two of them are much simplified. The others are practically identical with their predecessors. Together with the material additions made in the interviews, they will be found just below.

It proved to be desirable and even necessary to make a regular practice of employing in the interviews questions supplementary to the basal ones that appeared in the printed paper. These questions are divisible into three groups. All had been used more or less among the "Hill" students and are accordingly already familiar to the reader. The first group consisted of additional casuistry questions, dealing with the same general problem as one of the fundamental ones, but involving in each case the interests of a different set of parties. The second, used where a considerable number of rigoristic answers appeared for which the student was unable to assign a reason, consisted simply in an inquiry as to whether one or another possible eudæmonistic reason for the observance of general rules had actually been in the mind when the judgment was formed and had determined the decision. The third, designed to elicit the exact nature of the attitude towards the precepts of the Bible, dealt with a problem similar to that suggested by the Prometheus myth, as described in Chapter II.<sup>1</sup>

The supplementary casuistry questions, as has just been said, were planned so as to discover whether and in what way the attitude of the student would change in response to variations in the nature and amount of the interests affected. The following formulae exhibit the various situations with which the questions deal. A stands for the agent; Y and Z stand for other parties whose interests are affected by the act. The symbol > is of course to be read "is greater than." Zero is here to be un-

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<sup>1</sup> See page 53 above.

derstood as representing not actual nothingness, but a quantity so small that it is treated by the respondent as negligible. The number of combinations represented in these questions is seven.

1. Z's good  $>$  Z's harm.
2. A's good  $>$  Z's harm.
3. A's good  $>$  Z's harm ( $=0$ ).
4. Y's good  $>$  Z's harm.
5. Y's good  $>$  Z's harm ( $=0$ ).
6.  $Y_1$ 's +  $Y_2$ 's + ... good  $>$  Z's harm.
7.  $Y_1$ 's +  $Y_2$ 's + ... good  $>$  Z's harm ( $=0$ ).

The questions used in the investigation follow. The numbering of the basal questions is that of Chapter II, the number in brackets shows its place in the paper which was put into the hands of the Agricultural students.

I [I] In a Russian city last year a poor man who could get no work took from a baker's shop without the knowledge of the owner several loaves of bread in order to save from starvation the young children of a sick widow who was his neighbor. He was unable to get the food in any other way. Did he do wrong?

In the interview it was explained, wherever necessary, that a Russian workingman in 1905 might easily become absolutely penniless through inability to get work due to no fault of his own. It is assumed that the people are Jews and that this fact, if no other, makes it impossible for them to get help from either the city authorities or the citizens, including the baker himself. Their fellow Jews, if there were any in the city, are supposed to have scattered, so that no one is left to whom they might turn.

1. The Chinese government having announced that it would prohibit the general sale of opium after a certain date, a Chinese who had contracted the opium habit lays in a store of the drug sufficient to last for many years. It would still be possible for him to break off the habit by a mighty effort without endangering his life, so that he can not receive the benefit of that portion of the law which permits the sale to those who can not live without it. As soon as the law has gone into effect, friends who have been trying for some time to induce him to break off the habit secretly enter his house, seize his entire supply of the drug and destroy it. It is assumed that conditions are thereby created

which will actually lead to his reformation and that nothing else would. Did they do right?

2. The basal question modified so that the poor man steals to save himself from starvation and does it persistently so as to cause an appreciable though not necessarily great loss to the baker.

3a. The basal question modified so that the poor man steals for himself a single loaf of bread from a large store owned by a very well-to-do man.

3b. An unmarried Englishwoman who had lived in the family of Mr. X in New York for many years died, bequeathing all her property to a wealthy sister in England. Mr. X, as executor, attended, among other matters, to the sending of the personal effects of the deceased to the English sister. Six months later a half-worn pair of shoes which had belonged to her were discovered. Mrs. X wished to send them to the Salvation Army to be given to some poor person, but Mr. X objected that the shoes were not theirs to give away. He accordingly had them packed up for shipment to England. But now it appeared that the exact address of the sister (whom they had never known) was lost, and as she had in the meantime moved to another city, some time and trouble were expended before the shoes could be sent. This was the more serious because Mr. X was at the head of a very large business which left him little leisure. Was he morally bound to send the shoes?

3c. The same as 3b except that the scene is laid in a small but prosperous town. The shoes if not sent to England will be thrown away, as the town contains no poor to whom they could be given.

4a. The basal question; the baker, however, is here supposed to be rather poor, and the only one in town so that the bread must be taken from him or not at all.

4b. As 4a except that, work being absolutely unobtainable, the thefts continue through several months.

4c. A shop girl just able to support herself steals a necklace from a jewelry store in order that her mother who is stricken with consumption may save her life by going to Colorado as directed by the physician. The money can be obtained in no other way, and the life of the mother depends upon the possi-

bility of getting into another climate. Did the daughter do wrong?

5. The basal question with the additional statement that the baker is well-to-do and carries on a big business. [All reference to this point is omitted in the basal question itself.]

6. The physicians' code demands that they publish their medical discoveries freely to the world. This was done, among others, by the discoverer of the antitoxin for diphtheria. But suppose that he had determined to use it as a gold mine; obtain a patent, charge "all the traffic would bear" and let the profits pile up. Then suppose an assistant aware of these intentions and indignant at them, before the patent is applied for gets possession of the recipe and gives it out to the public. Would the assistant have done wrong?

7. As 6, with the additional statement that the discoverer is already very rich and is simply preparing to pile one fortune upon another.

II [VII] A man who had devoted his life to building up a very successful grain elevator business had an only son whom he wished to continue the business after his death. The young man himself was very anxious to go into stock raising, but at the earnest request of his father he promised to give up his life to the business. Soon afterwards the father died. The young man stuck to his promise at first, but although successful in the business, he hated it more and more. So after about two years he sold out and went into stock raising. Was this right? He had no reason to suppose that his father would have released him from his promise, if living.

1. Some sixty or seventy years ago in Wisconsin, in a part of the state where there were no telegraphs, railroads, or regular mails, a man, living in a small town was very sick. His son, ten miles away on a farm and separated from his father by almost impassable roads, is also very sick. On the daughter-in-law being compelled to come into town one day the father said: You need not attempt to let me know every day or even regularly about the condition of my son if you will only promise to inform me in case he grows decidedly worse. The promise is made. The son grows very much worse indeed (or he may be at the point of death). But it is practically certain that the

news will (a) cause the death of the father, or (b) cause a very serious and dangerous relapse. What is it the duty of the daughter-in-law to do?

2. The basal question with the omission of the statement that the father died. The son begs for a release from his promise, but is refused.

3. A man who has just returned from a residence of many years in India promises his nephews—he has no children of his own—to leave them his fine collection of Indian curios. On making a visit to these nephews, however, he discovers that they care nothing for the curios he has already given them. The young men are already grown so he does not expect any change in their taste to occur. So on his return home he changes his will and leaves the curios to his town library. Was this right?

4. A is the one man in a New England village who is at once wealthy and generous with his money. Y is a man in the same village who though industrious and honest has, through lack of business ability, never succeeded in anything he has undertaken. As a result he and his large family are in want of the necessities a good deal of the time. Y has borrowed money from A several times to help him in his attempts to start a business, but never having been successful, he has not been able to repay it. After one of these failures A's wife, whom we shall call Z, a lady who is as "close" as her husband is generous, extracts from the latter a promise never to loan Y any money again. Some time after this Y comes to A once more to borrow from him. This time by providing a little capital he has an opportunity to go into partnership with a man who will supplement his defects and the two together may be expected to succeed finely. This, accordingly, seems a really good opening. Y moreover can borrow from no other source. May A break his promise? His doing so, it should be said, is not likely to endanger the peace of the family for his wife is too much accustomed to bow to the will of her husband to make trouble.

5. A farmer promises to take his wife to town, a dozen miles distant, on a certain day. She is at the head of a large household and has inefficient help so that she has to plan a week in advance in order to be able to get away and at the same time have things run smoothly at home during her absence. Just as

they are about to start, a call for help comes from the adjoining farm, where the barn is on fire. Our farmer is the only near neighbor and is needed to help save the movables, and if possible the barn itself. His wife, however, objects to his going, reminding him of his promise to her and how she always has to plan to get a free day and insisting that under the circumstances their neighbors be allowed to look out for themselves. What ought the farmer to do?

III [II] Is it right to tell children that there is a Santa Claus?

1. A sick man demands information about the condition of his son who is also very sick, in another part of the town. The truth is likely (a) to kill him or (b) to produce a painful and dangerous relapse. Would it be right for them to give an answer which is not true?

3. A is engaged to the daughter of a wealthy man who objects to the match solely because A is poor. The daughter believes she can win her father's consent in a few months if only the affair can be kept secret in the meantime. Otherwise there will be trouble, as the father is hot-headed and "pig-headed," too. Z is an acquaintance of A who, without being in the least ill-intentioned, is one of those incessant talkers who can no more keep a secret, even if bound by the most solemn of promises, than a sieve can hold water. One day by mere accident Z asks A a question of no importance to himself but one which, if answered truthfully, or if an answer is refused, will reveal the engagement. A knows Z's reputation. What ought he to do?

5. [From an old work on casuistry.] "A malicious Saracen had secretly defiled one of the mosques which the Turks have in Jerusalem. The fact was imputed to the Christians (as the Saracen wished it should be), who, denying it, but having no credit with their enemies, were all presently dragged to the place of execution. Thereupon one of their number, a young man, declared he did it, in order to save the others. He was put to death by the Turks with exquisite torture." Was he justified in telling the falsehood?

IV [V] A University student hired a room, agreeing to keep it for a year. After four weeks, when there was no longer any chance of renting it to anyone else, he left and went to another house because he there got a room rent free for taking care of

the furnace. The student was working his way through the University and needed to save every dollar he could. The house he left belonged to a poor widow with a young child whose principal means of support was renting rooms. Was it right for him to leave? Suppose the owner of the house he left, instead of being poor, had been comfortably situated so that the room rent would not have been greatly missed, would it have been right for him to leave? Oral additions: No one would rent a room to any student in September who would not agree to stay the entire year. The financial situation was as follows. The student's room rent at the first house was \$40 for the school year and this [under certain conditions that were specified] represented a net loss to the landlady of practically the entire amount. The student could probably raise this extra money by doing odd jobs at 20 cents an hour; but he must spend time looking for them (in the absence of the now-existing employment bureau), and in going and coming, which in Madison may be a serious factor, whereas the care of the furnace will require almost no expenditure of time. He has to earn a good deal of money in doing odd jobs, anyway, for he has little to spend that he does not himself earn.

V [VIII] Is it right for a physician, by giving an overdose of morphine, or otherwise, to hasten by several weeks the death of a patient hopelessly sick with cancer and suffering terrible torture all the time, when he knows that the patient is in every respect prepared to die and will be glad to die?

The eudaemonistic reasons for the observance of general rules were as follows:<sup>3</sup>

1. The effects of one's example upon others, the reasons for which the agent permits himself to break the rule being either not known or not understood by others.
2. The danger of starting a habit of breaking the rule. The infraction might be innocent in itself, but, as a result, a reason not quite so good is liable to serve as an excuse for breaking the rule a second time, and so on.
3. The agent will lose the confidence of others. They will believe they can not depend upon him.

<sup>3</sup> See above, page 64.

4. The act will tend to cause others to lose their confidence in their fellow-men as such.

5. If everybody acted in that way, property, confidence in the word of others, *et cetera*, would be undermined; the life of society would thus become impossible.

6. If you once admit a single exception to a general rule, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to determine where to draw the line.

The question designed to determine the exact nature of the attitude towards the commands of God was based upon the story of the sacrifice of Isaac. After relating the story, as told in Genesis xxii: 1-13, the following explanation was added. We must remember that Abraham, when this command came to him, and indeed to the very end of his life, had no such knowledge of God as we have been given through the Christian revelation. He left his home in the Chaldean city to worship our God knowing only that Jehovah was the true God, but knowing at first little else about Him. And it was only gradually that he could become at all acquainted with His character. Now the gods of his own country whom he had been trained to believe in all through his childhood and youth were supposed to delight in human suffering and to demand the sacrifice of human beings. It would not be strange, then, if, when he heard the command to sacrifice Isaac upon the altar he had believed that God was demanding this simply for the pleasure of seeing him (Abraham) suffer. If Abraham had looked at the matter in that way, would it have been his duty to obey the command?

The students whose moral judgments we are now about to examine may be divided into three groups according to the nature of their answers.

GROUP I. As among the "Hill" students Group I consists of those who give three or more demonstrably eudaemonistic answers to the basal questions. The criteria used for determining what is "demonstrably eudaemonistic" are those employed in Chapter II and described above, page 27. The only exception to the rule that answers counted for admission into this group must be answers to a basal question is in I. This is always

counted as eudaemonistic whether the reference to welfare as a standard appears in the answer to the basal question itself or in the answer to some one of the supplementary questions dealing with the theft of bread in the Russian city.

Of the papers received in reply to the printed questions only four contained a sufficient number of eudaemonistic answers to entitle them to a place in this group. As might be expected, reasons were assigned in the written replies far less frequently by the members of this Course than by the "Hill" students. The great majority of Group I owe their place in it, accordingly, to the use of the interview. The total number of students belonging to it is thirty-one, or nearly two-thirds of all those examined.

The eudaemonistic answers are quite similar to those which we have made the acquaintance of in Chapter II. The answers to the supplementary questions conform to the same types. It might therefore seem possible to pass to other groups without farther description. I shall, however, deal with these responses in detail, and that for several reasons. In the first place, while the presence of demonstrably eudaemonistic judgments in at least three out of five possible cases may well create a presumption that the remainder belong in the same category, where after careful scrutiny no positive evidence to the contrary can be discovered, the evidence for the use of the eudaemonistic standard is far more complete than that. In the great majority of this group such evidence appears, in one form or another, in every one of the five classes of problems with which they had to deal. To show this it will be necessary to present certain sets of replies in their completeness. In the second place, this mode of procedure will enable us to test the validity of some objections that may be urged against the methods employed with the "Hill" students, in particular the objection that the homage shown by them to the eudaemonistic standard was a matter of mere lip service, the real springs of their decisions lying deeper. For these reasons I have selected for complete presentation ten sets of replies from Group I, chosen at random. That is to say, I have taken the first ten members of this group in alphabetical order, omitting two who on account of the presence of three and four eudaemonistic written answers respectively were not interviewed. The responses of these young men are typical for the en-

tire group in matters of principle, and not even a great deal in the way of significant details would have been added if the remaining twenty-one had been placed before the reader with equal completeness.

A few words of explanation will be needed in order to understand the following presentation. Written and oral answers to the basal questions are distinguished thus: WRITTEN; ORAL. Where the written answer does not appear that does not mean that none was attempted. It means merely that the corresponding question was misunderstood. The exact statements of the students, written or oral, are in quotation marks. My formulation of their statements is given in ordinary Roman print. This will sometimes be found among the written questions as well as the oral, as a device for saving space. For some of the men persist in incorporating the question into the answer, or performing some other equally unnecessary evolution before coming to the point. Statements made or questions asked by me during the interviews are in italics. My own comments, explanations, etc., are in square brackets. All answers were given without suggestion from me (unless it be a "suggestion" to inquire Why?) except as it appears from this record that the contrary was the case. With a few insignificant exceptions the discussion of the five basal questions, with that of the supplementary questions belonging to them, is given in its entirety. So that where reasons do not appear they were not demanded. Where the answer itself was not worth the space required to quote it, the nature of the decision is indicated by the letter L, where it was latitudinarian, and R, where rigoristic. In reporting the written returns I have changed only spelling, punctuation, and capitalization, and also, in two or three places, the grammar. The order of presentation is that of the order of discussion in the interview. At the close of each report will be found a list of the answers that are counted as eudaemonistic.

201. I. WRITTEN: "I should say this was wrong from the man. In the first place he stole the bread. And second, if God intended to save the widow and her children, it would be done without a man stealing food for them."

III. WRITTEN: "I should think this is right because the Santa Claus may be compared with Christ. If the story of Christ be

told them, and the good He brings them, they would not understand it, and would not feel so happy during Christmas time as they do this way."

IV. WRITTEN: "A person must not break his promise. He left this widow in great fear of starvation, which he could never pay with all the dollars he saved during the year. Had the owner of the house been better situated it would be wrong too."

II. WRITTEN: "I think it was all right that the young man left the business. Because doing work in which a person is not interested is a pretty hard thing and it doesn't make life a pleasure."

I retold the story modifying it so as to lay much stress upon the fact that the father had always done a great deal for the happiness of the boy. He said the boy should have kept his promise. *Why have you changed your answer from that of the paper?* "I did not understand it as you told it that his father was so good to him." *But I think his father was selfish to get him to make such a promise.* He agreed and the answer was thereupon changed to, The boy did right. "His father is dead, and it will do him [the father] no good, and would not do any one else any good if he stayed. So he may go." *What is the difference between IV and II?* In the first the people might hear of it and would not trust him and he might lose a great deal. In the second they might not hear of it, or if they did they might say he did right.

V. WRITTEN: Wrong. ORAL: "God has sent this suffering upon him and we ought not to stop it." I told the story of the sacrifice of Isaac, as above p 71. Abraham need not have obeyed. *Suppose God is merely delighting Himself with the sight of this man's suffering?* Then the doctor might have stopped it with the poison. *Why did God send this suffering?* We must believe because the man deserved it.

[III, IV, and II are here classified as (demonstrably) "eudaemonistic;" IV, partly because of the written answer, and partly because of the ground adduced for the difference between the answers to IV and II. A number of instances from other papers show that what are given out as two reasons for I may be different formulations of exactly the same idea.]

202. I. WRITTEN: "Stealing is wrong. But in that case the baker could stand the loss. For the bread was taken in a good cause, for it was taken to save a poor woman from starvation. I do not like stealing. But to save people from starvation, it is a different thing." 4 a and 5: It would not make any difference whether the baker was rich or poor, seeing it was saving them from starvation.

III. WRITTEN: "Yes, I think it is right to give the young children something to think about. But when they are older I think they should be told the truth." ORAL: *Why is this right?* "It gives them pleasure to expect Santa Claus and to think their presents come from him." *What do you suppose those members of your class who take the other side have to say against it?* He could think of nothing they could say except that it was not the truth.

IV. WRITTEN: "If a man has made an honest agreement he should stick to it through thick and thin. Even [if] he made a losing agreement he ought to have stayed until his time was [out]. In the second I think it was all right." ORAL: The reason assigned for the answer to the second part was that of II 5 below [By exception the discussion of II preceded that of IV in this interview]. "To be sure," he added, "if I was keeping a boarding-house I would not want people to leave like that. But I guess it would be all right this time."

II. WRITTEN: "I think the young man ought to stick to his promise, especially as it was a death-bed promise. Of course it would be hard to stick to a business you did not like but a death-bed promise is sacred." He had partially misunderstood the question given him, so I asked: *If the father had not been on his death-bed, but had fallen sick and died some little time after obtaining the promise, would the son have done wrong in breaking it?* "Not quite so wrong; still it would have been wrong." 2: "In that case he may break his promise. The sacredness of the promise is due to the fact that the father is dead." 1 a and b: L. 3: L. He should put the curios into such hands that they would do some good, not into the hands of those who cared nothing for them. 4 he found difficult till I eliminated the factor of family discord [which I never did except as I suspected it was causing perplexity]. Then L, if it was to do the

poor man so great a service. *What is to be said on the other side?* "A man ought to keep his promises, and he ought to respect his wife's feelings." 5: L. *How would you defend your answer against some of the boys who have taken the other side?* "It was a great deal more to the neighbor to have the man's help in saving his cattle and other things than it was to the wife to go to town just that day."

V. WRITTEN: "Yes, since the patient is willing and when his life is doomed anyway and he suffers torture every day he lives." Reasons for loyalty to general rules: 1, 2, and 6 he had not thought of in preparing his paper. 3 was familiar. He had thought of it in answering I, but in spite of that believed that the theft was justified under the conditions. As to the authority of the Bible, he believes it to be the word of God and "mostly infallible." But he has recently been learning some heresies in a Bible class, which, however, seem to refer to the historical and scientific statements. *How do you reconcile your answer to I with the Eighth Commandment?* "It would only be right under such circumstances as this. Perhaps there are no other exceptions." *How about V and the Sixth Commandment?* "It would only be right if the man was willing to die. Even if it shortened his life by only a day, if the sick man was not willing, it would not be right."

[I, III, and V are classified as "eudaemonistic." IV is not here counted as "eudaemonistic" because the reason is assigned, not indeed in response to a leading question, but as an application of a previous answer to a supplementary question. The answer in I "Stealing is wrong" constantly appears where the writer means "Stealing is usually wrong." This is clearly its meaning here.]

203. I. WRITTEN: "No, not if the baker was a man who could have given something to help the poor and was too stingy to do so." 2, 3a, 4a, 4b, 5: L. if it can be done without too serious a loss to the baker. It would make a great deal of difference whether he was under obligation to the woman [he continued without suggestion from me], as because of some favor she might have done him. Then he might go to almost any length to get the bread. *How far may he go otherwise?* If the baker is

wealthy he may go ahead as far as necessary for "he could do it without affecting the baker's surplus," for "the richer baker could afford the loss better, and besides might be [*i. e.*, apparently would be likely to be] mean spirited." But if the baker does a very small business he must not take the bread [except under the conditions mentioned above] from the same shop more than two or three times, even to save his own life; but he might go from one baker to another and thus keep himself alive for some time. 1: L. Because the opium was doing him an injury. 3b: L. "The sister would have thrown the shoes into a trunk and they would never have done any one any good." 3c: R. He was supposed to have sent to England the things that belonged to the dead woman, and he should have done so. 6: [The story revised as it was for a few students to bring out the fact that even if the assistant gave the recipe to the world the reputation which the discovery would bring the doctor would bring in a cash return in the form of a larger practice so as to recompense him handsomely for the labor of the discovery.] L. If the assistant knew he was planning to ask a price that would give more than a fair return on the cost of the article, *i. e.*, more than 10-20 per cent. in the way of profits, he was really stealing, "just as the telephone companies are stealing from the farmers who need the money more than they do."

III. WRITTEN: "Yes. If it is going to make the child any better a man without his losing his confidence in you when he grows up."

IV. WRITTEN: "I think it was right to leave as he needed every dollar he could save" [last eight words in italics]. ORAL: He might also leave in each case if he was lonely [see the question as given to the "Hill" students]. He says frankly that he himself would leave in each of the four cases.

II. WRITTEN: "I think that as long as he was successful in grain business remain." *Why this difference between IV and II?* In II the promise is made to a member of his family; also his father is dead. If living, the son would be at liberty to break it.

V. ORAL: "Yes, if they asked the patient and he wished it."  
[I, III and V are classified as eudaemonistic.]

205. I. WRITTEN: L. 3a, 4a, 5: L and eudaemonistic. 1: L. If he did not know enough to stop the habit himself his friends had the right to do it for him. *Because it was for his interest?* "Yes." 3b: L and eudaemonistic. 6: If the doctor was going to put up the price to the point where many could not obtain it, the assistant did right. Otherwise it would be treachery to the interests of his employer.

III. WRITTEN: Wrong "because it is lying to them and may cause them to lie when they get older." ORAL: *Many of your classmates think it does not teach children to lie; if so, would it be right?* "Yes." *Why?* He could not assign a reason. *Your father and mother thought it innocent* [he had just told me his parents taught him to believe in the myth]; *why did they think so?* "Because it would make us enjoy Christmas more." *Was this a good reason?* "Yes." Further conversation made it perfectly clear, if that was necessary after the preceding, that he believed if the bad effect mentioned could be eliminated the lie would be entirely innocent.

IV. WRITTEN: "If he took the room for the year I think it would be his duty to stay providing the lady was very poor; but if comfortably situated I think it would be all right for him to leave." ORAL: *Why must he stay in the first case but not in the second?* Because the money was very much needed by the landlady in the first and was not in the other. *Where would you draw the line?* Where the rent would go for necessities he must stay, for luxuries, he may go.

II. WRITTEN: R. 1a: If the son died they must tell the father because if they did not he would be very angry. If the son merely grew worse, they need not tell the father, because afterwards when he discovered that the promise had not been kept he would not care. 3: R. 4: L. The difference between this and II is that in this he benefits some one other than himself.

V. ORAL: L. *Why?* "He has got to die anyway, and it saves him all that suffering."

[III, IV, V classified as eudaemonistic. Note that in III he declared himself unable to assign a reason, and in the next moment gave a very good one.]

211. [An unambiguous case of rigoristic eudaemonism. He answered my written questions immediately upon reading them because he could see only one side to them, and he did not entirely conceal—it seemed to me—a slight contempt for me because I wasted my own and others' time over such obvious matters. His parents had been rigoristic by example and training, but had never, as far as he could remember, assigned reasons for the observance of general rules. These he thinks he learned from his reading of books and newspapers and from the sermons of the clergyman of a village in which his sister lives. About this last statement I feel somewhat doubtful, for he mentioned the clergyman only in response to an inquiry to that effect and I could get no definite information as to the nature of this influence. Moreover it is not the habit—as far as I know—for rural clergymen, or most others for that matter, to assign in their sermons the sort of reason which follows. His standpoint appears—**apart from what is said in answer to specific casuistry questions—in his answer to my request for the reasons for his "strictness."** It was given instantly: "Why, society would go to pieces if every one was all the time trying to get out of doing things."]

I. WRITTEN: "I think he would be considered a thief, even in a case of starvation." 4a and 5: It makes no difference whether the baker is rich or poor. 1: At first he thought this might be right, then decided it was wrong. 3b: L. I tried to discover why he answered this differently from I but could get no definite result. [The reason seems to be that in 3b nothing is actually taken out of the possession of some one else.]

III. WRITTEN: "No. It causes children to be distrustful." 1a: L. 3: R. 5: R.

IV. WRITTEN: R.

II. WRITTEN: R.

V. WRITTEN: "No, if this were the case there would be many such cases where wealth was involved."

[All answers classified as eudaemonistic because of statement, quoted above, made at conclusion of interview.]

217. I. WRITTEN: "If the baker was a man of some means I would not say that the man did anything wrong." 4a

and 5: If the only shop in town was owned by a poor man it would not be right, because it might reduce him to poverty and starvation so that he would be as badly off as the poor family. The answer of the paper holds only for a baker of some means.

III. WRITTEN: "No. Children should never be told anything that was not the truth." ORAL: *What is your reason for your answer?* "The children will find it out in the end and it will make them suspicious of their parents and teach them to lie." *Is there anything to be said on the other side?* "Sometimes it makes them behave better." However he did not think this very important and apparently he attached still less importance to my suggestion that it would make them enjoy Christmas better.

IV. WRITTEN: R. ORAL: He should remain in both cases in order that people may have confidence in his word at the time and later on in his life.

II. WRITTEN: R. ORAL: The principle stated under IV gives the reason for his answer. 2: It would make no difference whether the father was living or dead except that the shock of disappointment would be very great if the father was alive, so that breaking the promise would be worse if he was living. 4: L. Because he could do so much good by breaking the promise. 5: L. Because it was far more important that he should help save his neighbor's property than that his wife should go to town on any particular day.

V. WRITTEN: "No, because the life he has is not his own but God's, and for such a reason no man has a right to help to end a person's life, because God rules over the life of men and knows what is best to do." ORAL: I asked for the meaning of the written statement. "God has made us and owns us and rules the world." *Of course He can do what He wants to with us, but does that make it right?* "It is not right unless it is done for our best" was the instantaneous reply. We passed to the reasons for obedience to general rules. He declared himself familiar with all that I inquired for, viz., 1, 2, 3 and 6. Then I asked if the commandments of the Bible appealed to him as a reason for obedience also. "Yes." *How can you make your answer to I agree with the commandment Thou shalt not steal?* "When it does so much good as that, I do not believe it can be

wrong." *Then Thou shalt not steal applies only where it will do harm?* "Yes."

[All answers classified as eudaemonistic.]

218. I. WRITTEN: "He did not do wrong because he saved the lives of the children who could not help themselves, and it was not loss enough to the baker to cause any hurt." 2: This would not be right. For if he started doing that, no one could tell where he would stop. *Is this the reason it would be right for him to do it for others?* Yes. He would not be likely to keep it up. 4a, 4b and 5: In answering the printed question he thought of the baker as carrying on a big business. If the business was on a small scale, he was doubtful how to answer. There must have been others besides these people who were "fixed that way," and if all had turned in they would have put the baker in the same position with themselves [Note that the baker here occupies the focus of consciousness]. "I believe in helping another, but not so that you are on a lower level than he is." 3b: R. At first his answer was latitudinarian, but then it occurred to him that the shoes not being sent to England in the first place was the fault of the executor or his wife. This consideration caused him to change his answer. I did not pursue the subject farther. 6: R., then L, because it would do good to so many.

III. WRITTEN: "It is all right for they get lots of fun, and I don't think it does them any harm." ORAL: *Are there arguments for the other side?* "You might say it would teach them to lie." But it was evident he did not think the danger sufficient to be worth considering.

IV. ORAL: He might leave in both cases. The "Short Course student" should not, for he could soon go out and earn money, so he would be able to borrow at the time and thus get through. I asked him by what arguments he could defend himself against one who took the other side. He could not answer beyond saying: "The widow might have luck and find some one to take her room." Then I asked if he decided the question by the principle of I 5. He replied: "That would be a good principle."

II. WRITTEN: "A promise is a promise, but he should not have made the promise if he did not intend to keep it."

V:L. *Why?* "Because he would be better off out of his misery." *Can you see any reason against it?* None except that the doctor would be punished. *There is the danger of abuse* [described in some detail]. He had not thought of it and it did not seem to impress him very strongly.

[I, III, and V, classified as eudaemonistic.]

221. I. WRITTEN: "No. The lives of the children were worth more than the bread and the offense of stealing it." 2 and 3a: He may not steal the bread for himself. 3b: L. Because the shoes were worth nothing to the sister. 1: L. 4c: at first L, then R. Thereupon he reversed his answer to I and 1. At the close of the interview I took up the reasons for this change of attitude. After attempting in vain to discover its grounds without asking leading questions I finally inquired whether it was due to the discovery that the latitudinarian answers were leading to a point where the distinction between stealing and not stealing threatened to disappear. I have not given the exact words of my question, but the exact words, or rather word of his reply was "Sure," enunciated with great fervor.

III. WRITTEN: "No. You should not lie to your or any other children, as it will learn them to lie. If the parents lie to their children as jokes, you will find that the children are also liars."

IV. WRITTEN: "No. A man is a word. No word, no man."

II. WRITTEN: "Yes, he had a right to quit the elevator. A person should follow his own instinct." ORAL: I read the preceding statement and said: *That may be a good reason as far as it goes, but it is not quite complete enough. The mere fact that it is disagreeable for the young man can not make it wrong. It is disagreeable for a man who has failed in business to set to work and pay his debts.* He replied: "It won't do the father any good, he is dead." I then asked 2. He said that was a very different thing. After some consideration he found he could not decide it. As he had had no trouble with IV, [which, according to my habit, I had gone over with him orally to assure myself that he understood the question] I inquired what was the difference between the two. He replied: In IV it is only for a year; in this it is for a life time.

V. WRITTEN: "Yes. A person suffering terrible pain is better off dead than alive."

[III, II, V, classified as eudaemonistic.]

224. I. WRITTEN: L. 4a: L. 3b: at first R, then without warning: "For a little thing like these shoes it was not worth while to go through all that trouble. If they had been of some value it would have been different." 7: L. Easier than I because it saved the lives of more people.

III. WRITTEN: "I think not, because sooner or later they find out the truth and it tends to lessen their faith in humanity."

ORAL: *Many of your classmates answer this differently from you. What would you say to them?* "It is true it gives them pleasure, but they can get the pleasure by being told about Santa Claus and at the same time being told it is not true."

IV. ORAL: In the first case he ought certainly to stay, "the widow being dependent on it, perhaps not able to get any other roomers." In the second [after some consideration] he may leave: "It would do him more harm to stay than it would do good to the well-to-do people."

II. WRITTEN: L. 2: He saw no particular difference between the two cases. In 2 it would not do any one any harm if he gave up the business except the hurt to his father's feelings. In II his father would not even know of it.

V. ORAL: "If I had seen such a case I might feel differently about it, but as it is I must say they must not kill him." He had not thought of the danger of abuse. His reason was that such matters must be left in the hands of God. *Because the Bible says Thou shalt not kill?* Yes. *How about your answer to I and Thou shalt not steal?* He could not answer, but affirmed expressly in reply to my question that he did not wish to change his position on that subject. *Then there is something else besides the command?* "Yes," but he could not tell what it was. *Suppose we believed—what is impossible—that God was torturing this fine and noble man merely for the pleasure of torturing him, as children may torture a cat. Would the doctor be justified in giving the overdose in that case?* At first he said No, then without any hint or suggestion from me that I am aware of, Yes. *What then are we taking for granted about*

*God's purposes, if we believe it wrong to kill the sick man?* He could not tell, but assented to my assertion that we must suppose the suffering sent for the man's real good.

[III, IV, and II, classified as eudaemonistic.]

226. I. WRITTEN: "He did wrong to steal in any case. But owing to the fact that he could get no work himself and had nothing to give her (the widow) and the baker had something which it was possible to spare, the poor man ought to be justified in doing what he did. And I believe I could do the same with a clear conscience for some of the rich ought to share with the poor, in some cases, anyway."

III. WRITTEN AND ORAL: R and eudaemonistic.

IV. WRITTEN: Since he "had agreed to keep the room he should have done it regardless of the situation of the owner. . . . Further it was as necessary for the poor widow and child to live as for the two-faced thing to attend the University. But do unto others as you would have them do unto you."

II. WRITTEN: R.

V. WRITTEN AND ORAL: L (provided the doctor will not get into trouble). Eudaemonistic.

[I, III, and V are classified as eudaemonistic.]

A study of these returns will show that in the great majority of instances the respondent does not look to any general rule as such for guidance. On the contrary, the mind turns spontaneously to a consideration of the interests of the parties affected. Thus in I he asks himself in effect: Ought the baker to be compelled (for that is what the theft amounts to) to give of his possessions in order to save the family. In II the question is whether the son is bound by his promise to sacrifice his happiness to the desires of his father. Here the cravings of filial affection or sympathy for the dead will sometimes be the deciding consideration, at other times the insignificance of the stake of the parent compared with that of the son, or the fact that the dead can not be affected by what we do. Even where obedience to general rules is demanded it is usually because of the indirect effects of obedience upon welfare. Sometimes, no doubt, the exact nature and extent of the obligation created by

a promise or contract may be obscure (see above ch. II pages 42 and 43); but even of this the records offer no unequivocal evidence. Thus the references everywhere found to eudaemonistic considerations are not epiphenomena; they are the forces that determine the result.

An examination of the preceding pages will also show, I believe, that although but two of these ten sets of responses are credited with more than three eudaemonistic answers to the basal questions, as a matter of fact they are in reality eudaemonistic from beginning to end. An answer is not classified as eudaemonistic except as it meets certain conditions, this in order to reduce to a minimum the possibilities of error (see ch. II, page 27). But good evidence for the eudaemonistic attitude is found far beyond these somewhat artificial limits; it extends in fact to the very boundaries of our inquiry. Rigoristic answers there are, to be sure, in these reports that are not demonstrably motivated by eudaemonistic considerations but they are answers that were not investigated either for lack of time or because there appeared to be no genuine necessity. Under the circumstances they can hardly be used for purposes of refutation by a hostile critic.

An equally detailed examination of the remaining twenty-one sets of returns that belong to this group would yield essentially the same result. There are but two in which there seem to be any rational grounds for asserting even a *prima facie* claim to immediacy. These are III in 238 and I 1 and 3 and IV in 241. Each answer occurs in a thorough-going eudaemonistic setting, latitudinarian, in part all too latitudinarian, in character, and represents an unaccounted-for lapse into rigorism. But in each case I was prevented by lack of time from asking whether the rigorism was due to the eudaemonistic reasons for loyalty to general rules, so that there is nothing in the way of the supposition that some one or more of these suddenly, as they not infrequently do, put in a claim that succeeded in making itself heard.

GROUP II. Its members supply two eudaemonistic answers to the printed questions and one or more such answers to the supplementary questions. It numbers eleven.

It will perhaps be supposed that the failure to obtain a larger

number of eudaemonistic answers points to the presence of a considerable amount of immediacy. An analysis of the reasons for the fact will show, however, that such an inference is not justified. In the first place five of the eleven presented rigoristic answers the reasons for which could be obtained only by means of leading questions. As has already been pointed out and as will be shown at greater length below, the inability to volunteer reasons is not incompatible with their actual presence in forming the judgment. In five more cases there were either lapses on my part during the interview so that I supposed I had eudaemonistic answers where later and more critical reflection showed me I had not, or else I was unable to complete the interview for lack of time. The eleventh case is somewhat peculiar and will be examined later.

After this explanation it will not seem presumptuous to contend that in reality this group stands practically on the same basis as Group I. We must remember that there are always at least three eudaemonistic answers, only that one or more of those above two are answers to the supplementary questions. Usually there is a considerable number of such answers. Furthermore in every one of these eleven records except one,<sup>4</sup> the non-eudaemonistic answers, with a total of two exceptions for the basal questions and three for the supplementary, are either latitudinarian or else were declared by the respondent—in answer, as already said, to leading questions from me—to be motivated by some one of the considerations that appear in the list of reasons for rigorism. And in the one exception, the interview was left incomplete for lack of time. The reader will remember the grounds upon which the improbability of immediacy in latitudinarian answers was asserted (see ch. II, pages 28 and 29.).

The only problem that can arise with regard to this group, then, is the validity of any inference from reasons for rigorism obtained through leading questions. This problem we must now consider. The attempt to discover in this manner the reasons for rigoristic answers was made altogether with eighteen persons. It was usually conducted in connection with some one of the printed casuistry questions. For instance: "Is the reason you think he ought not to take the bread that

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<sup>4</sup> The eleventh is number 213, which is presented at length below.

if he does," *et cetera*? The grounds for placing confidence in the replies of the students are as follows. No one of the eighteen claimed to be familiar with and to have used all of them; they picked and chose. Some claimed to be familiar with a good many, but declared with positiveness they used none in answering my questions (as 204). Others recognized a less number but had used them. 207 recognized reason 5 but said it was not *his* reason: "I first thought it wrong, and besides thought of this as a good reason." A typical illustration of the results obtained is the following (239). 1 and 3 he had never thought of. 2 and 6 were perfectly familiar. 2 he had thought of and used in answering I 3 b: "I thought if he got started doing that he might not know where to stop." Such a statement as this seems to me to bear the stamp of veracity upon its face.

Their failure to volunteer their reasons is, as has already been said, in no wise suspicious. It may be explained as due to their failure to understand what I meant by a "reason," or their inability to formulate a universal statement, though the material for it was right in their hands. Thus 223 could think of no reason for sticking to general rules. Yet his written answer to III read: "It is not right to tell children there is a Santa Claus for that is lying to them and they may, as they do after a time, find out that there is no such thing. Therefore they may start lying and telling things that are not true and get into trouble through the cause of that Santa Claus which there is none." When I stated the principle embodied in this answer he recognized it at once and remembered that he had used it in dealing with this question. This is but one of a considerable number of instances, among which 46 (page 35) and 205 (page 78) have already been quoted, in which convincing evidence has been afforded that the reasons which they could not formulate for themselves were really the forces at work in the determination of their moral judgments. As a result of all these considerations, I believe we are justified in concluding that the method now under examination supplies trustworthy information about the working of these minds.

There is one member of this group whose answers have been reserved for special examination, namely 213. His replies to I

and V were eudaemonistic, to II, III, and IV rigoristic and non-mediated. The (written) answer to I, which must be used in a minute, reads as follows: "He did not do wrong. Because if they would not have got this bread they would have starved, while the baker's loss was not near so bad as the loss of her children would have been to the sick widow." The answers to the supplementary questions to II and III, and also to IV, which last, as given to only two or three persons, I have not placed on the list in the early part of this chapter,—these answers are uniformly latitudinarian except III 3 which he was unable to decide. And wherever I demanded reasons he balanced gain against loss. Thus, for example in II 3 he assigned as his reason for a latitudinarian answer the fact that the curios would do the city a great deal more good than they would the nephews. Again he hesitated long before answering III 1, but answered 5 at once. I asked him why the latter was the easier and he replied because it saved more lives. In general where the losses involved in loyalty to the rule were very great he decided it was not obligatory. This point of view appears clearly in the answers to one of the questions on contracts just referred to. It was: "In 1859 Mr. S., an immensely wealthy New Yorker made a contract with a certain contractor for the erection of a magnificent palace on Fifth Avenue. Before the work was begun or the sub-contracts let, the war broke out, resulting in a great rise in the prices of materials and labor. Mr. S. nevertheless refused to modify the contract. The contractor faced ruin. If it had been possible legally to get out of the contract, would he have been justified morally in breaking it?" To this the answer was given that the contract need not be kept because it would have ruined the contractor, while Mr. S. could well afford to lose the money. "What is the difference," I asked, "between this and IV?" He repeated that the contractor was face to face with ruin while this was not the case with the student. The only place where he came out squarely for rigorism where it involved the very greatest sacrifices was in II, where, however, the promise is binding because made to the *father*. (This is not classified as eudaemonistic because elicited by a leading question.)

So far there is nothing to differentiate this paper from any

of the preceding. The anomalies arose when the reasons were sought for the rigoristic answers to III and IV. He was entirely unable to state them. After several futile direct attacks I read him his answer to I and asked him if he had applied, and then if he could apply it to IV. He could only reply that he thought when the boy had made an agreement he ought to stick it out. "It is easy enough," I said, "to see why he ought to stay where there is a poor widow dependent upon him, but why in the second case? Why should he keep a contract when it is so hard to do so? The whole object of my inquiry is to discover what reasons we give ourselves for doing things that are hard to do." Again he replied he could only answer: He ought to stay in the second case because he has agreed to.

We then turned to the reasons for rigorism. He declared none of them had been in his mind while writing out his paper, or during the discussion with me. In reply to a question he said that his mode of answering III and IV (and he included II in this list) was more "instinctive" than like deciding to buy a certain farm, the reasons for which one could assign at the time of forming the decision. On the other hand the following reasons had occurred to him at various times, 1, 2, 3, and 6; also 4 and 5 rather vaguely. Two or three rather recondite ones, which I threw out as a decoy, he declared he had never thought of. The others, however, were familiar, having occurred to him many times when he was deciding moral questions. The authority of the Bible was not a factor.

This case appears to me identical in principle with those of 135 and 22 in the College of Letters and Science (see above, page 40 ff). The main difference is that here I have definite statements which go to confirm that which at least in 135 was hypothesis. At the close of our second interview, I showed him again his answer to I, pointed out the fact that he had used it in many judgments, and that in IV on the other hand he had refused to use it and had not assigned any other reason in its place. He replied that as far as the answer to I was concerned he had never thought much about problems of property so that the reasons for being strict in that field would not naturally occur to him. "Then you have thought of these reasons in settling problems of veracity and faithfulness to promises?"

I inquired. Yes, he had thought a great deal about them, a variety of such problems having been brought before him in various ways. Thereupon I suggested the following hypothesis which he said he believed represented the facts accurately. In writing out the answers to III and IV, which was done very rapidly, he had no particular reasons in mind because he wrote out the answers to conform to previous solutions. They were therefore put down at once without any particular thought. Question I, on the other hand, as something new, he was compelled to solve for the first time. He answered it therefore in accordance with the principle which spontaneously occurred to him, without regarding more remote considerations. The appearance and manner of the boy, that of an exceptionally intelligent and thoughtful fellow, at once confirmed the truth of his own statements and created confidence in his ability to verify them. The immediacy here brought to light, then, is of a sort which, as has been shown above,<sup>5</sup> is entirely compatible with autonomism.

The preceding explanation leaves one difficulty behind it, why, namely, he was not able to assign a reason for his rigoristic answer of IV when it was demanded of him. After all, however, this is not very different from the problem why some students recognize reasons as their own when they can not volunteer them. On certain points, we must suppose, this young man had reached definitive conclusions. For the moment the mind was not able to retrace the path by which the goal had been reached.

GROUP III. The common characteristic of the eight sets of replies that form this group is the fact that the great, and sometimes the overwhelming majority of the answers are rigoristic, and that (generally) the reasons for such decisions are not volunteered, so that they must be discovered, if present, either by leading questions or by some other indirect method.

Three members of this group, 250, 216, 242, may be taken up together. Almost all answers are rigoristic but in every case there are latitudinarian answers with an indubitable eudaimonistic basis. Thus 250 answered II, and the supplementary questions, 2 and 3 rigoristically. But 1 a and b, and 5 were

<sup>5</sup> See page 15.

latitudinarian, while 4 he could not answer. 5 was answered in an instant. The difference between 4 and 5 is that the farmer in 5 is in "a worse fix" than the poor man in 4, for the latter *could* get along without the help. I protested against this view somewhat feebly, but to no avail. Apparently the imagination had been affected by 5 as it had not been by 4.

Having obtained little light from the casuistry questions I took up the reasons for rigorism. 250 volunteered number 3 (in connection with II), the other two students volunteered none. In reply to leading questions each, however, claimed to recognize, and to have used in judging, several of the reasons. One's conclusion with regard to these men accordingly must turn upon the credence he accords to this claim. The considerations that can be urged in its favor were presented during the examination of Group II.

All these men mentioned as one reason for their answers the "commands of God." This phrase, as I have attempted to show in Chapter I, is ambiguous. If it stands for the results of the mere pressure of another will upon our own, then deference to such a command supplies evidence for the custom theory. On the other hand, if the "command of God" means a revelation of God as to what is right independently of any command, then such deference means simply a resort to an infallible source of knowledge. In order to determine which of these two attitudes was the attitude of our three students, I asked two of them (in the interview with the third this was impossible for lack of time) the question based upon the story of Abraham and Isaac as narrated above, page 71. Both declared that under the hypothetical conditions described Abraham was not bound to sacrifice his son; whereupon the application to V was made by them at once and without help from me: If God could be supposed to be sending this horrible suffering simply in order to delight himself with the sight of it, the physician would be perfectly justified in administering the poison.

The fourth member of this group is 204. In a general way his responses were like the preceding except there was a little more latitudinarianism. His discussion of the difference between II 4 and 5, the former of which he answered in rigoristic fashion, the latter in latitudinarian is the exact counterpart of that quoted

just above. In reply to my leading question he declared he recognized but had not used reasons 1, 2, 3, and 6 in his rigoristic answers. His real ground throughout was the command of God. This, indeed, was sufficiently apparent from his paper. His written answer to I, for instance, read: "He did wrong. For God's commandment, Thou shalt not steal does not give anybody the right to steal under any conditions whatsoever. I also think that it was an act of God and the will of God that they were suffering, and if God wanted them saved from starvation he would have provided means in which it might have been done without doing wrong. For we find instances in the Bible where means have been supplied when people were starving." What conceptions was such an answer based on? The problem of the sacrifice of Isaac revealed them. Abraham, he declared as soon as he understood the question, was only bound to obey if he believed God intended the sacrifice for their good. How incompletely even this point of view was capable of determining his moral judgments was shown by the result of my inquiry why the answer to II 5 did not apply to I. He could not say; but, though given an opportunity, he did not offer to change either answer. The sources of each apparently lay beyond the commanded and the forbidden.

Three more men may now be considered together, 207, 223, and 229. In these a vigorous and almost uninterrupted rigorism has its origin, mainly, in a single source, inability to see that a principle may hold in the great majority of cases, and yet because of the presence of exceptional conditions, not in all. Some of the eudaemonistic reasons for rigorism, enumerated in my list, were indeed recognized by all three men, one (223) declaring he used certain of them in preparing the paper and during the interview (see above, page 87), but in none was the central consideration of this nature. Two of them also made some concessions to latitudinarianism, while the third (207) showed at several points much reluctance in demanding a strict adherence to the rule. Furthermore they recognized that in all the more difficult cases, as I, II 4 and 5, III 1a and b, practically every one would break the rule, and they declared they would do so themselves. Furthermore, when I asked 207 whether he believed most people would consider such actions

wrong, he replied they probably would not unless they stopped to think about it. What thought then would be likely to give them pause? None other than this: "If you are not to keep your promise in this case [II 5] why in any case?" "Why not allow a promise to be broken any time?" I thereupon inquired. He was unable to reply.

In the other two men the same point of view appears, but it is expressed in terms of the agent's character as well as in terms of the action itself. 223, for example, could not see how you could call such actions as taking another man's property right in one case and wrong in another, and he feels that "if a man breaks the rule in one case, you never can have any confidence in him again, for he is just as likely to break it again in any other case." Similarly 229 in I: "If a man will steal one thing he will steal another;" and in V: "I can see no difference between the doctor's killing this man and anyone he might want to." Only here the answers came in reply to a question of mine to that effect; he being a young man from whom I could get nothing but Yes or No, except as I put a leading question.

The inferences we draw from these data will doubtless depend largely upon our confidence in the results already presented for acceptance. If we believe that forty-six out of the forty-nine thus far examined base their answers upon eudæmonistic considerations, we shall hardly see in the facts stated concerning these three young men anything to prevent us from placing them in the same category; especially as they are average representatives of their class, quite like the rest except for the taciturnity of 229, for which I found but one parallel. 223 expressly recognizes the value of confidence in others, and has made it the basis of a written answer (to III, see above page 87). His case, I think, is a clear one, especially as he recognized and used No. 6 as well as No. 3 of the reasons for rigorism. The other two are more obscure. And yet does not the foundation appear here also? In 207, the more communicative, we have the clean-cut assertion that the only reason for not breaking the rule in certain of the extreme cases is that then the rule disappears altogether. What objections are there to that? With his rudimentary powers of abstract thinking he is unable to formulate an answer. But can we believe that the experiences

of life, his observation and his reading (even if he reads nothing more than a country newspaper) have not forced upon his attention again and again the evils of theft, lying and murder? In reality, he knows the answer as well as anyone else. What he does not know is what I am driving at and what sort of an answer I expect. If we will go back in memory to our school days we shall recall exactly similar experiences of our own in the class room.

The remaining difficulty in these cases—the possibility of a recognition of the eudaemonistic basis of a moral judgment combined with the absence of a corresponding perception that a rule is not valid beyond the limits of its *raison d'être*—is removed by reminding ourselves that the same thing happens in the pseudo-eudaemonistic judgment described in Chapter II.<sup>6</sup> I tested 207 on this question, and although he stated clearly and on his own initiative the two eudaemonistic reasons for punishment and recognized that one, according to the terms of the question, no longer held, he thought the other still applied and necessitated the infliction of punishment.

The last member of Group III is 232. With him I had two interviews, aggregating four hours in length, making use of all the methods thus far described as well as others prepared for difficult cases which in mercy to the reader I will leave undescribed. In the end I was forced to give up without having obtained sufficient data upon which to base a conclusion. The trouble was that the best I could get out of him—with rare exceptions—was Yes or No, and often not even that. The simplest questions which the others, even the most dull, were able to answer, he could sometimes find no answer for. His answers to all the printed questions and to all the supplementary questions except two were rigoristic. The latitudinarian ones were II 5 and III 1a and b. He could not state the difference between the former and III 4 or explain his change of attitude. Of the grounds for rigorism, none had been in his mind in answering the questions either of the paper or the interview, but he declared himself perfectly familiar with 1, 2 (which we took up in connection with III), and 3 (in connection with III and IV). The others he had never thought of.

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<sup>6</sup> See above. page 35.

The commands of the Bible were a factor, but, as he seemed to think, if I understood him aright, not a very important one. "There is," he said, "something more than this, but I can not tell it." The teachings of his parents also he thought had a good deal to do with his opinions upon right and wrong. In answering these questions, he informed me in one of the rare lapses from his Yes-No procedure, he said to himself: "This is stealing, or lying, etc.; therefore it is wrong."

As far as I am concerned, anyone who cares to claim this young man, may have him. Readers who after the examination of the hundred and fifty cases that have been presented still believe in the social pressure theory should by all means exhibit student of agriculture number 232 as a demonstration of the truth of their theory. To be sure, in III he slaps in the face a custom in the midst of which, as he tells me, he grew up and decides against allowing children the joys of belief in Santa Claus on good eudaemonistic grounds. But then I am perfectly willing to admit that no view of this case is free from difficulty. Before celebrating the victory, however, it would be well to remember that several other explanations are equally at our disposal. In view of the results obtained from 17 and 49 (see Chapter III page 55) the possibility that the answers are due to the influence of parental or divine authority<sup>7</sup> can not be denied. It must be noted, however, that he himself believes "there is something more." Again, since he recognizes many of the reasons for rigorism, although he is not conscious of using them, he might be counted with 213 (page 87). In view of all the facts, however, I am inclined to classify him with 207, 223, and 229. It is true that in response to my inquiry he denied that he was moved by the consideration that appealed to them: If you are not to keep your promise, or to respect other people's property, in this instance, why in any? However, he missed the meaning of what I said so often that this denial is not decisive. On the whole I am willing to stand by my first offer: Anyone who thinks this young man will help his cause is welcome to him.

In order to determine whether the fifty students who have now been passed in review were fairly representative of the

<sup>7</sup> As explained above, pages 12 and 13.

entire first year class of which they were members, I came before them in their lecture room a second time, after all the papers had been handed in, and requested those who had failed to turn in answers solely because they could not give reasons for them, to inform me to that effect, in order that I might determine how many such persons there were. No one presented himself in response to this request. This result was about what I had expected. For in the first place, as may be remembered, over half of the entire number had turned in answers to the first set, which was no easier than the second. In the second place whatever had prevented the remainder from answering the questions, it was almost certainly not inability to assign reasons. For even those who in the interviews showed themselves to be most thoroughly eudaemonistic did not, in half the cases, feel bound to assign reasons in writing their papers.

The results of our study of immediacy among the members of the College of Agriculture may now be summarized. Between six hundred and fifty and seven hundred questions, basal and supplementary, were given to these fifty men. In Group I only two basal and two supplementary questions, belonging to two students, justify any suspicion whatever of their immediacy. Even these exhibit no positive evidence of its presence, the examination of them having been left incomplete for lack of time. In Group II there are two supplementary questions, belonging to one man, of which exactly the same may be said, and two basal questions and one supplementary question in the record of 213 that appear to owe their immediacy to a process of classification grown automatic through habit. In Group III the only evidence for immediacy is found in the returns from 232. As will be clear, it is a little difficult to make any statement as to the total number of these answers that have a *prima facie* claim to immediacy, but in any event it is not greater than in the returns from the "Hill" students, while the plausibility of the claim itself is in the case of every person save one (232) far less. This last fact has no more recondite explanation, I believe, than the greater thoroughness of the investigation.

What is true of our study of immediacy holds also for our examination of the influence of authority. There is no difference

of any importance between the students of the College of Letters and Science and the members of the Short Course in Agriculture. This is the more significant because the investigation made of this subject among the latter was, on the whole, distinctly more systematic and complete than that among the former. In twenty out of the twenty-four cases where the paper or the interview supplied the suggestion of a leaning upon the commands of the Bible, a careful inquiry was made to determine the nature of the facts themselves and the inferences which they require. If there were more than twenty-four such persons, then, with them, the belief in the Bible as a guide to conduct left not a single trace.

As with the "Hill" students, these young men were examined as to the relation of their answers to I, V and the problem of revenge (see page 143, Question IX) to the VIII and VI commandments and the prohibition in the Gospels of revenge. As has been said, the results were the same in principle as those obtained on the "Hill." Class 1 is pretty well represented; an example is 217, quoted above (page 80). Classes 2 and 3 do not appear, but unequivocal examples of the attitude of 4 are very frequent. As an example take 224, already quoted (page 83). Class 5 has the largest number of representatives. In some cases their point of view appears spontaneously, as in the following written answer to V: "A man has no right to take another's life, which we would be doing in this case. All suffering is made for a purpose." More often it is discovered through the answers to the problem of the sacrifice of Isaac, as in 201 (above, page 73). Instead of eudaemonism, the dysdaemonistic judgment seems to show itself once or twice. At least the doctor is forbidden to put an end to the sufferings of the dying man because God is punishing him for his past sins. The suffering of infants, in the theodicy of one of these young men, I may say in passing, was accounted for by the fact that "the parents suffer about as much as the child." I may add that the attempts to discover, both here and on the "Hill," why this point of view permitted the taking of anaesthetics to relieve pain, but not to put an end to pain, brought to light nothing but futilities.

Of the twenty students examined sixteen fall readily into

some one of the classes 1, 4, and 5. The remaining four call for special treatment. Two of them, 223 and 232, have been in part presented above (pages 92 and 94). They were, as may be remembered, almost without exception, rigoristic. I asked them about the sacrifice of Isaac, and also the disobedience of Prometheus. Both floundered terribly and in the end gave them up, unable to decide them. Their difficulty was not due to a failure to understand the question. Nor, in the light of all the facts, can I believe that their hesitation was the result of a tendency to bow blindly in the presence of power. Only those will declare that, under the conditions of my question, Abraham ought not to have obeyed, who have imagination enough to deal with the results of an incredible supposition. If the fact that God can not be believed to torture men for the mere pleasure of torturing them obscures all the rest of the problem, the opposite answer is to be expected. The truth of this statement is well shown by the answers to V given by two brothers who are both Christian Scientists. The older of the two wrote: "It is not right. The case would not be hopeless if he resorted to Christian Science." But the minute I asked what might be done if the man was not a Christian Scientist, he replied: "It would then be all right for him to take the morphine." The younger brother, on the other hand, was incapable of getting back of the fact that there is no such thing as cancer, and could not put himself sufficiently in the place of an unbeliever in his faith, even of the days before the revelations of Mrs. Mary Baker Glover Eddy, to tell what he ought to do. For no other reason than that there is no such thing as cancer (and that there is a very deadly thing called morphine) he stuck to his position, despite all my arguments, that it was wrong to administer the poison. This principle I believe explains the hesitation of 223 and 232 to justify the disobedience of our hypothetical Abraham. And the explanation is rendered plausible by the fact that these two young men stood at about the bottom of the list in the matter of mental flexibility.

This conclusion, however, is not based upon mere presumptions. 232, as will be remembered, when asked whether the commands of the Bible determined his answers, replied "Mostly."

And when I inquired what that meant, said he felt there was something more but he could not put it into words. 223 answered I on his paper by an appeal to the VIII commandment and in the interview asserted that the commands of God were one of the reasons for his rigoristic answers in general. But in V he wrote: "This is too much of a question for me;" nor was he enabled to come to a decision by a reference on my part to the VI commandment. The fact of the matter is that if it had not been for his inability to see that a law may remain a law and yet under certain conditions suffer exceptions, his sympathies would have led him to approve of the administration of poison, despite all the commandments in the Decalogue.

A problem of a different sort is presented by 235. His written answer to I was: "No. He was helping poor and sick and to save these people he was willing to take the blame of stealing and [be] dealt with accordingly." The answer to V, I may add, was latitudinarian also. In the discussion of I he still affirmed that the man did right, nevertheless declared that his act was a sin. God would not like it, because it was contrary to the VIII commandment; but God would forgive him for stealing under the circumstances. The explanation of this doctrine of the two-fold right is very simple. To displease God is, on any view, in so far forth wrong, just as it is to displease one's father. On the other hand it is right to help the poor. Most of us would say, God would desire us in this case to make an exception to the general rule which he has laid down. Our student fails to see this but is sure that God will nevertheless forgive the offender "under the circumstances."

The last on our list is 215. Most of his answers are latitudinarian and of these the majority are demonstrably eudaemonistic. At the conclusion of the interview I inquired how he reconciled his latitudinarianism in I and V with the commands of the Bible. Thereupon, declaring he had not thought of that, he instantly changed his answers. There was no time to carry the subject farther on that day, and I did not seek another interview. I am therefore unable to tell what would have been his attitude toward the story of the sacrifice of Isaac; but in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is fair to assume that

he would have conformed to the rule that seems to have held for all the others.

Our review of the data furnished by the students in the Short Course in Agriculture is now completed. We find here, as among the members of the College of Letters and Science, that the authority of the Scriptures, even when regarded as the God-given guide to conduct, has again failed to demonstrate its ability to determine, in any appreciable degree, the content of the moral judgment. If this be true, what shall we say of the other forms of authority?

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The results of our examination of a hundred and fifty members of the student body of the University of Wisconsin have now been presented. If the conclusions reached are valid for them, for what classes in the larger community, from which those young people come, will they hold?

The members of the College of Letters and Science who submitted to the dissector's knife were unquestionably representative of the three upper classes from which they were drawn. The brilliant and studious, the future leaders, are here; so are the easy-going, so are the mediocre in talent, so are the stupid. There is no correlation between the character of the answers and either ability or industry. One of the students quoted at length was then taking the psychology course as an "encore." Four others among those who are here quoted were later conditioned in the course in psychology or logic which they were then taking, three of these certainly and the fourth probably not because of idleness but from genuine inability to "get the stuff."

Time was when college students were, on the whole, a picked class. But with the democratization of education and the frank appeal made by the modern university to the instincts of acquisitiveness, this is no longer true. Ability we have in plenty, as much, no doubt, as there ever was. Industry still characterizes the great majority, at least in our institutions in the West. But thoughtfulness upon the broader problems of life, interest in things intellectual, the cast of mind resulting from the read-

ing of the masters, all these things are absent. In this respect Wisconsin is probably neither better nor worse off than its neighbors. It must be remembered also that the same results were obtained from the lower as from the higher levels of the class. The fact that youth is less prone to raise the question *cui bono* than middle life must not be left out of the count. Taking all these things into consideration, I believe we are justified in affirming that the description of the moral judgment here given holds at the very least for the so-called upper and middle classes in the population of our towns and cities.

The returns from the members of the Short Course in Agriculture are almost equally representative of the body of students from which they came. The higher levels of attainment, in so far as these are the product of education or environment, were, as may be remembered (see above, page 63) excluded. The very lowest stratum, as far as that can be determined from class standings, excluded itself. I have the marks for the first hundred members of the class in alphabetical order. This number contains twenty-six of my respondents. The standings of the latter average 1.47 per cent. higher than those of the entire hundred, the passing mark being 60 per cent. But the lowest mark found in our group is 75 per cent., whereas there are twelve out of the remaining seventy-four whose marks are below this. Omitting these twelve, the average of our respondents is practically that of the rest of the class. I give these figures for what they are worth. I am not sure that they have any great significance. Certainly within the group examined no correlation could be discovered between standings. And 207, 223, 229, and 232, my most difficult cases, obtained marks above the average. The following statement is in any event, as I believe, justified: Our examination brought us at least very close to the lowest levels of the class.

How far, then, are these students representative of the farming communities of the state? According to Professor Moore who was in charge of this course from 1895 to 1905 inclusive, and who, moreover, is acquainted with the farmers of Wisconsin as are few other men, the average is slightly above that of this population in ability and culture. They come largely, though by no means entirely, from the more well-to-do families.

It must not be forgotten, however, that here, as in the College of Letters and Science, the minority yield the same results as the majority, and without going into details the general intellectual level of at least a portion of this minority, judged by any standard you may wish to apply, is very low. In view of all the facts, I think it not wide of the mark to assert that these returns are representative for at least the upper nine-tenths of the farming population of this state. And since a large proportion of the boys studied are the sons of European peasants (chiefly from Germany and Norway) and some of them live in essentially foreign communities, our results may fairly claim to have something more than a local significance.

## CHAPTER V

## AN EXAMINATION OF OBJECTIONS

Various objections will undoubtedly be urged against the conclusions with regard to both immediacy and authority that have been drawn from the preceding study. Those that I have heard during the progress of this inquiry are reducible to four classes. They are: I, objections based upon a belief that the results are due to the influence of the University, including under this influences that have come directly or indirectly from the investigator himself; II, objections based upon the alleged insincerity of the reasons assigned by the students for their answers; III, objections based upon an alleged difference between the conditions under which these questions were answered and the conditions under which similar questions would be answered in real life; IV, those due to a misunderstanding of the conception of the process of moral judging here presented for acceptance. I shall take up the first, second and third, in order, reserving the fourth for the following chapter where the positive results of our study will be presented and with them a sketch of the *modus operandi* of the eudaemonistic judgment of every-day life.

We may proceed then to the first objection, viz., that the results obtained are due to influences arising from the connection of these young people with the University. (a) For the students of the College of Letters and Science this alleged source of error may be found in the influence direct or indirect of the faculty, or in influences emanating from my ethics classes, carried by my former students, or finally in influences passing from student to student. Direct passage of my views to these students is, however, practically excluded, for none of them had ever been in any of my classes before, and the main body of our results were obtained not through the interviews but

through written answers. (b) Among the Agricultural students the results might be supposed to be due to hints conveyed by me in the interviews, together with the transmission of these and of other items of information from one student to another. This might also be supposed to be a subordinate factor among the "Hill" students.

We may begin with (b). It may be thought that the interview offers peculiarly favorable opportunities for the transference of ideas from investigator to student. And since this was the principle method employed with the Agricultural students, that the results obtained from them are vitiated to an indeterminable degree by this fact. In the first place, I must point out that a goodly supply of eudaemonistic judgments were obtained from the written papers. As regards the interview itself, it will be remembered that I asked no leading questions beyond those specifically mentioned. Furthermore I expressed no opinions as to the correctness or incorrectness of any judgment whatever its character except inferentially at one point, specified just below. At the close of the interview I asked a number of the Agricultural students whether they had obtained any hints from my expression, manner, or anything else, as to the way in which I thought the questions should be answered. With one exception they replied in the negative, most of them asserting that they were too busy thinking about the question to notice me; the one student who thought he could detect my opinions from my manner as a matter of fact answered the majority of the questions differently from what I should. There were, indeed, occasional instances of apparent partisanship on my part, indulged in, I hasten to add, only at the close of the interview, from which the student might have extracted a hint, had he been seeking for one, but unfortunately for the objector their influence was in each case zero. This was when I made an attack upon a position once taken, to see how it would be defended. The following illustration of the outcome is thoroughly typical. 204 answered II 4 rigoristically and II 5 in latitudinarian fashion. I asked what the difference was between 4 and 5. "In 5 the woman could go to town any other day." I replied that the situation was not so simple as all that, suggested various inconveniences that would result from postponement, and—as

these considerations produced no effect—ended by asserting that it was a promise anyway. He hesitated a moment and suggested that in 4 the poor man *might* get upon his feet in some other way. Thereupon I reshaped the question so as to make this improbable in the extreme. He could suggest no farther difference, but clung to each answer with undiminished tenacity. The same thing happened when there was a conflict with the authority of the Bible. In all cases of insubordination, I, in so far as I took any attitude, backed the commandments. This was a liberty I could permit myself because the discussion of the subject came at the end of the interview. In only one instance—as has been already seen—did this partisanship produce any effect.<sup>1</sup>

This matter is of such vital importance that I shall venture to attempt to fortify my statements by introducing an account of a deliberate attempt made this winter to browbeat some of the members of this year's entering class in the same course. It occurred in the progress of an investigation undertaken by Mr. Otto, fellow in philosophy, into their conceptions of justice. The question he is dealing with is IV in the original numbering as found in the Appendix,—the question of the settlement besieged by Indians which can only be saved by sacrificing the life of one of its inhabitants. He shall tell his story in his own words.

Where the student said, "I think they ought to fight it out," a deliberate attempt was made to get him to change his position by describing the situation in such a way that he would naturally suppose I did not agree with his answer. The interviews proceeded substantially as follows:

*You know what a stockade is?* [Here some explanation was at times necessary.] *I want to tell you what happened in connection with one down in New England, early in our history. Well, one forenoon, all of a sudden, this stockade was surrounded by a band of Indians,—about three hundred, I think it was. They came to get a white man who, they claimed, had done them a great injury. They claimed he had killed two Indians that morning, six miles from the stockade; had scalped them; and stolen all they had. Two squaws had witnessed the deed.*

<sup>1</sup> See above, page 99.

Now, as it happened, this man with several others had been busy three or four days on a piece of work inside the fort—making a map I believe—and had not been outside of the stockade in that time. So it was impossible for him to have done the deed. The captain knew this, of course, and so he told the chief that he could not give the man up. But the Indian chief said: “When an Indian kills a white man we have to give him up to be punished by you; this man has killed two Indians,—is it not fair that you give him up to us, to be punished as we think best?” You can see how the Indians would look at it. (Here the student would usually say, “Yes I can see; you can’t blame the Indians.”) The captain, absolutely sure that the man was innocent, said: “If the man had done what you say, I would surrender him, that would be only fair; but he hasn’t, and so I cannot give him up.” The captain then explained to the Indians why this man could not have committed the deed, and tried to convince them that there was a mistake somewhere, but the Indians would not believe him. (Here a number of the students interjected, “You can’t blame them for that either, because the whites did lie to the Indians a lot.”) Well, there was a lot of talking on both sides, and then the chief told the captain he’d have to have that man. If they’d give him up willingly, they’d go away believing in his honesty and sense of justice, and there would be no further trouble. If he’d refuse to give him up, so that they’d have to lose a lot of men to get what they ought to have by right, then when they got into the stockade they’d kill the whole crowd of them. The captain knew he could depend on this chief to do as he said, so he was in a pretty bad fix.

Now as this was in time of peace, there was little powder and food in the stockade, so they couldn’t stand a siege. And since there were only about fifty men against three hundred Indians, a pitched battle was out of the question. It was either give up the innocent man to the Indians, or all die. Which do you think they ought to do? Wait a minute, I wish you’d try to look at it from an outside point of view. What would it be right for that captain to do,—command the one to march out and so save the rest, or command the rest to stand by this man

*and die doing it? And remember the man will die either way you fix it. What do you say?*

You say the man didn't do it? *Yes, it was perfectly clear that the man was innocent. And couldn't they get help some way? No; remember they are surrounded. I'd never give him up! I'd say fight it out. But you see that means a large loss of life, whereas, if you send the man out, all the rest may live. Yes, but the man hasn't done anything. The others haven't either, have they? Why should you make FIFTY innocent people suffer for nothing when by making ONE innocent man suffer you save so many lives? Yes. I see that. And of course the Indians would certainly get that man if they ever got in. That's a bad one. [Then with renewed vigor] No, sir, I'd never give him up. One man is no better than another, therefore I think each man should take his share of the trouble. It doesn't look right to have all those people die; in another way it is mean and cowardly to put it all on one man, just because the Indians happen to want him. You don't seem to want that man given up. No, sir, I don't; that certainly doesn't seem right. Have you thought of the women and children involved in this? I didn't know there were any; you didn't say anything about that, did you? No, but I thought you knew there were usually women and children in the stockades so I didn't mention it. That makes it harder. Then suppose we look at it again, and say there were fifty men and fifty women and children, all these would have to go if the captain didn't give up the man. The men would be killed, the women mistreated, the children carried into captivity. What would you say the captain ought to do then?* [Here a few said the man ought to be given up for the sake of the "innocent women and children," and they justified their change of position on the ground that new data had been introduced. In the majority of cases, however, the interview went on as follows.] *Well, what do you think the captain ought to do—say to the one "you must go," or to the rest "you must stand by this man and die?"* I don't think he ought to force the man to go if he didn't do the deed. If he's willing to go, all right, and I think it's his duty to offer himself. And if he were guilty I'd say give him up. But I can't see how anyone can have a right to give up an in-

nocent man that way. It seems tough, but the man is innocent and I think they ought to stand by him. *You see what that involves? You are willing to give up a hundred men, women, and children to save one man. If he hasn't done it! Yes, I understand you,—if he hasn't done anything. But now I can go right on increasing the number; make it two hundred, three hundred, and so on. That's true; I saw that all right. That's what makes it such a hard question. In the case of the train and the child<sup>2</sup> you thought it right to save the train because it was many lives against one. Why do you hold out for the one—as you do here, even at the expense of the many? I don't know. It's inconsistent of course, but somehow it looks different. Don't you want to change your answer then? No, sir, I can't see how we have a right to make a man suffer for what he hasn't done.*

Such facts seem to me to take the foundation from under the claim that the only data capable of satisfying the scientific conscience of any one not present at these interviews would be complete phonographic and kinematographic records. In the face of such a claim it may be asserted with confidence that the minor details which do not and can not appear in the preceding accounts make absolutely no difference in the results.

Precautions were taken to prevent leaking—assuming that there was anything to leak. With both sets of students I requested each one to say nothing whatever to any of his fellows about the interview. And from every Agricultural student I obtained an assurance that no one had communicated with him in any way concerning the interviews. Other influences from the University are excluded for the Agricultural students. They had been in the city less than a month when the printed questions were given to them. Their time was wholly occupied with learning how to handle and repair farm machinery, how to select seed corn, to plant alfalfa, to judge stock. They were kept at these things from early morning till late at night. If all this time their teachers were (without knowing it) weaning them from blind obedience to custom to loyalty to a reasoned

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<sup>2</sup> This refers to Question IX of Series I: College of Letters and Science, for which see Appendix. It formed a part of the investigation under consideration.

code, then the boss superintending the repairs of the street railway below the University Hill is doing the same thing with the men wielding their picks and shovels.

If these considerations justify the conclusion that the Agricultural students were really using their own legs instead of being carried along by a concealed moving sidewalk, the case against the mental independence of the "Hill" students falls to the ground. For what reason is there to claim that the judgments of the latter were the mere reflection of the medium in which they happened to arise, when as far as immediacy and the attitude towards authority are concerned they are identical with those from the other college? However, even this is not all there is to be said on the subject. I questioned very carefully about a dozen of those "Hill" students whose answers were most completely eudaemonistic, with regard to the sources of their opinions. All asserted that they were aware of no influence emanating from their university life to account for their attitude. It so happened that none of them had had anything more than an elementary course in economics or political science, and from these they could trace no relations to my casuistry questions; they had heard nothing about my attitude towards ethical problems from my former pupils—students here do not discuss their work with anyone except their fellows in the same course—it is hardly "good form." The studied avoidance of all serious questions on the part of the undergraduate makes improbable the existence of any "eudaemonistic atmosphere" among the students, originating, I know not where, but abiding with generation after generation as a tradition. Some of the men and women were members of the literary societies. They had of course debated or heard debates upon the Philippine problem, the problem of government ownership, *et cetera*. But they were aware of no influences from that direction and indeed those not members of the societies were in these matters indistinguishable from those who were.

Some of the Chicago newspapers discussed V at considerable length during the winter of 1905-06. But the discussion was opened after the written returns from the class had come into my hands and most of my interviews had been held. While the debate was going on I asked a number of these students

whether they were following it. Not one of them had even heard of it.

II. It may be objected that it is easy enough for anyone to invent reasons on demand. But what evidence is there, it may be asked, that the reasons assigned were those which actually determined the answers? To this I feel tempted to reply: What evidence is there that the large number of persons who directly or by implication declared these to be their real reasons were deceiving either themselves or me? It is true we found evidence of self-deception in regard to the influence of the authority of the Bible. But then we found *evidence*, and found it easily and repeatedly, and no assertions have been made on the subject in this study that are not based on a large amount of such evidence. Similar grounds for suspicion concerning the reality of the eudaemonistic attitude were not discovered, though searched for with patience and care.

But what will probably be more convincing lines of argument are at our disposal. The reasons found in the papers and interviews are too often an organic part of the answers to be an afterthought. Illustrations of this are 9 (I. d, on page 25), and 23 in II, and 110 in III, which follow. 23: "I think the young man would be justified in abandoning the business career. His father was selfish and exacting, I think, to make his son make a promise which would so needlessly spoil the pleasure of his life. Sacrifices made to help some one else or to raise the standards of a community which will be for the betterment of humanity in the end are highly honorable but such an unnecessary sacrifice under the circumstances is not." 110: "Yes. The belief in a Santa Claus is one of my happiest recollections, as I look back to my childhood. It caused me a great amount of pleasure and never did me a whit of harm. The more such harmless and delightful illusions man can cherish, the happier will his life be." With this last should be compared the rigoristic answers to III above, page 26.<sup>3</sup>

Moreover the verdict itself varies according as conditions affecting welfare vary. This appears unequivocally in the latitudinarian answers of the "Hill" students to IV and V. (See

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. above, page 84.

above pages 24 and 25). It appears also in the answers of the Agricultural students to the supplementary questions as found on page 73 and following. If we compare the reasons put forward not merely for these but for all the answers with the reasons against taking interest quoted in Bacon's essay on usury we shall feel the difference instantly between what are manifestly artificial reasons raked together to persuade others of what one is himself convinced on other grounds and the reasons that really determine the conclusions of the person judging.<sup>4</sup> And these reasons are not merely good *per se*, they are just those which would naturally present themselves in the consideration of the different problems, if the persons were looking at them from the eudaemonistic point of view. This is clearly shown, it seems to me, in Tables II and III in the next chapter.

Once more, if these reasons had no part in determining the answers, it is curious that one hundred and fifty persons should all hit upon the same principle. There is variety enough in the answers as we shall see when we come to classify them in the next chapter. But in all this variety there is a striking, or rather, if the objection under consideration be valid, a miraculous unity, a unity which exhibits itself, through all the diversity of its application, in the presence of a single point of view—the eudaemonistic. Can such a phenomenon be due to accident?

Another line of evidence leads straight to the same conclusion. During my interviews with both sets of students I noticed that the statement of the reason usually followed immediately upon my inquiry, Why? even when considerable time had been spent in deciding the question itself. If this could be shown to be anything more than a mere impression it seemed to me it would be decisive, for it would mean that the reason had emerged during the process of reaching the decision. I accordingly asked Mr. Otto to make a careful investigation of the amount of time elapsing between answer and reason in the replies of a group of

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<sup>4</sup> "Many have made witty invectives against usury. They say that it is pity the devil should have God's part, which is the tithe. That the usurer is the greatest Sabbath-breaker, because his plough goeth every Sunday. That the usurer is the drone that Virgil speaketh of: *Ignavum fucos pecus a præsepibus arcent*. That the usurer breaketh the first law that was made for mankind after the fall, which was: *In sudore vultus tui comedes Panem tuum*; not: *In sudore vultus a'ieni*. That usurers should have orange-tawney bonnets, because they do Judaize. That it is against nature for money to beget money; and the like." Bacon, *Essays*, xii.

students of the same general character as the members of the "Short Course," the students, namely, in the Winter Dairy Course. His account of the results follows:

In the results here given the printed questions distributed play a very small part. It happened to be impossible, at the time, to get the students to give the matter much thought, and consequently at the interview the majority had forgotten the questions. Even after these were repeated to them many failed to recall the attitude they had taken originally. Moreover, some of the students included in this list had answered a different set of questions than the one used by me, and others had not been reached at all until the time of the interview. One thing, at any rate, was perfectly obvious, namely, that the men came without a program of answers and reasons.

The method of procedure was as follows: Seated in ordinary school seats in a quiet room, we began with perfectly general conversation regarding the nature of their school work, opportunities in the line they had selected, mutual acquaintances, *et cetera*, until a basis of easy, familiar conversation had been reached. This was usually brief, but it sometimes lasted as much as ten minutes. When the transition seemed easy and natural we took up the basal questions of page 65 and following, but with no regard to order. The time required for answers to appear either spontaneously or in answer to the question, Why? was measured in pulse beats as obtained by holding the thumb and first two fingers of the left hand in contact. To each question a number or letter had been assigned, and as reasons were given the number of beats was recorded with the right hand. Absolute accuracy of course was not aimed at, but the method seems sufficiently reliable for the purpose in hand. Twenty-five men were interviewed; of these one discovered that a record was being taken, and while his time is not strikingly different from the rest, he is not included in the summary of results. The interview was written up immediately after its conclusion, while details were fresh in mind.

At the outset a difficulty was encountered which had not been in the least anticipated. While an explicit 'because' formed an organic part of fewer answers than I had expected, the rea-

son in many cases was given so quickly in answer to the question, Why? that counting was practically impossible. This, for example, was the case in almost every instance where the student considered it right to take the loaf of bread. No record runs over three beats, and only four reach that figure. The rest are between zero and two beats, but the majority of the two's are arbitrary and mean that the time was appreciable but too short to be measured. The reasons in Question I were usually of this nature: "Life must be preserved at all hazards," or, "It cannot be right to let people starve." It may be objected that such reasons are ambiguous, but the matter was not allowed to rest there, as examples given below will demonstrate.

The men who in Question I took the other side, namely, that it was wrong to take the loaf of bread, required more time. They usually began by offering as a reason, "because it's stealing," which at once led to the question why stealing is wrong. The same question was asked of those who did not object to the taking of the bread, because the number who did object was too small to base conclusions upon. A eudaemonistic answer to this question made its appearance in every case in a period ranging from zero to twelve pulse beats in duration. The average was a little under four pulse beats. A few of the answers will illustrate. The first is by the man who, on the whole, was the slowest in giving reasons. He had had practically no education, had thought little about anything, and was slow of speech. The figures in brackets indicate the time required for the reply.

No. 6. [I repeated the story.] *Did he do right or wrong?* He did right to take it. *Why do you say so?* (0) "Gee, we can't let people starve." [Then he added:] "Of course it's stealing, and that's wrong." *You really consider stealing wrong, do you?* (0) "Gee, how kin a fellow answer a question like that,— sure it's wrong." *Why is stealing wrong?* (8) "We have always been taught by all the holy books, haven't we?" *Is that what makes it wrong, because we have always been taught by all the holy books?* (0) "Well, I don't know." *Supposing the holy books of some country taught it was right to steal, would it be right for those people to steal?* [Immediately and emphatically.] "No, sir." *But why not?* (9) "Well, this is my idea, you can't let people steal." *What do you mean?*

(3) "Why if stealing was right, then pretty quick nobody would have nothing." [and after about eight beats] "Gee, that would be a fine world, that's what I think!"

The following are typical replies. No 11 [after I had repeated the story]. Under the circumstances I would not blame him. *That doesn't quite answer my question. Do you think he did right?* Yes, under the circumstances, I think so. *Why?* (3) "Well, he helps a person in great need." *But he steals.* "Yes, and stealing is wrong, I know." *Always?* "No, not always, but most always." *Why so?* (3) "O you couldn't let people steal, because then no one would do nothing in a little while." *What do you mean?* (0) "Why supposing you worked and got something together; someone would steal it, and if that was right to do, and you couldn't do nothing, what would be the use of working at all? That wouldn't work." [In a tone of surprise and some reproach] *Then you mean to say that stealing is wrong because we could not get along that way?* (5) "That's the only reason I can think of."

No. 12 [after my telling the story]. *What do you think of this action?* I think it's right. *Why so?* (0) "You can't let people suffer like that; what kind of a world would that be?" *Then why not say stealing is right?* [At once and with vigor] "Great Lord! that would make an awful mess." *What do you mean?* (2) "Stealing's got to be wrong or we'd have an awful mix-up." *Still I am not sure I understand you.* (2) "Well it's like this. One man would steal all he could, another would steal from him, and where would the thing end? The biggest bully would get along best of all."

The next question here reported upon had to do with the keeping of contracts (IV), various complications being introduced by means of sub-questions. Two men, of the twenty-four, stood out for keeping their agreement under any and all circumstances, and they were slowest in giving reasons, requiring as high as seven beats. Of the remaining twenty-two one took six beats; two, five beats; five, three beats; the rest from two to zero. The average was about two and five-tenths.

Two typical sets of replies follow:

No. 4 [I repeated the question]. He should have kept the room. *Why so?* (0) He had promised, and a promise must

be kept. *Always?* (0) "Well, in a case like this the hardship he was put to was not great and certainly less than the widow." *What would you say in the case of the woman comfortably situated?* (0) There it would still be wrong to go, for we must keep promises. *You seem to feel that a promise is pretty binding.* I do. *What makes you feel so strongly about that?* (5) "Everything would stop if you couldn't depend on people." *Did you say it always was wrong to break promises?* No, I wouldn't say that, but a man should go slow about breaking a promise; "it's just like lying." *I fear I don't understand you.* (3) I mean promises should be kept where it's possible; "unless it costs us more to keep them than it does the other fellow good."

No. 5. If the woman is poor he should keep his promise. *Why so?* (3) "He can work some other way and it won't hurt him." *Why do you say that?* (6) "Well I don't know why, but it's easier for him than for her." *How about the woman comfortably situated?* (0) That's different, still he ought to keep his promise if he could. *What do you mean?* (0) "She don't need it like the poor widow,—but he gave his promise." *You seem to think that a promise is pretty binding.* "That's what I think, too." *Why are you so set on that?* (2) "Well, now, how could you do anything if men didn't keep their promise?" A man would promise to give you \$5,000 for a house, and after he got it he wouldn't do it; and you wouldn't be sure of wages or anything. "I think we couldn't do that way very long."

In connection with the question about Santa Claus reasons were given with greatest rapidity. Only two required as high as three beats, while the majority either gave their reasons as part of the answer, or immediately upon being asked for them. The record is,—sixteen, zero; five, two beats; two, three beats. The average is about eight-tenths.

Typical replies:

No. 17. "It's all right to tell children there is a Santa Claus because it's done for their pleasure and not to deceive them." *But isn't it a lie?* (0) "I suppose it might be called a lie, but if we only told lies to give people pleasure I guess we wouldn't call lying wrong at all."

No. 2. "I think it's wrong to tell children there is a Santa Claus because it makes them nervous." *What do you mean?* (0) "I've seen lots of children who were afraid of the dark, and a noise, and things like that, because they were told such stories." *And that's why you consider it wrong?* (2) "Well, yes. Some folks consider it a lie I suppose, but I don't think it's much of a story because it's told to give the children pleasure." I think it does a lot of harm though to tell such stories; that's why I think it wrong, because it makes the children nervous.

The results in the case of the other questions do not differ from those given. Whenever the questions became more complicated of course more time was required, and some men were more rapid than others; but the readiness with which reasons were given was a continual surprise.

III. Admitting that the reasons alleged in these responses were really determining factors in their formation, it may be further objected that the differences between an exercise in casuistry like the present and the process of dealing with problems of conduct in everyday life are too numerous and too great to justify an inference from one to the other. Four such differences may be asserted to exist. First, a reason for the answer is demanded. At the head of the paper stood the words: "Please give reasons for answers to all questions as far as possible." The challenge, then, to produce reasons may have brought them to the mind, where otherwise they would never have been thought of.

I might begin by denying the assumption involved in the objection. It is not true that life never raises for us the question, Why? It does so many times when we pass judgment upon others; it does so still more insistently often when we find ourselves at the crossroads, where the demand can not be ignored as my printed request frequently was. But waiving this, let us remember just what is meant by the reason for an answer to a problem in casuistry. When applied to the answers of these five questions which we are alone studying at present it means, as we saw on pages 16 and 17, that the action is judged right or wrong according to its relation to the welfare of certain or all of those affected. The real problem therefore is:

Is the demand for a reason capable of making a person pass from the blind worship of custom or any other form of authority to the eudaemonistic standpoint? I think no one who understands what he is saying will assert it. If the foreign pressure theory were true the demand for a reason would simply bring the general rule to mind, as a result of which we should find in the latitudinarian answers to I, for instance, the words "Right, because to let them starve would be murder," throughout instead of only twice (see above, page 47); and in the rigoristic answers, instead of such statements as that of I d (page 25), a bare recital of the rule.

The second alleged difference may be dealt with in the same way. In deciding these questions, it may be urged, plenty of time was allowed for reflection; to this may be attributed the constant use of the eudaemonistic standard. Again we may deny the implied assumption. In forming many moral judgments, especially upon our neighbor, we often have all the time we want to take. On the other hand, generally speaking, not a great deal of time was given by these young people to any one of my questions. Unfortunately I have nothing but impressions upon which to base this assertion for the "Hill" student, but the time spent in this exercise by the Agricultural students was determined as accurately as they were able to estimate it. Omitting two men who said they spent three or four evenings upon them, the average time expended by the remainder for reading over the ten questions which I gave out, deciding them, and writing out the answers (for some of these men not the easiest of tasks) was a few minutes less than one hour. Of this entire number only four required over an hour, and three decided all (or in one case almost all) questions instantaneously. Still more conclusive are the results obtained by Mr. Otto from the Dairy students, just reported. As far as I have been able to discover the only significant difference anywhere produced by reflection is the appearance of a tendency to decide somewhat more consistently in accordance with the demands of the greatest balance of good over evil, in particular to restrain the first impulses of sympathy and to look to the more remote effects. It is impossible to see how five or ten or even fifteen minutes' reflection upon one of these problems (or, for that matter, an indefinite

amount of it) could do more than this. It would indeed be a new formulation of the doctrine under criticism which should read: "Moral laws arise in consciousness as categorical imperatives and remain in that state for from five to ten minutes. After this amount of time has elapsed they drop the mask of absolute commands and prohibitions and counsel us to promote individual or universal happiness."<sup>5</sup>

Thirdly, it may be alleged that the results we have obtained are due to the fact that a considerable number of problems were presented at the same time. This may be supposed to have lead the mind away from authority to the use of the eudaemonistic standard in the following way. This standard may have appealed to the student as the one possessing jurisdiction in one or two places; whereupon the demands of consistency made him feel he must apply it throughout. To this may be replied that consistency can work both ways. If obedience to a blind impulse was the rule for eight cases out of ten, why was not the idea of a change of allegiance treated as a suggestion from the devil of inconsistency? But aside from this, the fact remains that my students do not take this matter of consistency so seriously. Of course they do not deny its validity. But they are not on the outlook for inconsistencies and accordingly often fail to see them where they actually exist. Thus in VIII and IX of Series I<sup>6</sup> many cheerfully decided in favor of the greater good in IX and in favor of the less in VIII. The interviews quoted in the preceding chapter also show some startling and oftentimes unaccountable leaps from Yes to No and No to Yes. When a student feels that a change in the point of view is in order he forthwith changes it. Otherwise, starting with questions calculated to bring out the eudaemonistic standard, we should have found no examples of the use of the dysdaemonistic or the aesthetic. That this happens not infrequently will be set forth in a study which is to follow this one. The effect of the massing of questions was like that of allowing time for reflection; it brought out more clearly in the minds of a few thoughtful students the necessity of choosing the alternative that promised the greater good if a breach of consistency was to

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. above, page 9.

<sup>6</sup> See Appendix.

be avoided. In this way it led to a more perfect application of the eudaemonistic standard. But even this effect seems to have been limited in range and neither *a priori* considerations nor observation justify the belief that it can lead to a passage from one point of view to the other.

Finally it may be urged that the entire situation in which my students are placed by this exercise is an artificial one, and therefore they might have answered these questions very differently if confronted by them in real life. In reply I must point out that in these chapters at least I care nothing about their Yes or No, but only about the method by which it is reached. There is nothing about these questions in themselves considered, or the device by which they are brought to the attention of the student, to call into existence a method foreign to that of daily life. The attitude he must take towards them is identical with what it is when he passes judgment upon the conduct of anyone with whom he is not personally acquainted. If it be said that such judgments are different in kind from those that we pass upon our own past or prospective conduct, I reply: (1) No evidence has ever been offered for such an assertion; (2) that one would expect the question *cui bono* to be raised about our own sacrifices and efforts more readily than about those which we demand from others; and finally (3) at the lowest the statement admits the truth of our description for a large part of our moral judgments and places upon the objector the obligation of showing that it does not hold for the rest.

In one respect, to be sure, certain of these questions may have produced a change in attitude, in that they explicitly raised a problem which hitherto perhaps had never been faced. Thus most of the large number of Agricultural students who disapproved of lying to children about Santa Claus were asked if they had ever thought of the matter before. The great majority had not; they had been helping to deceive their little brothers and sisters and their child friends about the source of their Christmas gifts in perfect good faith. In the same way, of course, the housewife orders a leg of mutton for dinner without ever pausing to consider the claims of vegetarianism. But such facts are nothing to the point. They are instances, not of judging, but of the absence of judgment. If the latter is iden-

tical with an actual judgment of approbation, then your dog is an atheist because he does not believe in the existence of God. Here is a fine illustration of the way—or rather one of the ways—in which custom actually works upon the conscience; it “puts the critical faculty to sleep.” But in the unconsciousness of sleep, be it observed, the powers of judgment are, by definition, not at work.

## CHAPTER VI

## THE EUDAEMONISTIC STANDARD

Our results thus far have been essentially negative: the foreign pressure theory neither describes nor explains correctly the facts of the every day moral consciousness. But our investigation enables us to make some positive statements with regard to the eudaemonistic point of view. These may properly find a place in our study, although the detailed description of the eudaemonistic judgment formed no part of our program.

We may begin with a certain statement about the mode of passing moral judgment in general, for which the preceding examination supplies, indeed, no absolutely new evidence but which, when accepted on other grounds, it tends decidedly to confirm. I shall not attempt to argue for the view about to be set forth. It is here given a place solely in order to show that the denial of immediacy does not necessarily thrust us into the arms of another alternative which, to many, would seem no better than that which has been rejected. This removal of a possible misunderstanding may serve, I hope, to make the acceptance of the conclusions of the preceding chapters less difficult for some readers.

The moral judgment is often described as the comparison of conduct with a standard. This view, if stated as a universal proposition, seems to me erroneous. It supposes the presence in the mind of some general rule as a major premise, of a formula for the present situation as a minor premise and the consciousness of the relation of the major and minor terms to the middle term as the basis of the conclusion. This process may of course take place at times. It certainly does so not infrequently in the so-called prudential judgment and I see no reason why it should not equally in the moral. Thus a man adopts the maxim: Letters are not to be written when in anger. On being tempted

to write a letter under such conditions he may think of his resolution and refrain. Usually, however, what happens is this. An angry man feels tempted to write a letter highly charged with electricity; then, without any general principle in mind at all, fears he may say something he will afterwards regret and lays aside his pen. It is the same, I believe, with the moral judgment. Ordinarily, as I have asserted on page 17 above, no process of reasoning seems to take place. We condemn an action usually because there is something about it that arouses dislike directly. There is to be sure one difference between the prudential and the moral judgment. Moral condemnation means that we disapprove of the act not because of any relationship in which it may chance to stand to our own welfare (as the industry of a business competitor which may lose us many customers) but because we wish no one whatever to do it, under the given conditions. But the universal involved in the "no one" is a universal that applies as such only to this particular kind of conduct as practiced in this particular situation. So that the act before the mind may be a single act in its concrete individuality.

The denial of immediacy, therefore, does not mean that in the eudaemonistic judgment the person compares the action with the principle of "the greatest good of the greatest number," or some similar formula. In fact he often prefers the less good as is shown by many of the answers to VIII and IX of Series I. And such answers are not to be explained by assuming that the person supposed, either explicitly or implicitly, that these modes of conduct were in the long run most conducive to the general welfare. Any such statement, however guarded, may be unequivocally denied if put forward as one of universal validity.

But whether he chooses in favor of what *de facto* will tend to bring about the greatest good or not, he seems usually to have in mind not the whole world of sentient life but merely the actors in the drama before him. "Taking the bread will save these lives:—good." or, "it will save these lives without doing any appreciable harm to the baker:—good!" such are some of the points of view from which the latitudinarian answers to I are formed. In the rigoristic answers the *dramatis personae* may be more numerous, including oftentimes the community in

which the chief actors live, or occasionally their country or even (still more rarely) the whole of the human race. But even in this there may be and often is no reference to a general rule in the meaning of the definition we are criticizing.

Sometimes, indeed, the reference to a rule takes place and that without any clear awareness of the eudaemonistic factors in the situation. But such a judgment, as I have tried to show,<sup>1</sup> if not itself entitled to the name of eudaemonistic, is the direct product of the eudaemonistic point of view, since it is but an echo of past eudaemonistic judgment. As it has already been discussed at length it need not detain us now.

After this introductory explanation we turn to a brief examination of the content of the eudaemonistic judgment where that content is explicitly before the mind. There is here much room for diversity. One aspect of a situation may attract the attention of one man, another aspect, the attention of a second man. Thus a great variety of attitudes is possible on the part of those who are using fundamentally the same criterion. The latitudinarian answers to the five questions we have been studying turn, in general, upon the approval of the intended good. In I, II, and IV there is usually—but not always—a recognition of the fact that some harm at least is a necessary accompaniment of the good. In such instances the principle often employed and sometimes expressed is that duty is determined rigorously by the balance of gain over loss; as in answers Ib, IIb, IVa, and also IIIb (page 24); again in I, page 81; II 5, page 76; IV, page 78 (in effect), page 83. More frequently, however, the limits of service are either not placed so high, or are at all events less clearly formulated and presumably less clearly recognized. This is especially true of the Agricultural students, though it holds also for the members of the College of Letters and Science. For examples from the former see above pages 76, 84 under I; from the latter IVb, page 25. In view of these results we must deny the statement of Professor Ladd,<sup>2</sup> "It would be contrary to fact to affirm that [in passing moral judgments] men at all frequently deliberate whether this or that way of behavior will produce the maximum

<sup>1</sup> See above, page 15.

<sup>2</sup> *Philosophy of Conduct*, 514.

of human happiness." Or at all events we are bound to assert that men very frequently deliberate whether a given mode of behavior will produce the greatest attainable happiness for those whom they think of as affected by it.

The rigoristic answers exhibit a much greater diversity in the point of view. The following are the chief varieties represented in our papers and interviews: (1) By all odds the most important class of causes for rigoristic answers to our questions is that group of considerations brought together in the Appendix under the heading: The eudaemonistic reasons for the observance of general rules. (2) The second class of causes consists of certain fallacies, the two most important of which, though already described, may be mentioned here for the sake of completeness. (a) The first I have been calling the pseudo-eudaemonistic judgment as such, although (b) is equally entitled to the name. In this we see the eudaemonistic reason for the rule but fail to observe that it does not hold in this particular case. The resultant judgment was illustrated above, Chapter II, page 35 and following. (b) The person judging regards it as impossible to maintain a rule if you permit a single exception. This point of view is not identical with reason 2 or 6 for the observance of general rules, just referred to; for the latter depends upon a recognition of the fact that there are all sorts of imperceptible gradations in conduct, and asserts (in effect) that were it not for this, exceptions to the rules would be permissible. But here this difficulty is not in mind, and the answer would presumably hold even if there were not a series of puzzling grays lying between the black and the white. Neither is it only a form of (a) above. For in (a) the person may be willing in principle to permit exceptions but fails to see that this is the place for one. Here, on the other hand, every possibility of flexibility is cut off by some such consideration as this: "If it was not wrong for him to steal, then it would not be wrong for anybody, and in this way would all go stealing when in need" [No. 233]. As will be remembered other representatives of this point of view were studied at some length in Chapter IV above, page 92 ff. (3) Trust in the leadings of God who does all things well. This appears most frequently, of course, in the answers to V. Sometimes, however, we find it in I also, as in 201, page 73

above. (4) The interests of the party that has less at stake catch and hold the attention and make the person judging their partisans. This may be due to several different causes: (a) The interests of the other party fail to obtain any consideration whatever, they are ignored. This seems to be the case in the following rigoristic answers to IV: "I think every one ought to stick to an agreement; I should want any one to do it to me." "He was hurting them folks' feelings just the same, whether they was rich or poor." In the following there is a formal recognition of the interests of both parties, but the imagination is so completely occupied by the smaller evil that the greater is for it practically non-existent. The answer is in reply to question IV of Series II, and reads: "No. No act or deed even though it is an act of kindness to one person is justified if it thereby causes injury to another." (b) The judges place themselves at the point of view of the person who will be injured by the proposed action and feel that the sacrifice involved is greater than he is bound to make. An unequivocal example is to be found, page 76, supplementary questions under I; another, page 43. There is no place where it appears as beyond controversy a determining factor in the answer to a basal question, but IVd, page 26, may perhaps belong here, and I have ventured to explain hypothetically I and IV of 129 (page 45) by this same principle. In practice it will often be difficult to distinguish between cases of (a) and (b), but as points of view they are of course quite different. (c) In promises, contracts, and matters of veracity the principle is tacitly adopted *volenti non fit injuria*. Examples are IV 1a and b in 8 (page 43), and in 205 (page 78). The number of such answers in III 1a and b and IV 1a and b among the Agricultural students is considerable. One student applies it in III. (d) Sensitiveness to the claims of family loyalty. An example is IIId, page 25. There are a number of similar answers among the Agricultural students. (e) For some reason other than (b) and (d) above enumerated sympathy goes out to one party as it does not to the other. Thus 201 changed his answer to II when I told him how good the father had been to the son. (See page 74.) Other examples are those of pages 75 and 77, where the answer turns on the fact that the father is dead. (d) and (e) ordinarily represent only one of the factors con-

tributing to the result. Usually (not always), for example, the son is not supposed to be bound to sacrifice his life to his father's wishes unless he has promised to do so. The second factor will be one or more of those enumerated under (1) or it may sometimes be (2) (a). On the other hand, as appears from our example, the latter alone is not able to determine the decision for the promise is not considered binding except as (d) or (e) is operative.

The comparative frequency of these different points of view is of considerable interest for a number of reasons. I have accordingly prepared two tables that may serve to throw a little light on this subject. They are preceded by a table that will enable us to compare the relative amount of rigorism among the "Hill" and the Agricultural students.

TABLE I.—LATITUDINARIAN AND RIGORISTIC ANSWERS AMONG "HILL" AND AGRICULTURAL STUDENTS.

Figures Represent Percentages.

		L. and S. Men.	L. and S. Women.	L. and S. Average.	Agric.
I.....	L.....	90	82.3	86.1	65
	R.....	10	13.7	11.9	33
	D.....	0	4	2	2
II.....	L.....	79.6	76	77.8	26
	R.....	14.3	16	15.1	70
	D.....	6.1	8	7	4
III.....	L.....	82.3	73.1	77.7	42
	R.....	17.6	17.3	17.5	54
	D.....	0	9.6	4.8	4
IV.....	L.....	54	54	54	35.5
	R.....	44	40	42	64.5
	D.....	2	6	4	0
V.....	L.....	64	57	60.6	56
	R.....	32	41	36.4	44
	D.....	4	2	3	0

Superficial observation would lead one to explain the remarkable difference in the amount of rigorism between the Agricultural and the "Hill" students by the influence of custom or the authority of the Bible. Our investigation has shown, however, the inadequacy of this assumption. The explanation must therefore be sought in other quarters. It is to be found partly in the difference in education and average culture in the two classes, partly in the particular circumstances of their lives. The de-

tails can be discussed to better advantage after an examination of the following tables.

These tables exhibit the reasons assigned for rigoristic answers to the "basal" questions, and, in questions the students were unable to decide, the reasons which made the rigoristic point of view appeal to them. Hypothetical reasons which I myself have assigned in the attempt to explain a position, such as those of pages 37 to 46, and 94, 95, do not appear.

TABLE II.—REASONS FOR RIGORISTIC ANSWERS,  
College of Letters and Science.

	I	II	III	IV	V	Total
1. Influence of example.....			4			4
2. Danger of creating a habit.....					1	1
3. Loss of confidence in the agent.....			8	1		9
4. Loss of confidence in man.....				1		1
5. Effects if everyone so acted.....				1		1
6. Difficulty of drawing the line.....	6	4	5	3	2	20
7. Social anarchy.....	2			1	5	8
8. Loss of respect for agent.....						
9. Pseudo-eudaemonistic judgment (a).....					1	1
10. " (b).....	3	2	1	1		8
11. Trust in leadings of God.....					19	19

TABLE III.—REASONS FOR RIGORISTIC ANSWERS,  
Students in Agriculture.

	I	II	III	IV	V	Total
1 Influence of example.....	1	2	10	2	1	16
2 Danger of creating a habit.....	3	4	5	5	2	19
3 Loss of confidence in the agent.....	2	5	8	7	1	23
4 Loss of confidence in man.....	2	2	3	2	1	10
5 Effects if everyone so acted.....		1	1	1		3
6 Difficulty of drawing the line.....	3	1	2	2	1	9
7 Social anarchy.....	1	1		1		3
8 Loss of respect for agent.....		1	3	1		5
9 Pseudo-eudaemonistic judgment (a).....						
10 " (b).....	4	3	2	3	3	15
11 Trust in leadings of God.....	4	1		1	12	18

The various entries are in the main self-explanatory. Numbers 1-6 are the "eudaemonistic reasons for the observance of general rules," of page 70. "Social anarchy" includes such answers as IV c of page 26: "The bottom would drop out of everything, if you commenced to permit any contracts to be

broken;" furthermore, considerations of the danger of abuse in V, and others of a similar nature. "Loss of respect for agent" refers to the fact that the intentions of the agent, while good in themselves, may be misunderstood by others and thus he will lose their respect. Where respect clearly means "confidence," the answer is of course classified under 3. The two references to the commands of the Bible on the part of 215 (page 99) find here no place for reasons which will have appeared from the discussion of this case.

The tables contain only reasons that belong under (1) (2) or (3) above, page 124. The others appear only in single questions. They are as follows. In II: The promise is judged binding because of sympathy for the dead, L. and S., 2 answers; Agr., 5 answers. The promise is binding because made to his *father*, L. and S., 2; Agr., 5. The promise is binding because to break it when the father is dead seems "sneaky," Agr., 1. III: Telling children about Santa Claus does not really give them more pleasure than pain (or, any pleasure at all because of the fear it arouses), L. and S., 3; Agr., 3. It turns the child's thoughts away from the significance of the day, Agr., 3 (in two cases the idea came from a Norwegian religious paper). IV: "I should not want it done to me" (see above, (4) (a) page 125); Agr., 2. The obligation to remain with the widow is asserted on the basis of a balance of gain in her favor, and then it is asserted that the loss to the landlord is just as great when he is well-to-do as when poor; this may be another case falling under (4) (a); Agr., 1. The landlord is not bound to give up the advantage secured to him by the promise, therefore the promiser has no right to wrest it from him, (see (4) (b) above) L. and S., 1 (?) V: "Something might happen which would have made the patient glad to have lived," L. and S., 3. The suffering is punishment inflicted by God for past sins and therefore must not be interfered with, L. and S., 3; Agr., 2.

These tables will prove helpful, I believe, if they are not approached with the assumption that they are meant to show more than was ever intended. In the first place, I recognize that the number of students represented is too small to permit the results to be anything more than suggestive. In the second place, such reports as these present at best what the students

had in mind at the time they framed their answers. Had the problems been given out the day before, the reason that occurred to the mind at any given point might have been somewhat different from that which appeared on the paper or in the interview at that point. Whether, however, the complexion of the whole would have been greatly changed thereby is another matter. It is always possible also that additional reasons may be operative besides those which receive mention. Apart from these two imperfections inseparable from any work of this kind, certain others may be present which were avoidable *per se* and are due to the fact that this investigation was not carried out with a view to collecting materials for such tables as these. The most serious is this. Four of the Agricultural students declared, in response to my inquiry, that they recognized and used two, three, or four of reasons 1-6 in answering the basal questions and I made no attempt to discover specifically which of them determined the decision in each instance. All appear therefore in the table under all of the answers to which they may possibly apply, whereby, no doubt, a certain amount of error is introduced into the returns. This, however, is not true of the "Hill" students. The reasons with which they are credited are always the grounds for some one answer except in three or four cases, like 43 (page 31), where it seems indubitable that a single consideration supplied the ground for several answers.

With these explanations in mind we may now take up the question why the Agricultural students are more rigoristic in their attitude towards general rules than are the "Hill" students. One reason is presumably the possession on the part of the latter of higher powers of imagination with which to picture the sacrifices involved in keeping the rule. We have come across a number of examples of this effect of the imagination upon the moral judgment. It will be sufficient to refer to 19 in V, page 52. The conditions in which the Agricultural students have always lived operate, no doubt, in the same direction. Accustomed to a life of hard work, and in many instances to exposure and privations, the stern call "*Entbehren sollst du, sollst entbehren*" does not send a chill to the heart as it does for their more delicately nurtured brothers.

So much is *a priori* probable. Other factors reveal themselves

in the written and oral returns. First there is the fact that among the "Hill" students the habit is far more highly developed of looking at both sides of a situation, instead of merely at one side, and of balancing the evil against the good. Then the pseudo-eudaemonistic judgment of type (b) appears throughout in six per cent. of the agriculturalists, whereas the percentage among the members of the College of Letters and Science is but one and a half. Curiously enough, however, type (a) occurs with about the same frequency in both, as determined from a study of VII of Series I (see above, page 36). The actual figures are: L. and S., eighteen per cent.; Agriculture, twenty-one per cent. Trust in the guiding hand of God is another important source of difference between the two groups. In the second, it is found not only in V, but also in I, and sporadically even elsewhere.

Special conditions affect the result in particular cases. In I among the agriculturists we may discover the peculiar horror which the farmer is said to have of theft, a horror due largely to the difficulty of effectually guarding his barns and their contents against it. In II the influence of sympathy for the dead, and filial affection and loyalty play a rôle apparently much larger than among the "Hill" students. In II, I must add, however, the disparity between the returns from the two groups is not quite so great as it appears from the table. In the questions of 1905 the promise is represented as having been exacted on a death-bed. The circumstances under which such a promise would be given exonerate the son completely when he later breaks it, in the eyes of a considerable number. Just exactly what effect this has upon the final outcome is not easy to determine. It is almost certain, however, that at the outside the elimination of this factor, making the question read as it does for the "Short Course" men would not raise the proportion of rigorous answers to anything higher than thirty per cent.

The unexplained remainder is attributable mainly to the greater timidity of the Agricultural students in the matter of example and of the confidence of others. This shows itself clearly in III and—for the second consideration—equally so in II and IV. One is tempted to find the source of the strength of the latter in the circumstances of country life, where everyone knows

everyone else. But it must not be forgotten that a considerable proportion of the "Hill" students come from farms or small towns. The most important reasons are doubtless those which were enumerated at the beginning of this discussion. At all events the latitudinarianism among the "Hill" students is not due to ignorance. At least one and usually more than one of the eudaemonistic reasons for the observance of general rules appears in over half the returns from either the first or the second series. These young men and women are thus aware of the reasons for rigorism but are not so apt to let them decide matters as are the other students. But the members of the Agricultural College are not mere slaves to these considerations. III of Series II was given to both sets of students. Of the members of the College of Letters and Science, seventy-eight per cent. declared the soldiers might leave their post, of the Agricultural students, eighty-one per cent.

Certain applications of the results presented in this study to the work of moral education must have forced themselves upon the attention of the reader from time to time. It seems advisable, however, to bring them together in one place for convenience of reference if for no other reason. What is called moral education consists of two things which in the abstract are quite distinct, *viz.*, moral instruction and the training of the will. As a matter of fact, however, the two can not be kept apart. Every moral ideal serves at once as a standard for approbation and disapprobation and a motive for conduct. The clarifying and harmonizing of standards thus render motives more completely conscious of their goal, more coherent, broader in their outlook, and more strong to resist at least certain dangers, such as moral skepticism. On the other hand the strengthening of the motives to do right will steady and broaden and, in the long run render more consistent the moral judgments themselves. Selfishness and cowardice dim the moral vision more effectively than ignorance and short-sightedness. And while it is undoubtedly true that a larger number of wrong actions are performed with a good conscience than is commonly believed, nevertheless dullness of conscience is more apt to be a matter of bad will than of defective or sluggish intelligence. With this

explicit recognition of the intimate relation between the two I shall not be misunderstood when I say that the few remarks that follow with regard to the bearing of the preceding investigation upon practice will deal primarily with the subject of moral instruction.

According to the foreign pressure theory, the mind of the young is mere putty in our hands, which we can squeeze into any form we may happen to desire. Education is thus practically omnipotent. Accordingly if all the authorities will but unite—parents, teachers, the church, society at large—they can make their pupil believe that anything is right, without any limitation whatever. The system of moral instruction, and of moral training also, that results is too obvious to need a moment's elaboration. Those who have accepted the conclusions reached in this investigation, on the other hand, must recognize that each child has an individuality of his own in matters moral, as almost everybody now recognizes he has in matters that concern his physique, his intelligence, his temperament, and his tastes. This individuality we must, as far as possible, discover and use as our starting-point in the work of moral education; precisely as in education in the ordinary sense we must start with the existing store of knowledge and the inborn aptitudes of the pupil. The moral ideals of the young can indeed be modified up to a certain point as was pointed out in Chapter III. Just how far this can be done in any particular case we shall probably never be able to determine, but that there are real limits always present seems undeniable in the light of our study of authority. If then we would broaden or deepen our pupil's ideals, we must do it either by showing him that the new duty is logically involved in that which he already recognizes as right, or by awakening aptitudes and latent powers that have hitherto slumbered, or by developing such as have already given evidence of existence.

It seems beyond question that common sense, in passing moral judgments, makes use not of a single standard but of a number of standards. It is, however, with the education of only one of these, which I have been calling the eudaemonistic, that I have to do in this place. An examination of the defects of the judgments that we have been studying will show, I believe, that the

first aim of moral instruction, in the case of the youth of high school or college age (and I am unable to consider any others here), should be the establishment of the habit of looking at the situation under consideration as a whole. Only when so viewed can a judgment upon it be valid—except by accident. Carelessness, or prejudice, or partiality, all too easily blind us to one side, and that often the most important one.<sup>4</sup> We must train our pupils, accordingly, to trace with impartial eyes the effects of an action, or a failure to act when action is called for, upon the agent himself and upon the other parties affected, the effects both in the way of happiness and of character and indeed of every other element of personality. This means, among other things, that they must be brought to recognize that there are no limits to the influence of any of our acts; that Mill's distinction between conduct which concerns only the agent himself, and that which concerns others is a purely artificial one; that in the last analysis every portion of human society is affected, for better or worse, by every significant act we perform. On the whole the students examined lack a sense for these things. They realize the difficulty of drawing the line when you once begin to break a general rule; they have some conception of the danger of forming the habit of skating on thin ice; they know very well that if you lie or break your promise you will become an object of distrust. But with few exceptions they fail to recognize that every lie, every breach of contract, every theft tends to undermine the confidence of man in man. They are aware of the influence of example, but in the few cases in which I looked for it I was unable to find any recognition whatever of the important consideration urged by Paulsen, the fact, namely, that our good and bad actions respectively awaken in the recipient a sort of impersonal gratitude or resentment which moves him to pay third parties in the same coin that has been dealt out to him.

He who has learned to look at conduct from these points of view will be more cautious about permitting the infraction of general rules than were a large number of our students from the College of Letters and Science. And this, it seems to me, is a desideratum. The extent of the laxity of standards of cer-

<sup>4</sup> See above, page 125.

tain of these young people does not perhaps appear from the answers to the questions which we have been studying at length. For in some or even most of them there is much to be urged in favor of breaking the rule. But the answers to IV of Series II show a very unsatisfactory attitude towards actions whose ultimate outcome can only be anarchy. Out of the seventy-six answers of this question, thirty-seven justified the theft. The following is a typical answer: "I believe I would say it was right since the merchant was rich and no other means existed to get leather. He was doing much good and perhaps not *really* hurting the rich man to an appreciable extent." Judgments of this sort are bound sooner or later to influence practice, either that of the man himself or of those within the sphere of his influence. Such shortsightedness on the part of well-intentioned people is a positive menace to society. Another need is to make the young recognize the necessity of keeping faith with those who no longer live or who for one reason or another will never know whether you are doing so or not. Some of the answers to II from both classes of students exhibit an inability to see beyond the immediate situation which, again, may have serious consequences.

A comparison of the answers of the agricultural students with those that came from the College of Letters and Science will show that the rigoristic attitude tends to disappear in certain cases as a result of the very intellectual progress which from the moral point of view itself we must desire to become general. Family ties seems to count less with the latter than the former (see pages 128 and 130); the imagination, which we must develop if we are to train the young to put themselves in the place of others, may awaken too much sympathy for the individual sufferer and lead to the ignoring or disregarding of the interests of a larger whole; trust in the guiding hand of God, however inconsistently applied—for no one today would hesitate to protect his house against lightning or to take an anaesthetic for fear of interfering with the designs of Providence—nevertheless is a powerful support to rigorism. The losses in these directions which the advance of education will bring must be counterbalanced by gains in other directions if we are not to be the losers in the end. On the other hand the disappearance of the

pseudo-eudaemonistic judgments (also, in their way, a stronghold of rigorism) will be little or no loss to practice if I was correct in my impression that these products of mere logic, and of bad logic at that, had little emotional warmth behind them. And the position of an Agricultural student: "It is always wrong to steal, but I would rather steal than starve," is more dangerous to morals than a frank admission that there are exceptions to the Eighth Commandment. I do not present this picture of the tendencies making for laxity because I have a remedy for them in my pocket, but simply in order to contribute my mite to that understanding of the actual situation which the moral education of the future must possess if it is to build upon a foundation of rock.

## APPENDIX

## THE QUESTIONS

COLLEGE OF LETTERS AND SCIENCE: SERIES I., DECEMBER, 1905.<sup>1</sup>

I. [I.] May a poor man without money, out of work, and unable at the time to find employment, take without the knowledge of the owner a loaf of bread from a baker's shop in order to save from starvation the young children of a neighbor? Their mother, a widow, is sick in bed and unable for the time to earn money for their support, and the man himself is unable to get the bread in any other way.

II. [II.] A young man just graduated from college was hesitating between law and business. His tastes inclined him very strongly to the former; indeed the very idea of the latter alternative filled him with antipathy. But the young man's father had built up a large manufacturing business by his own unaided efforts and wished this, his only son, to carry it on after he himself should be compelled to give it up. Before the matter was decided the father fell sick. On his death-bed he obtained from his son a promise to abandon all thought of the law and devote his life to carrying on the business. The young man did as he promised, but although successful in the work, the longer he continued in it the more distasteful it grew, until he began to feel it positively unendurable. Under these circumstances would he be justified, after giving it a fair trial, say for a year or two, to abandon the business career and turn to the law?

III. [III.] Is it right to tell children that there is a Santa Claus?

IV. During a famine which extended over a considerable part of Europe in the early part of the Eighteenth Century a

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<sup>1</sup> The order of the questions in this Appendix is that of the printed paper placed in the hands of the students. The numbers in brackets attached to the five principal questions are those used throughout the study in referring to those questions.

wealthy nobleman was the only man in a certain district who had food for sale. A peasant who owned a little property going to the nobleman to purchase a supply of food for the remainder of the winter, the latter refused to part with any except at the price of the man's house, land, agricultural implements, and an agreement to serve the nobleman one-fifth of his time for the rest of his life without compensation. The peasant had no other course open to him than to accept. Has the nobleman done anything wrong in making this bargain?

V. A young author is offered an opportunity to sell his title to the authorship of a book he has just written to a wealthy man who wishes to pass as an author himself. The large sum of money offered the real author will enable him to repay to the ward of his father the equally large sum which the latter (now dead) in his capacity as executor lost to her estate through an unfortunate investment. Would it be right for him to make the sale?

VI. [IV.] A university student hires a room for a year. After four weeks, when there is no longer any probability of its being taken by any one else, he leaves and goes to another room. Is this right under any of the following conditions? (1) He is lonely and wishes to go to a house several blocks away where some friends are lodging. (2) He is working his way through the university and an opportunity offers itself to get room-rent in return for an exceptionally small amount of service. He could earn enough to put himself through in other ways but the change will save him two hours a day, which will enable him to do very much better university work. Does the answer to (1) or (2) differ if we suppose that: (a) his present room belongs to a man sufficiently well situated so that he and his family will not actually suffer at the loss of the rent; or (b) that it belongs to a widow with a young child and that she has no other means of support than the income from her rooms, representing let us say a net income of \$400 a year, which in case (1) will be reduced by \$60.00 and in (2) by \$30.00 if the lodger leaves.

VII. A century or more ago a shipload of people were wrecked upon a desert island in the Pacific far from all trade routes. There they and their descendants lived for many years, unvisited

by other men, until finally a ship appeared and carried them away to Europe. At that time there was in their prison a man, who had just been sentenced to be hung for murder. Is the community, before breaking up, its members to scatter to different parts of the world, bound to hang this murderer or are they at liberty to set him free? It being assumed that while the murder was in every respect unjustifiable, it was committed under circumstances which give no grounds for the fear that the murderer, if freed, would ever commit another similar crime.

VIII. In the Sixteenth Century a city was being besieged by a powerful king, with every prospect that it would soon be captured. The king finally offered to withdraw his army entirely provided they would deliver to him a certain one of their citizens, who was a personal enemy of his, and whose life he was determined to take. Otherwise he would order an assault. This they knew would almost certainly be successful, and would in any event involve a great loss of life. They also knew they could trust the king to keep his promise in case they complied with his demand. What was it their duty to do?

IX. A man returning home from his day's work discovered that a careless switchman had left a switch open which would mean death or injury to the several hundred people on the swiftly moving train that was only a few hundred yards away. At the same moment he saw his only child playing upon the track in front of the approaching engine. He had time only to turn the switch and save the train or else to save the child. Which was it his duty to do?

X. [V.] Is it right for a physician, by administering an overdose of morphine or otherwise, to hasten by several weeks the death of a patient, hopelessly sick with cancer and suffering terrible torture all the time? Three cases may be distinguished: (1) It is done without the knowledge of the patient and his family; (2) it is done with the knowledge and consent of the family, but without the knowledge of the patient; (3) it is done at the request of the patient and with the consent of the family. Does the answer differ for the different cases?

COLLEGE OF LETTERS AND SCIENCE: SERIES II., FEBRUARY, 1906

I. In the recent Russian upheaval an influential labor leader was instrumental in the killing of a number of officials, including in one case an entire family, composed of a wife and several young children. His arrest and punishment would have led to a general strike and a great revolt of the laboring classes, with consequences which no one could foresee. So the authorities refrained from arresting him, recognizing, when they did so, that if they let him go now they might never have a chance to get him again. Did they do right?

II. According to the daily papers, a Chinese merchant living in the State of Washington recently crossed the boundary line into Canada in order to transact some business. Because of the red tape connected with the admission of the Chinese into this country the United States government officials found it was absolutely impossible for them to give him a permit to reënter the United States. Knowing that he was a *bona fide* resident of this country, would the official in authority have been justified in shutting his eyes and allowing the merchant to slip through without the legally required formalities?

III. At the burning of Moscow in 1812, two guards at the royal palace were in the confusion forgotten and the order to relieve them was not given. They therefore remained at their posts and were buried under the burning timbers. Was it their duty to remain, when they knew there was nothing left to guard? If not strictly their duty, would you think less of them for making their escape?

IV. In the lives of the early Christian saints occurs the story of a certain monk who stole leather from the shop of a rich merchant in order to make shoes for poor children. Assuming that the leather could have been obtained in no other way, was this right?

V. An astronomer of great ability was offered an opportunity to make large sums of money in a commercial enterprise. This would necessitate the giving up of his professional career and entail a mode of life containing too much routine to be of any cultural value worth considering. While his researches did not

promise to be of any "practical" value to the world, they were of a very high order of excellence and had helped towards the solution of more than one mystery. Would he do wrong to abandon them? If not, would you think less of him for doing so?

VI. The story is told of a mathematician passionately devoted to his wife who, immediately after her death and for a number of months following, devoted every moment at his disposal to the most intricate and profound mathematical problems in order that he might rid himself as soon as possible of her memory and the sorrow which it caused him. Was this morally justifiable? If not wrong are we to think worse of him for so doing?

VII. A has been swindled in an indirect way and within the limits of the law, by a real estate dealer. A's present holdings of real estate in the town where this agent lives are in the hands of the only other agent in the place, an honest but inefficient and unenterprising man. The dishonest agent, who does not know that A is aware of his share in the swindle, comes to him and says that he has a customer for the property. Shall A tell him what he thinks of him and refuse to have any dealings with him, or shall he say nothing about the past and accept the offer,

1. If he has no immediate need of the money, although desirous of getting rid of the property;
2. If he needs the money very much in order to liquidate certain obligations which are now pressing and which he sees no other way of meeting?

VIII. A young lawyer who, as a worker in municipal politics, has performed for his city services of exceptional value, discovers, on looking back upon the five or six years just passed, that his political life has much blunted his moral sensibilities and lowered his standards of conduct. He has just been offered a place on the Executive Committee of his party and the nomination to an office which, if accepted, will bind him to four years more of political life. Believing, as he does, that this will inevitably lead to a still further lowering of his standards, what is it his duty to do? Should he get out of politics altogether in order to save himself from further degradation, or should he continue his political work for the sake of the welfare of the city, which those who would replace him would, as he knows, disregard?

IX. Many of the Russian officers captured at Port Arthur refused to accept the parole offered them by the Japanese because it was not offered to their soldiers. Ought we to condemn morally those who did accept it?

X. A young man came to New York from the country without money and without friends. He was soon befriended by a prosperous business man who took him into his employment and into his home, and, in the end, made him his partner. The new partner took advantage of his position to cheat his benefactor out of all his money, deprived him of his share in the business, and turned him out of both shop and home, penniless. More than that, he openly boasted of it to certain persons, evidently considering it not merely a smart trick, but also a good joke. Suppose the benefactor, knowing not merely what had been done to him, but also the brazen effrontery of the man in boasting of his misdeeds, and having no prospect before him of obtaining restitution from the courts, had found himself able to secure the aid of powerful influences that by diverting custom and withdrawing loans could have ruined the business of the younger man, would he have been morally justified in so doing? This story of ingratitude, I may add, is true in every detail.

XI. Some years ago in a railroad wreck a lady was imprisoned in the debris in such a way that escape was impossible. Her husband, who might have extricated himself with an effort, deliberately chose to remain and die with her, in order that he might give her the support and comfort of his presence in her last moments. She herself, we must suppose, was not aware of the possibility of his escape, otherwise his aim would of course have been defeated. What is to be said of the moral character of his choice in each of the following cases?

- (1) If he was a clerk with the expectations of the average of his class and had no family ties apart from his wife?
- (2) Position as in (1), but he had a mother living with him in his home, who was very much devoted to him, but not dependent upon him for support.
- (3) Position again as in (1). He had a distant relative, a lady who was an invalid and absolutely dependent upon him for support.

- (4) If he had been a clergyman doing a great deal of good.
- (5) If he had been a Morse, conscious that he was on the eve of the solution of the problem of the electric telegraph.
- (6) If he had been an artist of very exceptional talents.

THE SHORT COURSE IN AGRICULTURE: JANUARY, 1907

I. [I.] In a Russian city last year a poor man who could get no work took from a baker's shop without the knowledge of the owner several loaves of bread in order to save from starvation the young children of a sick widow who was his neighbor. He was unable to get food in any other way. Did he do wrong?

II. [III.] Is it right to tell children that there is a Santa Claus?

III. About a century ago a shipload of people were wrecked upon a desert island in the Pacific. There they and their descendants lived for many years until finally a ship appeared and carried them away to Europe. At that time there was among them a man who had just been sentenced to be hung for murder. Was it their duty to hang this man, or would it have been all right to set him free? It being understood that although the murder was entirely unjustified it was committed under peculiar circumstances which made it certain that the murderer, if freed, would never commit such a crime again.

IV. A settlement was once besieged by a large body of Indians. The chief promised to withdraw permanently if they would deliver to him one of their number who, he thought (incorrectly, however,) had done him a great wrong. Otherwise, he threatened to take the town by storm. They all knew that the chief could be absolutely depended upon to keep his promise to withdraw. They also knew that in case of an attack the Indians were almost certain to succeed; they knew that there must be a great loss of life anyway. On the other hand, they also knew that to give up their fellow-citizen meant for him torture and death. What was it their duty to do?

V. [IV.] A university student hired a room, agreeing to keep it for a year. After four weeks, when there was no longer any chance of renting it to anyone else, he left and went to an-

other house because there he got a room rent free for taking care of the furnace. The student was working his way through the university and needed to save every dollar he could. The house he left belonged to a poor widow with a young child whose principal means of support was renting rooms. Was it right for him to leave? Suppose the owner of the house he left, instead of being poor, had been comfortably situated so that the room rent would not have been greatly missed, would it have been right for him to leave?

VI. At the burning of Moscow in 1812 two soldiers who were guarding the royal palace were in the confusion forgotten and the order to relieve them was not given. They therefore remained at their post and were burned to death. Was it their duty to remain when they knew there was nothing left to guard? If not strictly their duty, would you think less of them for making their escape?

VII. [II.] A man who had devoted his life to building up a very successful grain elevator business had an only son whom he wished to continue the business after his death. The young man himself was very anxious to go into stock raising, but at the earnest request of his father he promised to give up his life to the business. Soon afterwards the father died. The young man stuck to his promise at first, but although successful in the business, he hated it more and more. So after about two years he sold out and went into stock raising. Was this right? He had no reason to suppose that his father would have released him from his promise if living.

VIII. [V.] Is it right for a physician, by giving an overdose of morphine, to hasten by several weeks the death of a patient hopelessly sick with cancer and suffering terrible torture all the time, when he knows the patient is in every respect prepared to die and will be glad to die?

IX. A young man came to New York from the country without money and without friends. He soon was befriended by a prosperous business man who took him into his employment and into his home, and, in the end, made him his partner. The new partner took advantage of his position to cheat his benefactor out of all his money, deprived him of his share in the business, and turned him out of shop and home, penniless. More than

that, he openly boasted of it to certain persons, evidently considering it not merely a smart trick, but also a good joke. Suppose the benefactor to have known how shameless this man was. Would he have been morally justified in ruining the business of the younger man, if he had a chance? This story of ingratitude, I may add, is true in every detail.

X. According to the daily papers, a Chinese merchant living in the State of Washington recently crossed the boundary line into Canada in order to transact some business. Because of the red tape connected with the admission of the Chinese into this country the United States government officials found it was absolutely impossible for them to give him a permit to re-enter the United States. Knowing that he was a genuine resident of this country, would the officials have been justified in shutting their eyes and allowing the merchant to slip through without the legally required formalities?

#### THE EUDÆMONISTIC REASONS FOR THE OBSERVANCE OF GENERAL RULES:

1. The effects of one's example upon others, the reasons for which the agent permits himself to break the rule being either not known or not understood by others.

2. The danger of starting a habit of breaking the rule. The infraction might be innocent in itself, but, as a result, a reason not quite so good is liable to serve as an excuse for breaking the rule a second time, and so on.

3. The agent will lose the confidence of others. They will believe they can not depend upon him.

4. The act will tend to cause others to lose their confidence in their fellowmen as such.

5. If everybody acted in that way, the institution of property, confidence in the word of others, *et cetera*, would be undermined; the life of society would thus become impossible.

6. If you once admit a single exception to a general rule, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to determine where to draw the line.



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